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Abstract
In efforts to meet the targets of carbon emissions reduction in power systems, pol-
icy makers formulate measures for facilitating the integration of renewable energy
sources and demand side carbon mitigation. Smart grid provides an opportunity
for bidirectional communication among policy makers, generators and consumers.
With the help of smart meters, increasing number of consumers is able to produce,
store, and consume energy, giving them the new role of prosumers. This thesis aims
to address how smart grid enables prosumers to be appropriately integrated into
energy markets for decarbonising power systems.
This thesis firstly proposes a Stackelberg game-theoretic model for dynamic nego-
tiation of policy measures and determining optimal power profiles of generators and
consumers in day-ahead market. Simulation results show that the proposed model
is capable of saving electricity bills, reducing carbon emissions, and increasing the
penetration of renewable energy sources. Secondly, a data-driven prosumer-centric
energy scheduling tool is developed by using learning approaches to reduce compu-
tational complexity from model-based optimisation. This scheduling tool exploits
convolutional neural networks to extract prosumption patterns, and uses scenarios to
analyse possible variations of uncertainties caused by the intermittency of renewable
energy sources and flexible demand. Case studies confirm that the proposed schedul-
ing tool can accurately predict optimal scheduling decisions under various system
scales and uncertain scenarios. Thirdly, a blockchain-based peer-to-peer trading
framework is designed to trade energy and carbon allowance. The bidding/selling
prices of individual prosumers can directly incentivise the reshaping of prosump-
tion behaviours. Case studies demonstrate the execution of smart contract on the
Ethereum blockchain and testify that the proposed trading framework outperforms
the centralised trading and aggregator-based trading in terms of regional energy
balance and reducing carbon emissions caused by long-distance transmissions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The world's population is expected to increase from 7.7 billion currently to 9.7 bil-
lion over the next 30 years [1], with the energy demand rising by nearly 50 % [2].
When providing essential energy to humans, the combustion of fossil fuels including
coal, gas, and oil will convert solid carbon elements into gaseous carbon emissions.
The large-scale release of anthropogenic carbon emissions would break the balance
of natural carbon cycle and lead to irreversible effects of climate change [3]. In ef-
forts to address this environmental challenge globally, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change aims to keep global warming below 2 ◦C and halve the green-
house gases by 2050 compared to the 1990 level [4]. The Kyoto Protocol [5] in 1997
is the first step towards the global low carbon targets, under which countries are
expected to meet their targets through domestic policies and regulations for facil-
itating renewable energy, improving energy efficiency, reducing landfills emissions,
and restricting industrial emissions.
The power systems represent around 40 % of global carbon emissions from the
combustion of fossil fuels [6]. The carbon emissions intensity which quantifies the
amount of carbon emissions produced by per unit of energy generation [7] has pro-
portionally increased with the growth of energy demand. To facilitate a transition
towards low carbon power systems, the U.K. government announced the Carbon
Plan [8] in 2011 for increasing the penetration of renewable energy sources, incen-
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tivising demand side carbon mitigation, and enhancing energy efficiency. This policy
measure has successfully reduced the average carbon emissions intensity in the U.K.
power systems from 0.545 kg/kWh in 2012 to 0.200 kg/kWh in 2019 given the in-
creasing energy demand, and the expected carbon emissions intensity by 2030 is
0.050 kg/kWh [9].
The smart grid is an enabling technology of future low carbon power systems.
The concept of smart grid refers to a range of operating and controlling measures in
power systems including demand side management, renewable energy sources, en-
ergy storage, electric vehicles, smart meters, and home energy manage systems [10].
From the communication perspective [11], the smart grid enables the bidirectional
communication between power systems and individual generators and consumers,
which facilitates the optimal operation of generators and the active engagement of
consumers. From the controlling perspective [12], the interoperability of smart grid
enables market participants to cooperatively achieve the overall benefits of power
systems, such as saving electricity bills for consumers, improving operating profits
for generators, mitigating carbon emissions, and enhancing security of supply.
The supports of low carbon policies and advances of smart grid technologies
enable consumers to actively produce, consume and store energy through renewable
energy sources, storage devices, electric vehicles, and smart meters. The power
systems are transitioning towards a prosumers era [13]. The new figure of prosumers
represents a small-sized or medium-sized agents [14], such as residential, commercial,
and industrial consumers, who produce energy for self-consumption and feed surplus
energy into distribution networks. Prosumers can also strategically exchange energy
with the main grid or other prosumers for meeting their demand or increasing their
revenues. An intelligent power systems and flexible energy markets structure are
crucial for the integration of emerging role of prosumers. How to incorporate these
advanced communication, control, and computational technologies of smart grid
with the regulatory supports for realising reliable, efficient, and low carbon future
power systems towards prosumers era presents a challenge to be addressed in this
thesis.
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1.2 Research Motivations and Challenges
The motivation behind this thesis is to establish how smart grid enables prosumers
to be appropriately integrated into energy markets for decarbonising future power
systems. In doing this, consideration should be given to the following three aspects:
 From regulatory perspective, how to determine appropriate policy measures to
facilitate the penetration of renewable energy sources and encourage passive
consumers to participate in carbon mitigation.
 From individual prosumer's perspective, how to strategically schedule their
own generation and consumption for improving self-benefits, e.g. bill saving
and profit improving, in an environmentally friendly manner.
 From community's perspective, how to design a mechanism enabling an en-
semble of prosumers corporately achieve regional benefits, e.g. energy balance,
and targets of carbon emissions reduction.
Fulfilling these three aspects is the subject of active research. Nonetheless, there still
remains a number of challenges. This thesis is an attempt to address the following
challenges:
 The long-term low carbon policy for overall anthropogenic carbon emissions
cannot target on power systems. A power systems specific low carbon pol-
icy design that can dynamically adjust incentive measures after receiving the
responses from generators and consumers needs to be considered.
 The idiosyncratic prosumption patterns cause the issues of scalability and
computational complexity for model-based energy scheduling.
 How individual prosumers' intrinsic features affect their decisions of genera-
tion, consumption, and incurred carbon emissions in responding to electricity
prices needs to be investigated.
 It is challenging to accurately predict prosumption behaviours in particular
given uncertainties caused by the intermittency of renewable energy sources
and flexible demand.
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 The centralised pricing scheme reflects the supply-demand relationship of over-
all energy markets and is uniform for all customers. This scheme is indepen-
dent of energy exchange among prosumers and thus not every prosumer can
be efficiently incentivised to reduce carbon emissions and participate in energy
trading.
 Separately designing energy or carbon markets is not efficient, because the
purchasing of carbon allowance is a part of energy costs. A decentralised
trading framework needs to be designed enabling prosumers to trade energy
and carbon allowance together.
 When individual prosumers proceed peer-to-peer trading, it is hard to ensure
the settlement and delivery without a standardised negotiation and enforcing
mechanism.
 The individual prosumers' carbon emissions caused by generation for self-
consumption, consumption from self-generation, and generation (or consump-
tion) for (or from) energy exchange with other prosumers cannot be traced
using existing approaches and then incentivised properly. This is more chal-
lenging when prosumers trade energy or carbon allowance, because they need
to know how much carbon allowance needs to be purchased as carbon cost.
1.3 Contributions
Through addressing the aforementioned challenges, this thesis offers the following
contributions:
 A novel energy scheduling model is proposed enabling the dynamic negoti-
ation of policy measures and power profiles between policy maker and gen-
erators/consumers to achieve low carbon power systems. The process of ne-
gotiation and reaching an agreement of optimal policy design and scheduling
decisions is modelled as a Stackelberg game-theoretic problem which is solved
by the developed algorithm based on artificial immune system. Case studies
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demonstrate that the proposed model outperforms the models of multiobjec-
tive optimisation and aggregated scheduling in terms of electricity bills saving
and carbon emissions reduction. This model can also incentivise both the
increase of renewable energy sources and demand side carbon emissions reduc-
tion.
 A data-driven prosumer-centric energy scheduling tool is designed by using
learning approaches to improve the scalability and computational efficiency
from the model-based approaches. This scheduling tool exploits the convolu-
tional neural networks (CNNs) and developed prosumption patterns process-
ing approach to analyse local features, temporal transient features, and the
correlation of dynamic price elasticities. A real-time scenarios selection ap-
proach is designed to improve prediction accuracy under uncertainties. Case
studies verify that the proposed scheduling tool can accurately predict the op-
timal scheduling decisions and demonstrate the connection between intrinsic
features of dynamic price elasticities and prosumers' scheduling strategies.
 A blockchain-based peer-to-peer trading framework is developed enabling pro-
sumers to jointly trade energy and carbon allowance at both prosumer level
and microgrid level. The biding/selling prices of individual prosumers can
directly incentivise the reshaping of prosumption behaviours for energy bal-
ance and carbon reduction. A carbon emissions tracing approach targeting
on individual prosumers' behaviours is designed to ensure a fair allocation of
low carbon incentives. The proposed energy scheduling algorithms interface
with the self-enforcing nature of smart contract to automate the standardised
auction procedure. Case studies testify the proposed trading framework and
demonstrate the execution of smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2
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In this chapter, a review of smart grid technologies and potential energy markets
design towards prosumers era is performed. The current low carbon policies and
carbon tracing approaches are introduced, followed by an illustration of the state-
of-the-art models and approaches for energy scheduling and blockchain technologies.
Chapter 3
In this chapter, the proposed Stackelberg game-theoretic model for day-ahead
energy scheduling and low carbon negotiation between the policy maker and con-
sumers/generators is proposed. The developed algorithms based on the artificial
immune systems are also introduced. Case studies based on the U.K. power systems
are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model in terms of
saving electricity bills, increasing the penetration of renewable energy sources, and
reducing carbon emissions.
Chapter 4
In this chapter, the proposed data-driven prosumer-centric energy scheduling
tool is introduced. The implementation of this scheduling tool includes the train-
ing phase and deploying phase, by which the training phase describes how to use
scenarios, prosumption patterns, and optimal scheduling decisions for training the
neural networks, and the deploying phase presents the real-time data driven en-
ergy scheduling and scenarios update algorithm. Case studies are performed under
various IEEE test systems and uncertain scenarios.
Chapter 5
In this chapter, the proposed blockchain-based peer-to-peer trading framework
is presented. Corresponding to each layer, the details of problem formulation and
the smart contract based auction mechanism are described. The case studies based
on the IEEE 37-bus distribution network are presented to examine the performance
of energy balance and carbon mitigation. The execution of smart contract based on
the Ethereum blockchain is also demonstrated.
Chapter 6
This chapter concludes the primary findings and results from this thesis, and
indicates the potential extensions in the future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The literature review presented in this chapter is inspired by the issue of how smart
grid enables prosumers to be appropriately integrated into energy markets for de-
carbonising power systems. The objective of this literature review is to discuss in
details about a variety of smart grid technologies, potential markets design for pro-
sumers, approaches of carbon emissions assessment, associated regulatory supports,
approaches of power systems scheduling, and enabling technologies for peer-to-peer
trading, for the purpose of finding out research challenges and providing a better
insight in these areas.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses various
smart grid technologies and the role of these technologies in integrating prosumers
into energy markets. The potential market design towards prosumers era is intro-
duced. Section 2.3 reviews the low carbon policies implemented by various countries
and documented by literature, followed by a discussion of carbon emissions tracing
approaches as a foundation to inform policy design. The state-of-the-art approaches
for energy scheduling to achieve both environmental and economic benefits of power
systems are illustrated in Section 2.4. The origin and development of blockchain
technologies are discussed in Section 2.5, by which how blockchain and smart con-
tract facilitate the peer-to-peer trading is specifically focused.
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2.2 Smart Grid
Smart grid is an intelligent electricity network which cost effectively integrates com-
munication, information and control infrastructure with all connected users, en-
abling bidirectional flows of energy and information [15]. The users include all
generators, consumers, and prosumers. The objective of smart grid is to achieve
sustainable, secure, and economic power supply and active participation of con-
sumers. A conceptual graph of smart grid is presented in Fig. 2.1. The advances of
smart grid are summarised as follows:
 Smart grid implements digital processing and communication into the electric-
ity network to enable real-time bidirectional information flows, which allows
the systems uncertainties to be precisely predicted [16,17].
 The optimal energy dispatch and accurate forecast of smart grid provide a
solution to the intermittency of renewable energy sources. Hence, smart grid
enhances the penetration of renewable energy sources so as to mitigate carbon
emissions from power systems.
 Smart grid ensures the continuity of power flows and thus guarantees the power
systems stability and security of supply.
 The automation of distribution network enhances the energy balance through
demand side management and regional energy trading.
In this section, the smart grid components and associated potential energy mar-
kets design with the integration of prosumers are introduced.
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2.2.1 Components of Smart Grid
Demand Side Management
As one of the key smart grid technologies, the demand side management is defined
as reshaping energy behaviours of consumers for supply-demand balance through
monetary incentives or education [18]. The demand side management aims to meet
peak demand without increasing the capacity of power networks, and balance inter-
mittent generation of renewable energy sources with demand [19].
The concept of demand side management was coined in 1973, following the first
energy crisis in American electric power industry [20]. This crisis was caused by the
heavy dependence on foreign energy imports and the rise of oil prices. To tackle this
energy crisis, the U.S. Congress legislated the National Energy Act [21] to reduce
the dependence of foreign energy, improve energy efficiency, facilitate alternative
energy sources, and encourage demand side management. The further two energy
crises in 1979 and 1990 [22], as well as the California electricity crisis in 2001 amplify
the importance of demand side management. Currently, the advanced information
and communication technologies of smart grid enhance the feasibility and public
involvement for demand side management [23].
The approaches for delivering demand side management can be categorised as
follows:
 Energy Efficiency : Consumers can deliver the same tasks with fewer energy
demand by improving energy efficiency of their loads [24].
 Demand Response: The demand response refers to reshaping consumption
behaviours in response to the incentive of electricity prices [25]. The man-
agement is delivered by curtailing energy demand of consumers during peak
time periods or shifting energy demand of consumers from peak time periods
to off-peak time periods such as midnight or weekends [26].
 Dynamic Demand : The operating cycles of loads can be adjusted by a few
seconds without disturbing the consumption of end users to increase the di-
versity factor of power systems [27]. The loads states, e.g. power factors and
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control parameters, are monitored to optimally schedule the operating time of
loads and reduce critical power mismatch.
 Distributed Generation: Different from the conventional large-scale centralised
generation such as coal, gas and nuclear power plants, which requires long-
distance transmission, the distributed generation is located in demand side
through using renewable energy sources. The distributed generation can strate-
gically dispatch power outputs by incorporating with energy storage devices
and smart grid technologies.
Renewable Energy Sources
Renewable energy sources are derived from natural process and can be replenished
constantly [28]. The renewable energy sources include wind, solar, hydro, geother-
mal, and bioenergy [29]. The increasing penetration of renewable energy sources con-
tributes to significant energy security, carbon emissions mitigation, and economic
benefits. Nonetheless, the intermittency caused by weather conditions presents a
challenge for the integration of renewable energy sources into power systems. Smart
grid holds the key to overcome this challenge. The advanced communication and
information infrastructures of smart grid incorporating with energy storage devices
enable the renewable energy sources to be optimally dispatched.
In the U.K., there are 1,007,427 installations of solar panels by the end of June
2019, providing a total capacity of 13.1 GW [30]. It is expected that the total
capacity increases to 15.7 GW by 2023 and 10 millions homes would cover their
roof with solar panels [31]. The 12 GW installed capacity of onshore wind has met
the annual demand of 7.25 million homes [32]. The offshore wind accounts for over
10 % of the U.K. electricity generation in 2020. The U.K. Government has also
committed to 40 GW of installed offshore capacity by 2030 [33].
Energy Storage
The pressure of increasing intermittent renewable energy sources and growing energy
demand drives the development of energy storage markets [34]. Energy storage
technologies can flexibly absorb or release energy when required with the benefits
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for system stability and security of supply [35]. Storage technologies can decrease
the need for investing in additional generation capacities, contributing to financial
savings and carbon emissions mitigation from power generation. The deployment of
energy storage devices also enhances the systems capacities and reduces the costs of
updating transmission and distribution systems.
Smart Meters and Home Energy Management
Smart meter is an enabling technology for home energy management, real-time
pricing, peer-to-peer trading, and low carbon power systems. With the smart meter
installed, consumers can self-read and control their energy use, so as to adopt energy
efficiency measures and save energy bills [36]. By 2020, there are 18.1 million smart
meters installed in GB, consisting of 11 million electricity meters and 7.1 million
gas meters [37]. These smart meters facilitate small-scale energy producers with
distributed renewable energy sources (DRESs) to be integrated into the power grid.
Additionally, smart meter holds the key to demand side carbon emissions mitigation.
From short-term perspective, consumers can be dynamically incentivised by real-
time pricing to save their bills by using energy generated from low carbon sources
during off-peak periods. From long-term perspective, consumers can cost-effectively
invest DRESs and integrate electric vehicles.
The smart control and communication technologies also enhance the efficiency
of home appliances to form a home energy management systems. The home en-
ergy management systems allow the users to monitor their energy generation and
consumption and automatically control the use of energy in a cost-effective man-
ner [38]. The home energy management systems consist of hardware and software.
The hardware is the communication infrastructure between the smart appliances
and end users. The software collects data from monitored information of energy
usage and generates control functions based on users' preferences. For instance,
receiving real-time pricing signals, the home energy management systems can help
consumers strategically shift or curtail their loads as responses.
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2.2.2 Energy Markets Transition Towards Prosumers Era
The advances of smart grid technologies with regulatory supports for low carbon
development enable consumers to produce, consume, and store energy through the
DRESs, batteries [39], electric vehicles [40], and smart meters [41]. The conventional
power systems are transitioning towards prosumers era. The figure of prosumers was
coined by Alvin Toer in 1980 [42]. On the context of energy markets, prosumers
are small-sized or medium-sized agents [13], e.g. residential, commercial and indus-
trial users, who actively produce energy and feed surplus energy into a distribution
network after self-consumption; When prosumers' demand cannot be met by self-
generation, they import energy from main grids or other prosumers [13].
A transition of energy markets towards decentralised generation and consump-
tion is crucial for the integration of emerging role of prosumers. The possible struc-
tures of these innovative energy markets have been well investigated. In our lit-
erature review, we identify three types of energy markets design towards the pro-
sumers era: peer-to-peer trading markets, intermediary-based trading markets, and
microgrid-based trading markets. These three types of energy markets design are
based on the information, communication, and control infrastructure of smart grid,
and categorised by the functions of control agents and associated manners of infor-
mation exchange. The schematic illustration of these three types of energy markets
design is presented in Fig. 2.2, where each dot represents a control agent and each
interconnected line represents the flow of communication and information exchange.
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Peer-to-Peer Trading Markets
Inspired by the concept of sharing economy [43], the peer-to-peer trading markets are
structured as a completely decentralised trading framework. Prosumers can directly
trade electricity and other services, e.g. demand side management [44], energy
storage [45], and carbon credits [46]. The role of distribution system operator is
limited to managing the trading platform and providing distribution function [47].
In comparison to other markets design, the peer-to-peer trading markets are the least
structured framework. Instead of using central authorities, e.g. market operators or
retailers, as control agents, each individual prosumers become an independent agent
to exchange information with each other and perform control functions [48]. Hence,
this framework enables a flexible market structure, with more complexed control
agents and information flows as indicated by the highest amounts of dots and lines
in Fig. 2.2.
Nonetheless, the information exchanges combined with system states monitored
by sensors or smart meters and decisions made by prosumers amplify the volumes
of information flows. This presents a challenge for the information infrastructure of
current power systems [49]. Another challenge of the peer-to-peer trading markets
is how to maintain system constraints and guarantee the security of supply with-
out the central authorities. This requires sophisticated rulesets to align individual
prosumers' interests with the overall power systems' benefits.
As practical cases, the RWE [50] has developed peer-to-peer trading platforms
integrating functions of controlling decentralised generation, grid management, com-
munication, automation, and security. The Power Ledger [51] provides peer-to-peer
energy trading for 11,000 participants from residential and commercial consumers in
Australia based on software solutions. This peer-to-peer trading market is supported
by Australia government, utilities, and distribution system operator.
Intermediary-Based Trading Markets
The intermediary-based trading markets are more structured than the peer-to-peer
trading markets. Under the intermediary-based trading markets, an ensemble of
prosumers is organised as a community or local organisation, e.g. smart buildings
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[52] and virtual power plants [53]. Each community is managed by an intermediary,
e.g. aggregators [54] or retailers [55], as an agent to maintain regional energy balance
and provide energy services. All generation sources, flexible demand, and storage
capacities within a community are pooled to collectively coordinate resources for
local benefits. The intermediary can earn bonus from regulators or utilities for
providing services to prosumers such as efficiency update, demand response, and
setup of renewable energy sources [56].
An example of the intermediary is the Stem [57] which has designed a platform to
provide storage services and demand response for consumers in California through
real-time optimisation and automated control. The company of Energy and Meteo
Systems [58] in Germany has established a virtual power plant via digital control
centre with the services of real-time data management, remotely control of wind
and solar generation, energy scheduling, demand side management, and balancing
group management. The data collection and controlling decisions are managed by
the digital control centre without the need of new IT infrastructure.
Microgrid-Based Trading Markets
The microgrid-based trading markets are the most structured framework, under
which prosumers are connected to microgrid and the microgrid can either connect
to the main grid or operate at islanded mode. When a microgrid connects to the
main grid, prosumers can sell surplus generation to the main grid [13]. Prosumers
would be incentivised to generate more energy for earning profits through export-
ing. When a microgrid operates at islanded mode, the surplus generation can be
stored within the microgrid or used for load shifting services [59]. Prosumers would
be incentivised to strategically schedule their generation and consumption for re-
gional energy balance. The primary difference between microgrid-based trading
markets and intermediary-based trading markets is that there is no intermediary in
microgrid-based trading markets to pool the sources together. Individual sources
of generation and consumption can directly connect to the microgrid and then to
the main grid. Rather than seeking for an intermediary's benefits, e.g. maximising
the aforementioned bonus, individual microgrids seek for their own benefits, e.g.
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maximising energy exporting or achieving energy balance.
As practical implementations, the Asea Brown Boveri Ltd [60] provides microgrid
solutions for customers to ensure reliable, stable and affordable power. The LO3
Energy [61] has developed the Brooklyn microgrid integrating 130 buildings on site
to facilitate demand response and improve communication infrastructures.
2.3 Low Carbon Policy Design for Energy Market
This section reviews the low carbon policy design from international regulations and
existing research. The carbon emissions tracing approaches are also introduced as a
foundation of low carbon policy formulation.
2.3.1 A Review of Market Based Low Carbon Policies
The market based low carbon policies, also known as carbon pricing, are an economic
instrument to address carbon emissions caused by the combustion of fossil fuels [62].
The carbon pricing enforces the pollutant emitters to compensate the environmen-
tal damage in a monetary manner. Therefore, the implementation of carbon pricing
increases the costs of using fossil fuels and subsequently stimulates the carbon mit-
igation. Two primary forms of carbon pricing are carbon tax and emissions trading
scheme. By the end of 2019, carbon pricing has been implemented in 46 countries, of
which 25 countries adopt carbon tax and the rest 21 countries adopt emissions trad-
ing scheme [63]. The carbon pricing helps these countries achieve their low carbon
targets by stimulating energy conservation, improvement of the energy efficiency,
and investment of low carbon technologies.
Carbon Tax
The carbon tax levies a fixed rate on carbon content of fossil fuels [64]. The rate
of carbon tax is determined by the social cost of carbon which quantifies marginal
damage costs of carbon emissions to the society [65]. As a revenue of policy maker,
carbon tax can be further redistributed for investing low carbon technologies or pro-
viding monetary compensation for demand side carbon mitigation, so as to achieve
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the carbon revenue neutrality.
Emissions Trading Scheme
The emissions trading scheme, also known as cap-and-trade scheme, is an alternative
policy to carbon tax. Under the emissions trading scheme, the policy makers and
regulators allocate a certain amount of carbon allowances for a given time period [66].
Emitters are obliged to have an enough amount of carbon allowances covering the
amount of their carbon emissions. The surplus or scarcity of carbon allowances can
be traded among emitters [67].
Nonetheless, an inappropriate carbon price determined by the emissions trading
scheme would inefficiently incentivise the carbon emissions mitigation and fail to
achieve low carbon targets. The issue of inappropriate carbon price presents a
challenge for the emissions trading scheme in a majority of countries [68]. If the
carbon price lies below the social cost of carbon or the rate at which the low carbon
targets can be achieved, it would insufficiently stimulate the mitigation of carbon
emissions; If the carbon price in one region is higher than that in another region,
the market competitiveness of carbon producers in the high-price region would be
harmed. The carbon producers are prone to discharging carbon emissions in the
low-price region, while the total amount of carbon emissions remains unchanged,
which is defined as the carbon leakage issue [69]. Additionally, the carbon producers
will pass the cost of carbon allowance onto consumers in the form of higher prices
on the products, e.g. higher electricity prices.
To overcome the issue of inappropriate carbon price, carbon price floor and ceiling
are implemented in current international carbon markets by setting an additional
price limits for the carbon emissions producers in certain regions [70]. For the case
of the U.K. carbon market, because the carbon price of the E.U. emissions trading
scheme is lower than the social cost of carbon in the U.K., the carbon price has
failed to incentivise the U.K. coal-to-gas transition before 2013 [71]. Afterwards,
the U.K. has formulated the carbon price support for its own carbon producers as
an additional carbon price floor to the E.U. emissions trading scheme. The U.S.
set a similar price floor and facilitated carbon auctions in 2009 [72]. By contrast,
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in New Zealand, a carbon price ceiling was enacted through fixed price option to
prevent high carbon prices and protect market competitiveness of generators [73].
Comparison Remark
As two well-established policy instruments, the carbon tax and emissions trading
scheme have following aspects in common:
 Both carbon tax and emissions trading scheme impose a price on carbon emis-
sions for facilitating energy producers and consumers to internalise the social
cost of carbon.
 Instead of command-and-control based policy measures that specify actions
for carbon mitigation to be taken, the market based policy measures flexibly
incentivise carbon producers to strategically respond to the prices.
 Market based low carbon policies can generate public revenue through charging
carbon tax or selling carbon allowance.
Figure 2.3: Comparison between carbon tax and emissions trading scheme from
economics perspective. The implementation of carbon tax would raise energy price
and reduce energy demand. The emissions trading scheme would limit the total
carbon emissions and raise carbon price.
The differences between carbon tax and emissions trading scheme including the
advantages and limitations of each policy design are as follows:
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 The carbon tax gives a certainty to the price of carbon emissions through
fixed tax rate, whereas the emissions trading scheme gives a certainty to the
quantity of carbon emissions through fixed carbon allowance [74].
 Carbon tax is easier to be implemented since it is based on established tax
systems. By contrast, emissions trading scheme is more flexible since it can
be extended with financial innovation such as peer-to-peer trading, options,
banking, and borrowing.
 From economics perspective as indicated in Fig. 2.3, when the carbon tax
is implemented, the energy price increases and the energy demand decreases
from point a to point b. Consumers would find alternatives, e.g. loads shift-
ing/curtailment, electric vehicles, replacing gas furnace with ground source
heat pump. By contrast, under the emissions trading scheme, when the total
amount of carbon allowance is fixed according to the target of carbon mit-
igation as indicated by line l, the carbon price would increase from point a
to point b. Facing the uncertainty of carbon price, generators would find al-
ternatives, e.g. improving combustion efficiency, replacing coal by gas, and
investing renewable generation.
2.3.2 Carbon Emissions Tracing for Power Systems
Tracing carbon emissions for power systems is a foundation of low carbon devel-
opment, since it provides options and suggestions that inform low-carbon policy
on energy markets and power systems planing [75]. Two primary approaches in
literature for tracing carbon emissions from power systems are carbon emissions
intensities and carbon emissions flow.
Carbon Emissions Intensities
The carbon emissions from power systems can be evaluated by the usage of fossil fuels
and the carbon emissions intensities of related fuels. Evaluation of carbon emissions
intensities has been focused by a majority of research [7679]. For the carbon emis-
sions caused by coal and gas, the displacement by renewable energy sources would
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cause part-loaded operation and reduce the generating efficiency. The part-loaded
operation consumes more fossil fuels and raises the carbon emissions intensities.
The research in [77] investigated the relationship between the dynamic change of
carbon emissions intensities and the levels of part-loaded operation using historical
data from power systems. For the carbon emissions caused by other sources such
as hydro, wind, and biomass, there is no significant impact of part-loaded operation
on carbon emissions intensities. The long-term average carbon emissions intensities
evaluated by life-cycle carbon analysis [80] are used for calculating carbon emis-
sions. There are three primary approaches to evaluate carbon emissions intensities
as follows.
 Average emissions intensity: The average emissions intensity quantifies how
much the renewable energy sources displace the annual average carbon emis-
sions from all power generation sources on the power systems [76]. The average
intensity is a long-term approximation based on historical observation [81].
 Marginal displacement intensity: The marginal displacement intensity quanti-
fies how much the renewable energy sources displace the carbon emissions from
generators operating at the margin [77]. The marginal displacement intensity
is evaluated by identifying which power plant responds to changes in outputs
of renewable energy sources.
 Marginal emissions intensity: The marginal emissions intensity quantifies how
much the renewable energy sources displace the carbon emissions from the
marginal changes in power demand [78,79].
In the GB power systems, the coal and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) are
the most significant generator types which respond to marginal changes of outputs
from renewable energy sources. Hence, the marginal displacement intensity is suit-
able for evaluating carbon emissions from coal and CCGT. The nuclear is a baseload
generator which is only affected by average power generation and corresponding av-
erage emissions intensity.
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Carbon Emissions Flow
The time-varying and spatial-varying consumption behaviours are a primary driver
for the generation from the combustion of fossil fuels. Instead of accounting carbon
emissions in generation side, the approach of carbon emissions flow (CEF) targets on
individual components of power networks including generators, transmission lines,
and consumers. The CEF is a virtual network flow concurrent with power flow
to trace carbon emissions caused by generators when transmitting and consuming
energy [75]. Analogous to the power flow, the virtual CEF flows along transmission
lines from one bus to another under spatial restrictions of power networks. The CEF
approach provides a precise information of carbon emissions from specific time and
location of power networks and a fair allocation of carbon mitigation responsibilities.
The approach of CEF has been focused in the literature [8284]. The concept
of CEF was initially created from international trades to account carbon responsi-
bilities among countries. Ståhls et al. [82] analysed the international carbon flows
from a consumption-based perspective and identified the portion of carbon emissions
from industrial exports. Further research implemented this concept into power sys-
tems to determine the obligation of carbon reduction in energy consumption side.
In [83], a CEF tracing approach in power systems was developed to determine the
indirect carbon emissions caused by consumption behaviours, by which the regional
variation of carbon emissions and locational carbon emissions intensities of indi-
vidual consumers were identified. Kang et al. [84] quantified the carbon emissions
accompanying the power delivery process and accumulated the carbon emissions
to consumers side. The operational characteristics and the topological features of
power networks were considered in this research.
2.3.3 Remark of Research Challenges
Although the market based low carbon policies have been implemented as practical
regulations and investigated in the literature, there are still opportunities in design-
ing dynamic low carbon policies. This is because the long-term market policy for
overall power systems cannot target on dynamic power profiles and incurred carbon
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emissions of individual generators/consumers.
Furthermore, with the participation of prosumers into energy markets, the in-
dividual prosumers' carbon emissions caused by generation for self-consumption,
consumption from self-generation, and generation (or consumption) for (or from)
energy exchange with other prosumers cannot be traced using existing approaches
and then incentivised properly. This is more challenging when prosumers trade en-
ergy or carbon allowance, because they need to know how much carbon allowance
needs to be purchased as carbon cost.
2.4 Approaches of Power Systems Scheduling
The low carbon energy scheduling refers to strategically dispatching power gener-
ation from various sources and reshaping power consumption behaviours, for the
purpose of carbon emissions reduction, electricity bill saving and generating profit
improving [85]. In this section, the state-of-the-art approaches for energy scheduling
are reviewed.
2.4.1 Optimisation
The optimisation is an essential approach for power systems scheduling. Under
optimisation problems, objectives of energy market participants, e.g. generators,
consumers, prosumers, policy makers, system operators, and market operators, are
modelled by predefined formulations and parameters, constrained by system capac-
ities, operating conditions and security restrictions. Through solving the optimi-
sation problems, optimal scheduling decisions, e.g. power profiles and electricity
prices, can be yielded. In current research for power systems scheduling, the op-
timisation approaches can be categorised as programming techniques and heuristic
algorithms as presented in Fig. 2.4.
The programming techniques include linear programming, integer linear pro-
gramming, mixed integer linear programming, and non-linear programming. The
linear programming refers to an optimisation problem in which all objective func-
tions and constraints are linear functions of decision variables [86]. The integer linear
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Figure 2.4: Categorises of optimisation approaches for power systems scheduling.
programming differs to linear programming in that only binary values and integers
can be used as decisions variables [87]. In the mixed integer linear programming
problems, both integers and non-integers can be used as decision variables [88]. The
non-linear programming refers to an optimisation problem in which at least one
objective function or constraint is non-linear function of decision variables [89].
In the literature, Javaid et al. [90] proposed a linear programming model to
assign power levels for controllable devices with the objective of costs minimisa-
tion, by which the power flows could be optimally controlled to accommodate power
fluctuations. In [91], a mixed integer non-linear bi-level programming was formu-
lated to minimise the electricity bills of consumers under a marginal pricing scheme.
To solve this problem, the original problem was converted as an equivalent single-
level mixed integer linear programming based on the duality theory, integer algebra,
and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions. Khushalani et al. [92] developed
a service restoration algorithm for unbalanced distribution systems, by which the
problem was formulated as a mixed integer non-linear programming.
The heuristic algorithms include particle swarm algorithm, genetic algorithm,
artificial immune algorithm, and other heuristic algorithms. These algorithms are
primarily used for solving non-linear programming problems by iteratively searching
over the entire feasible space. The particle swarm algorithm [93] optimises a problem
by searching from solution set consisting of particles, and moving particles within the
searching space according to predefined functions of particle's position and velocity.
The movement of particles is determined by both local best known position and
global best known position of searching space. All particle swarm will ultimately
move towards the best solution. The genetic algorithm [94] is based on the Darwin's
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theory of evolution, by which a population of candidate solutions to an optimisation
problem is randomly generated and defined as a generation. The value of objective
function for every individual in the population is evaluated and defined as fitness.
The highly fitted individuals are selected and mutated to form a new generation.
The population is iteratively evolved towards the best solution. Analoguously to the
genetic algorithm, in the artificial immune algorithm [95], a population of candidate
solutions to an optimisation problem is randomly generated and defined as antigens.
The value of objective function for every antigen in the population is evaluated and
defined as antibody. The antigens are iteratively cloned towards the best solution.
In the literature, Meng and Zeng [96] formulated a problem for maximising the
profits of energy retailers by modelling the effects of real-time electricity prices on
shiftable loads and curtailable loads. The problem was solved by genetic algorithm.
Olsen et al. [97] implemented the weighted sum bisection method to minimise car-
bon tax rate constrained by maintaining total carbon emissions from power systems
below a prescribed target of carbon reduction. This research investigated the re-
lationship between system investments and tax setting process and found that the
carbon tax can encourage the investments on cleaner generation, transmission and
energy efficiency. Li et al. [56] proposed a hierarchical multiobjective scheduling
model to integrate renewable energy sources and demand side management. In this
model, the utility seeks to minimise operating costs and the customers seek to max-
imise social welfare. The demand response aggregator as an intermediary seeks to
maximise its net profits, which are the difference between bonus from utility for pro-
viding demand side management and the cost of offering compensation to customers.
A selection criteria was designed to select the optimal solutions yielded by artificial
immune algorithm without favouring any market participant. A user-centric multi-
objective optimisation problem was further developed in [98] to achieve a tradeoff
between residential privacy and energy costs. This research developed a hybrid al-
gorithm by combining a stochastic power scheduling with a deterministic battery
control, which addressed the drawbacks of weighted-sum methods, i.e. combing ob-
jective functions with various scales, heuristically assigning weight coefficients, and
misrepresentation of user preferences.
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Nonetheless, the scalability and computational complexity limit the implementa-
tion of optimisation approaches on high-complex problems of power systems schedul-
ing. The scalability issue is caused when the scale of power system varies, since each
scale requires predefined parameters and mathematical formulations. The computa-
tional complexity issue is caused when solving optimisation problems using heuristic
algorithms, for which the optimal scheduling decisions are obtained by iteratively
searching. At the instance of optimization solved by ι iterations, once it is combined
with |I| types of generators and |K| types of loads, the computational complexity
increases to O
(
ι|I|+|K|
)
[99].
2.4.2 Game Theory
The game theory is gaining increasing attention as an analysis tool for modelling
strategic interactions among energy market participants. Cournot and Stackelberg
are two classic and common models for analysing actions of market players, e.g.
generators or retailers. The Cournot model describes that market players supply
homogeneous products, and compete on the amount of supplied products by mak-
ing decisions independently and simultaneously [100]. On the contrary, the Stackel-
berg model features a hierarchical two-level or multi-level sequential decision making
process [101]. For the two-level decision-making, the players are categorised into a
leader level which makes decisions first and a follower level which makes subsequent
decisions responding to the leader's strategies. For the multi-level decision-making,
after the first level of followers makes responding decisions, they become a leader
level to make decisions prioritising the decisions of the next level of followers. This
process continues until the last level of followers makes their responding decisions.
In energy markets, policy makers, e.g. regulators or system operators, formulate
incentive policies prioritising market changes or responses from generators and con-
sumers, so as to achieve certain targets such as reducing carbon emissions or improv-
ing social welfare. This sequential action process can be appropriately captured by
the two-level Stackelberg model through seizing the strategic interactions of market
participants. Additionally, when considering more market participants, e.g. system
operators, market operators, and retailers, the multi-level Stackelberg model can
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be implemented to capture the interactions among these various participants. For
instance, when the policy maker charges the carbon tax from generators, the gener-
ators would then increase wholesale prices responding to the increase of generating
costs caused by carbon tax. The increase of wholesale prices would incur the increase
of retail prices, which results in consumers to change their consumption behaviours
for electricity bills saving as responses.
The game theory has been well documented in literature. The game-theoretic
models, players and solution approaches in the field of energy scheduling are sum-
marised in Table 2.1. Belgana et al. [102] developed a multi-leader and multi-follower
Stackelberg game-theoretic problem to find optimal strategies that could maximise
the profits of utilities and minimise carbon emissions. The problem was solved by a
hybrid multiobjective evolutionary algorithm. Meng and Zeng [103] proposed a 1-
leader, n-follower Stackelberg game to maximise the profits of retailers at the leader
level and minimise the electricity bills of consumers at the follower level consid-
ering the real-time pricing scheme. The genetic algorithm was used to solve the
leader's optimisation problem and the linear programming was used to slove the fol-
lower's optimisation problem. Ghosh et al. [104] formulated a coupled constrained
potential game to set the energy exchange prices for maximising the amount of
energy exchange among prosumers and reducing the consumption from main grid.
A distributed algorithm was proposed enabling individual prosumers to optimise
their own payoffs. In [105], an energy trading framework based on repeated non-
cooperative game was designed enabling individual microgrids to optimise their own
revenues. The reinforcement learning was exploited to estimate the payoff functions
under incomplete information. The Cournot game was implemented in [106] to
model the competition between customers and utilities in distribution networks for
satisfying the system reliability. Similarly, Zhang et al. [107] modelled local energy
trading as a non-cooperative Cournot game to stimulate regional energy balance
and promote the penetration of renewable energy sources.
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The game theory assumes all players are rational when they compete with each
other. Nonetheless, during practical energy markets operation, individual players
have various sensitivities to the incentive signals, which causes the individual de-
cisions to deviate from theoretical rational decisions and thus reduces the model
accuracy. For instance, when considering the small-scale consumers, e.g. residential
users, the price-insensitive consumers normally use energy irrespective of pricing
signals.
2.4.3 Data-Driven Learning Approaches
To overcome the aforementioned issues of scalability and computational complexity
by using optimisation approach, machine learning has been considered to assist or
replace the step of solving optimization problem by the intelligent heuristic algo-
rithm, because it only requires historical data for extracting general features with
the advantages of improved scalability and reduced computational complexity.
Using learning approaches for solving energy scheduling problems has been well
studied in literature. The learning approaches can be categorised as supervised
learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning. In supervised learning,
the input is provided as a labelled dataset, such that the model can learn from the
labels to improve the learning accuracy [108]. By contrast, in unsupervised learning,
there is no labelled dataset, such that the model explores the hidden features and
predicts the output in a self-organising manner [109]. In reinforcement learning, the
model learns to react the environment by self-adjusting through travelling from one
state to another [110]. Zhang et al. [99] developed an online learning approach to
replace heuristic algorithms for solving a cost minimisation problem under uncertain
DRESs outputs and load demand. Gasse et al. [111] proposed a learning model for
extracting branch-and-bound variable selection policies to solve combinatorial op-
timisation, and testified that a series of computational complex problems could be
efficiently solved. An energy management system was designed in [112] to provide
demand response services, by which the explicit model of consumers' dissatisfaction
was replaced by the feature representations extracted through using reinforcement
learning. Analogously, Ruelens et al. [113] combined heuristic algorithm with re-
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inforcement learning to control a cluster of loads and storage devices, and Zhang
et al. [114] integrated learning mechanism with optimisation techniques to obtain
optimal demand response policies. The controller can help consumers reduce energy
costs with improved computational efficiency.
Further research implemented deep neural networks as a regression algorithm
into learning approaches. The CNN is a class of deep neural networks primarily
used for analysing visual imagery, by which the network employs convolution for
general matrix multiplication [115]. The convolution operation imports low-level in-
put, e.g. images, to learn general abstractions of a high-complexity problem without
the use of manually predefined models [116]. Hence, the CNN is particularly suitable
for the high-complexity problems. Owerko et al. [117] trained the CNN under imi-
tation learning to approximate an optimal power flow solution. A well trained CNN
can scale to various power networks for accurately predicting optimal power flows.
Du et al. [118] used the CNN to accelerate N-1 contingency screening of power sys-
tems, by which the CNN can generalise topological changes and uncertain renewable
scenarios with improved computational efficiency. Claessens et al. [119] combined
the CNN with reinforcement learning for high-complexity load control. The issue of
partial observability was addressed through using CNN to extract hidden state-time
features. In [120], the CNN was adopted as an online monitoring tool for predicting
instabilities in power systems. This research demonstrated that a trained CNN was
scalable in terms of varying load conditions, fault scenarios, topology structures,
and generator parameters.
When the pattern recognition capability of CNN is exploited, the approach of
processing numerical data to CNN input is the key for extracting hidden informa-
tion. Choi et al. [121] processed time-series power systems data from row vector
to the matrix of greyscale image by restructuring the original datasets. Liao et
al. [122] mapped different patches of bus matrix to various areas of power networks
for voltage sag estimation. The variables representing power systems configuration
were assigned as the dimension of depth from the input image.
Nonetheless, there are primary three issues for data-driven learning approaches.
First, when the size of historical data is small, the overfitting issue would be caused
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by learning approaches. This would reduce the accuracy for predicting optimal
scheduling decisions. Second, although the learning approaches can reduce the com-
putational complexity and improve scalability from solving optimisation by heuristic
intelligent algorithms, the predicted optimal decisions may deviate from the theoret-
ical optimal decisions and result in the suboptimal solutions. Third, the predicted
optimal decisions may not maintain the system constraints.
2.4.4 Analysis of System Uncertainties
Power system uncertainties caused by the intermittency of renewable energy sources
and flexible demand present a challenge for accurately predicting generation and
consumption. It is crucial for the reliability of power systems scheduling to con-
sider the possible variations of these uncertainties. The probability approaches have
been primarily focused in the literature for incorporating the analysis of system
uncertainties into energy scheduling process.
Using a set of scenarios is a potential way to predict possible variations of uncer-
tain variables, by which each variation is defined as a scenario [123]. The uncertain
scenarios are generated from probabilistic distribution of historical data by using
sampling approaches [124], such as Monte Carlo simulation [125, 126], Latin hyper-
cube sampling [127130] and stochastic analysis [131,132]. Santos et al. [125] imple-
mented Monte Carlo simulation to generate renewable scenarios and carried scenar-
ios optimisation by deterministic modelling. Similarly, Hemmati et al. [126] anal-
ysed the uncertainties of renewable energy resources and load deviation by Monte
Carlo simulation, and incorporated uncertainties analysis into decision making pro-
cess to maximise the profits of distributed generators in microgrids. Nonetheless,
the Monte Carlo simulation through randomly sampling would cause the issues of
computationally intensive and inefficient. These issues can be further overcome
by the Latin Hypercube sampling which can reduce standard deviation of samples
through space-filling. In [127], the Latin hypercube sampling was used to gener-
ate uncertain scenarios for overcoming the computationally intensive and inefficient
issues of Monte Carlo simulation and considered low probable conditions. Mavro-
matidis et al. [131] proposed a two-stage stochastic programming for the design of
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distributed energy systems considering the uncertainties of energy prices, emissions
factors, heating demand, electricity demand, and solar radiation. In comparison
to the deterministic methods, this study demonstrated that the stochastic method
can yield a more accurate estimation of costs and carbon emissions. Huang et
al. [132] designed an economic dispatch model for virtual power plants, by which
the uncertainties caused by load prediction and power prediction were described
by stochastic intervals. These intervals were subsequently integrated into a costs
minimisation problem.
Further research efforts have been dedicated to improving the prediction accu-
racy and adaptability of scenarios. Liang et al. [128] proposed a non-parametric
kernel density estimation method to yield the probability density distribution of
uncertain variables. The scenarios were generated from the probability density
distribution through using Latin hypercube sampling. In [129], a data-driven ap-
proach for scenarios generation was developed using generative adversarial networks.
This approach can capture both temporal and spatial dimensions of uncertain vari-
ables, so as to improve scalability and diversity from probabilistic models. To se-
lect high-probable scenarios, Xiao et al. [130] proposed an approach to implement
synchronous-back-to-generation-reduction for merging scenarios with a minimum
probability distance.
2.4.5 Remark of Research Challenges
Although extensive studies have focused on the power systems scheduling, there are
four major challenges as follows.
Firstly, for the power systems scheduling, current research has investigated the
policy impacts on generation, consumption, and incurred carbon emissions. How
policy maker further adjusts incentive measures after receiving the responses from
generators and consumers, i.e. an iterative negotiation between policy maker and
generators/consumers has not been modelled.
Secondly, with respect to prosumer-centric energy scheduling, it could be useful
to connect the intrinsic features of prosumers, e.g. price patterns, with potential
scheduling strategies.
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Thirdly, when analysing system uncertainties, an approach for using real-time
prosumption data to update uncertain scenarios needs to be studied to improve the
prediction accuracy for uncertain scenarios.
Fourthly, the pricing schemes investigated in current literature are not prosumer-
centric. A new peer-to-peer energy trading needs to be designed, under which the
bidding/selling prices of prosumers in energy and carbon markets are able to di-
rectly incentivise the reshaping of prosumption profiles to achieve carbon emissions
reduction and regional energy balance.
2.5 Blockchain Applications on Peer-to-Peer Trad-
ing of Energy and Carbon Allowance
In this section, research and innovations on the blockchain technologies including
smart contract, as enabling technologies of peer-to-peer trading, are introduced.
2.5.1 Peer-to-Peer Trading Mechanism
The term of `peer-to-peer energy trading', similar to the terms of `transactive energy'
and `community self-consumption', was coined by [133135] with the aim of energy
balance, cost saving and reduction of transmission losses, in a real-time, autonomous
and decentralised manner. The mechanism of peer-to-peer energy trading enables
the DRESs to be directly managed by prosumers, and aligns individual prosumers'
behaviours to the overall benefits of power systems. These benefits include:
 An economically stronger distribution system can be built by using collabora-
tive economy models, by which the profits of supplying energy can be main-
tained in local communities [136, 137]. Opportunities of training, education
and work can be created.
 The local energy resilience and supply-demand balance can be enhanced through
facilitating and integrating the small and independent prosumers with DRESs
to the grid.
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 The carbon emissions caused by long-distance power transmission and fossil-
fuelled power generation can be reduced with the increasing penetration of the
DRESs.
 The bill saving, profit improving and cost saving can be achieved when pro-
sumers strategically decide their bidding/selling prices and prosumption be-
haviours.
The design of framework and mechanism of peer-to-peer trading in the energy
sector have been well documented. In [138], a two-stage aggregated control frame-
work was designed for peer-to-peer energy sharing in microgrids. Under the designed
framework, prosumers could manage their DRESs through the energy sharing co-
ordinator. This research proved the cost saving of community and bill saving of
individual prosumers. Morstyn et al. [139] proposed a federated power plant to in-
centivise the coordination of individual prosumers through combining virtual power
plants with peer-to-peer energy trading, and addressed the social, institutional and
economic issues from the top-down strategies of conventional trading framework.
Further research in [48] developed a bilateral contract networks for peer-to-peer
energy trading on real-time and forward markets. The developed networks coordi-
nated the upstream larger-scale power plants with downstream small-scale DRESs
and considered the forward market uncertainty, so as to ensure an agreed market
prices for market participants.
2.5.2 Blockchain Technologies
Blockchain technologies [140], as one of the distributed ledger technologies, have
the potential of establishing a decentralised trading platform with automated nego-
tiation procedures, reduced transactional costs, secured information infrastructure
and protected residential privacy. The blockchain technologies have three phases of
evolutions: cryptocurrency, smart contract and decentralised autonomous organisa-
tion [141]. In the field of energy markets, the blockchain can support a platform for
energy trading, by which the residential privacy, e.g. address, load patterns, and
price patterns, can be protected by the encryption of blockchain. The issues of dou-
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ble spending and the same energy supplied twice can be overcome by the collective
verification of blockchain networks. The feature disintermediary allows prosumers
trade with each other without the interference of market operator. Hence, the role
of market operator becomes a neutral facilitator of an open and accessible energy
markets.
The most potential technology to be explored in the field of energy and car-
bon allowance trading is the smart contract. The smart contract, coined by Szabo
in 1994 [142], enables executable programs to be performed in a manner of self-
enforcing settlement and setting out negotiation [143]. This provides opportunities
for both energy and carbon markets to securely automate the trading procedures
with standardised contract, and thus reduces the costs of information flows from
transactions of a large amount of prosumers. The features of replicable, secure and
verifiable of the smart contract [144] ensure the trading, negotiation and agreement
to become more trustworthy without the interference of centralised authorities.
A basic principle of the smart contract is that `If an event A happens, the smart
contract pays currency B, deposited by buyer C, to seller D ' [145]. On the context
of energy and carbon allowance trading, the event could be the supply of energy
or carbon allowance which is monitored by smart meters of prosumers. The pay
function is executed in a self-enforcing manner. Hence, the trustworthiness of energy
trading is dependent on the trustworthiness of smart meters and programs to be
executed on the smart contract.
Overall, the blockchain technologies including smart contract provide a transac-
tion and control foundation for the trading of energy and carbon allowance on the
smart grid environment, with the following advantages:
 The blockchain can prevent the risks of which the same energy or carbon
allowance is sold twice, or the same digital currency is spent twice, i.e. double
spending attack [146], through accounting the ownership of digital and physical
assets.
 The distributed feature of blockchain [146] enables a ledger to be held by all
participants. Changes to the ledger require the consensus of all participants.
Hence, the blockchain network is open and accessible for all participants in
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markets including prosumers, energy retailers, power system operators and
market operators.
 The properties of trustless and disintermediating [147] require no centralised
authorities. Instead of supplying the DRESs, the role of distribution system
operators becomes a neutral facilitator to encourage passive customers to be
both producers and consumers. This prevents the market manipulation by
one or more participants.
 From the cryptographical perspective, the public/private key encryption [148]
guarantees private security of a prosumer, including the residential privacy and
information security. The computational difficulty of block mining and collec-
tive validation through reaching a consensus guarantee the collective security
of a trading network.
 The blockchain supports smart control architectures for realising the interop-
erability of smart contract [149]. The interoperability is defined as multiple
agents corporately perform a function through information exchange. The
automatically executed control functions written in the smart contract inter-
face with smart meters, distributed computing and fog computing, so as to
minimise the latency and enhance the computational efficiency and security.
 The blockchain supports a trading platform that minimises or eliminates costs
of handling the information flows from transactions through automatically
self-enforcing settlement and setting out negotiation of the smart contract.
 The smart contract with standardised auction procedures has the potential to
prevent unforeseen trading behaviours in both energy and carbon markets.
Meanwhile, the blockchain including smart contract remains the following chal-
lenges from the technologies' perspective:
 The throughput, i.e. transactions per second, of blockchain is relatively lower
than the existing trading technologies. For instance, the throughput of Ethereum
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is 15 transactions per second [150] and the throughput of Bitcoin is 7 trans-
actions per second [151], whereas the throughput of Visa is 2000 transactions
per second [152].
 The latency, i.e. time per verified transaction, of blockchain is relatively higher
than the existing trading technologies. For instance, the latency of Ethereum
is 3 min [153] and the latency of Bitcoin is 10 min [154], whereas the latency
of Visa is 3 sec [155].
 The users of public blockchain can be identified by analysing their trading
patterns or power profiles, which would threaten their data privacy.
 The interface between blockchain network and smart meters requires new pro-
tocols and secured communication infrastructures.
The blockchain technologies applied on peer-to-peer trading of energy and carbon
allowance are the subject of active research and practical implementation as follows.
Blockchain implementation on Energy Trading
The implementation of blockchain technologies on energy trading is well studied in
scientific research. Thomas et al. [49] proposed a general form of smart contract
for controlling energy transfer process between separate distribution networks. The
designed negotiation framework and use case on a DC-link provided a means of
applying the smart contract into power systems. In [156], the real-time power losses
caused by transactions in microgrids were accounted by the blockchain, by which
the prosumers were considered as negotiators of energy transaction and distributors
were responsible for computing losses. Li et al. [157] applied smart contract into a
distributed hybrid energy systems to facilitate energy exchange among end users.
The demand side management and uncertainties caused by renewable generation
were considered into a framework of peer-to-peer energy trading. Mihaylov et al.
[158] designed a paradigm for energy trading with a virtual currency generated
by energy supply of prosumers. Case studies of this research testified that the
designed currency incentivised prosumers to achieve demand response and supply-
demand balance. Saxena et al. [159] proposed a blockchain based transactive energy
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systems to address the incentivising, contract auditability and enforcement of voltage
regulation service. The smart contract was used by this research to enforce the
validity of each transaction and automate the negotiation and bidding process. In
[160], a transparent and safe power trading algorithm executed on the Ethereum
blockchain platform was presented for prosumers to trade energy.
Blockchain implementation on Carbon Allowance Trading
In carbon markets, the blockchain has been developed to trade carbon allowance
or allocate monetary incentives for decarbonisation. Khaqqi et al. [161] customised
carbon allowance trading to industries using reputation based blockchain by which
the reputation signified participants' performances and commitments for carbon
emissions reduction. The reputation system was maintained by the consensus of
blockchain networks to guarantee the fairness and security. Pan et al. [162] im-
plemented blockchain into carbon emissions trading to reduce the entry threshold
for the carbon market and improve the reliability of information exchange. Anal-
ogously, Richardson and Xu [163] proposed a blockchain based emissions trading
scheme to ensure transparency, tamper-resistance, and high liquidity. With respect
to the application of smart contract, a distributed carbon ledger system fitted with
existing market-based emissions trading schemes was designed in [164] to strengthen
the corporate accounting system for carbon asset management.
2.5.3 Remark of Research Challenges
Based on the aforementioned literature, the difference between the conventional
centralised trading and blockchain based peer-to-peer trading in the energy sector
is summarised in Table 2.2. This table explains the changes in both energy markets
and carbon markets, and the advantages of using blockchain into the peer-to-peer
trading, with detailed explanation as follows.
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First, the primary energy provider in conventional centralised trading is large
scale generators connected to the transmission networks, whereas the primary en-
ergy provider in blockchain based peer-to-peer trading is prosumers with DRESs
connected to the distribution networks.
Second, the pricing schemes in conventional energy markets and carbon markets
are centralised. For the case of the U.K. markets, the carbon price is determined
by the E.U. emissions trading scheme plus the U.K. carbon price support [68]. The
centralised carbon price applies for all carbon producers without difference; The
centralised wholesale energy price is determined by the wholesale market and applies
for all energy retailers without difference [166]. The retail energy price is determined
by energy retailers in retail markets and applies for all regional consumers without
difference [167]. By contrast, the pricing scheme in the blockchain based peer-to-
peer network is decentralised. Each individual prosumers can determine their own
bidding/selling prices for exchanging energy or carbon allowance, according to their
real-time situation of supply-demand balance.
Third, the negotiation and contract processing in the conventional energy mar-
kets are idiosyncratic [165], which means that each large-scale generator signs con-
tract with the transmission system operator individually, and the content of each
contract varies according to the specific situations of generators. By contrast, in the
blockchain based peer-to-peer trading, a standardised contract and negotiation can
be formulated by using the nature of smart contract, which reduces the complexity
when large amounts of prosumers formulate their own contracts.
Fourth, the settlement of conventional centralised trading is enforced by the legal
restraint, which means that if the energy or carbon allowance is not delivered at the
agreed time, retailers will be accused or receive penalty from power system operator
afterwards. By contrast, in the blockchain based peer-to-peer trading, the self-
enforcing nature of smart contract enables the violation of contract to be prevented
beforehand by querying the smart meters to ensure that prosumers have enough
capacity to supply.
Fifth, in the conventional centralised trading, the carbon accounting and energy
trading of generators rely on the third party, e.g. auditing institution or market
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operator, whereas in the blockchain based peer-to-peer network, prosumers' trust
relies on the automatic interactions between the smart contract and smart meters,
under the consensus of the blockchain network.
Sixth, in the conventional centralised trading, the low carbon incentive is formu-
lated by the policy maker, which is a long-term policy. By contrast, in the blockchain
based peer-to-peer trading, based on the formulated low carbon incentive mecha-
nism, the real-time low carbon incentive can be allocated by reaching a consensus
of the network.
From existing research and aforementioned discussion, separately designing en-
ergy or carbon markets is not efficient, because the purchasing of carbon allowance
is a part of energy costs. A decentralised trading framework needs to be designed
enabling prosumers to trade energy and carbon allowance together.
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Chapter 3
Game Theory for Low Carbon
Negotiation and Energy Scheduling
3.1 Introduction
The low carbon energy scheduling refers to strategically dispatching power gener-
ation from various sources and reshaping power consumption behaviours, for the
purpose of carbon emissions reduction, electricity bill saving, and generating profit
improving [85]. The low carbon behaviours of consumers and generators are driven
by monetary compensation and market-based policy incentives, i.e. carbon pric-
ing, respectively, formulated by the policy maker. In this chapter, a novel model
for energy scheduling and low carbon negotiation between the policy maker and
consumers/generators is proposed. A Stackelberg game-theoretic problem is for-
mulated to model the dynamic negotiation process, during which the policy maker
strategically formulates the monetary compensation rates and carbon prices to re-
duce total carbon emissions from power systems, and consumers/generators decide
their responding strategies, i.e. consumption behaviours/power outputs, to min-
imise electricity bills/maximise generating profits. An algorithm is proposed based
on the artificial immune system for solving the Stackelberg game-theoretic problem
to yield an optimal agreement between the policy maker and consumers/generators.
Case studies based on the U.K. power systems demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed model and algorithm, in comparison with the models of multiobjective
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optimization and aggregated scheduling.
Overall, this chapter offers the following contributions:
 A novel energy scheduling framework is proposed enabling the dynamic nego-
tiation of carbon reduction between policy maker and consumers/generators,
based on the Stackelberg game-theoretic model.
 A decentralised low carbon incentive mechanism is designed based on the de-
veloped carbon emissions tracing approach, to reduce the carbon emissions
incurred by specific time period and location of individual consumers.
 A bus test system is developed based on the GB power network structures and
operations, which demonstrates that the proposed low carbon energy schedul-
ing model can yield better bill saving and carbon emissions reduction, and
drive fuel-switching from coal/gas to renewable energy sources.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the proposed
model for low carbon energy scheduling, and discusses the carbon emissions tracing
approach and the mechanism of decentralised low carbon incentive. The framework
of low carbon energy scheduling is presented in Section 3.3 to analyse the strategies
of policy maker and consumers/generators. Section 3.4 formulates the Stackelberg
game-theoretic model to describe the process of negotiation and reaching an agree-
ment between the leader and followers. An algorithm is also developed to solve the
game-theoretic problem. Section 3.5 provides case studies on the context of the U.K.
power systems and energy market. Section 3.6 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Preliminary
In this section, the proposed model for low carbon energy scheduling is illustrated.
The approach of carbon emissions tracing and the mechanism of decentralised low
carbon incentive are discussed as a preliminary of scheduling framework.
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3.2.1 System Model
The proposed model for low carbon negotiation and energy scheduling between pol-
icy maker and generators/consumers is presented in Fig. 3.1. The generation sources
consist of solar, wind (including onshore and offshore), nuclear, coal, gas (including
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and open cycle gas turbine (OCGT)), biomass,
hydro (including hydro generation and pumped storage), and interconnectors. The
consumers consist of residential, commercial, and industrial users. The policy maker
incentivises reshaping power profiles for carbon reduction by charging carbon al-
lowance from generators as carbon cost and provide monetary compensation for
consumers. The proposed model is implemented in day-ahead market to enable the
energy scheduling for the following day and negotiation between the policy maker
and generators/consumers.
The information flows are processed by three types of agents: central data collec-
tion/distribution, central/distributed scheduling, and central/distributed decision-
making. The central data distribution agent in consumers' side distributes the
real-time data of monetary compensation rates and retail electricity prices to the
distributed smart meter of each consumer. Analogously, the central data distribu-
tion agent in generators' side distributes the real-time data of carbon prices and
wholesale electricity prices to the distributed smart meter or sensor of each genera-
tor. Receiving this data, the distributed scheduling agents perform optimisation ac-
cording to the predefined preferences, e.g. minimising electricity bills for individual
consumers and maximising profits for individual generators. The optimal scheduling
decisions of consumption and generation are sent to the distributed decision-making
agents to confirm whether individual consumers/generators accept these decisions.
Subsequently, the confirmed decisions are collected by the central data collection
agent and sent to the central scheduling agent to perform optimisation according to
the policy targets, e.g. carbon reduction and carbon tax neutrality. The optimal
policy decisions of monetary compensation rates and carbon prices are sent back to
the central data distribution agents. Additionally, the information of retail market
prices and wholesale market prices is provided by the market operator. The power
balance and system constraints are managed by the power system operator. The
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roles of both market operator and power system operator are beyond the scope of
this model architecture.
The process of negotiation between policy maker and consumers/generators, and
reaching an agreement of low carbon energy scheduling is modelled as the Stack-
elberg game-theoretic problem. The policy maker acts as a leader with strategies
of monetary compensation rates and carbon prices, and the consumers and gen-
erators act as followers with responding strategies of consumption and generation,
respectively.
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3.2.2 Carbon Emissions Tracing
To trace the temporal and spatial variations of carbon emissions from power systems,
two metrics are defined as [84]
 Metric 1 (Carbon Emissions Rate): The carbon emissions rate is defined as
the amount of carbon emissions from a point of power networks per unit of
time as
r =
e
∆t
, (3.2.1)
where r is the carbon emissions rate, ∆t is the time interval, and e is the
amount of carbon emissions during the time interval ∆t.
 Metric 2 (Carbon Emissions Intensity): The carbon emissions intensity is
defined as the amount of carbon emissions from a specific point of power
networks per unit of energy as
ρ =
e
p ·∆t =
r
p
, (3.2.2)
where ρ is the carbon emissions intensity, and p is the active power.
Let N , I, K, and L denote the index sets of buses, generators, loads, and trans-
mission lines, indexed by integers n ∈ N , i ∈ I, k ∈ K, and l ∈ L, respectively.
Consider a power network with |N | buses, |I| generators, |K| loads, and |L| trans-
mission lines, under which the CEF is categorised as CEF from generation (CEFG),
CEF from transmission (CEFT), CEF from transmission loss (CEFL), and CEF
from consumption (CEFC).
Carbon Emissions Flow from Generation
The CEFG traces the carbon emissions caused by electricity generation due to the
combustion of fossil fuels. The carbon emissions intensities of generators are deter-
mined by the carbon emissions intensities of input fuels and efficiency of electricity
supply [79] (Evaluation of carbon emissions intensities for each generation source
will be detailed in simulation). Let an |I|-size column vector ρCEFG denote the car-
bon emissions intensities of generators. The carbon emissions rates of generators
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can be calculated as
rCEFG = PCEFG × ρCEFG, (3.2.3)
where rCEFG is a |N |-size column vector to denote the carbon emissions rates of
generators, and PCEFG is a (|N | × |I|)-size matrix to denote the power outputs of
generators. The indices n and i of each element pCEFG,n,i ∈ PCEFG indicate that the
generator i is located at bus n. For the buses without generators, the corresponding
elements equal to zero.
Carbon Emissions Flows from Transmission and Consumption
The CEFT and CEFC trace the carbon emissions caused by generators when the
electricity is transmitted and consumed, respectively. Firstly, to calculate the car-
bon emissions rates of transmission and consumption, the corresponding carbon
emissions intensities need to be analysed. Analogous to the definition of bus in the
context of power flows, a bus in the context of CEF refers to a node connected by
various generators, loads, and transmission lines. The CEF flows through a bus from
inflows, e.g. generators and inflowing transmission lines, to outflows, e.g. loads and
outflowing lines. According to the proportional sharing principle [168] and distribu-
tion of the CEF [84], the following two properties hold for the distribution of CEFT
and CEFC. A schematic illustration of these two properties are presented in Fig.
3.2.
 Property 1 : The CEF caused by all power outflows from a bus (including
power outflows to the loads connected to this bus) equals to the CEF caused
by all power inflows to this bus (including power inflows from the generators
connected to this bus).
 Property 2 : The proportion of the CEF caused by one power inflow to the
CEF caused by all power inflows keeps unchanged in the CEFs caused by each
power outflow. Hence, all power outflows from the same bus would have the
same carbon emissions intensities.
Let a (|N | × |N |)-size skew-symmetric matrix PB denote the distribution of power
inflows from other buses yielded by power flow analysis. The indices na and nb
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Figure 3.2: Schematic illustration for the distribution of CEFT and CEFC. The
CEF caused by all power outflows from a bus equals to the CEF caused by all power
inflows to this bus (indicated by the size of CEF box). The bus homogenises the
carbon emissions intensities of all power inflows (indicated by the colour of CEF
box), so that all power outflows have the same carbon emissions intensities.
(na, nb ∈ N ) of each element pB,na,nb ∈ PB indicate the direction of power inflow in
transmission line is from bus na to bus nb. Recall that the (|N | × |I|)-size matrix
PCEFG represents the power inflows from generators. The distribution of power
inflows from both other buses and generators can be described as
PCEFT = diag
i(|N |+|I|) ×
 PB
PTCEFG
 , (3.2.4)
where PCEFT is a (|N | × |N |)-size diagonal matrix to denote the distribution of the
total power inflows from both other buses and generators, diag {·} is the operation
to create diagonal matrix, and i(|N |+|I|) is a (|N |+ |I|)-size unit row vector.
According to the Property 1, the carbon emissions rates caused by all power
inflows to each of buses equal to the carbon emissions rates caused by all power
inflows from other buses and generators as
PCEFT × ρCEFT = PTB × ρCEFT + rCEFG, (3.2.5)
where ρCEFT is a |N |-size column vector to denote the carbon emissions intensi-
ties of transmission and consumption. Thus, the carbon emissions intensities of
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transmission and consumption can be calculated as
ρCEFT = (PCEFT −PTB)−1 × rCEFG. (3.2.6)
Secondly, the carbon emissions rates of transmission and consumption can be
calculated as
RCEFT = diag{ρCEFT} ×PB, (3.2.7)
RCEFC = diag{ρCEFT} ×PCEFC, (3.2.8)
where RCEFT is a (|N | × |N |)-size square matrix to denote the carbon emissions
rates of transmission, RCEFC is a (|N | × |K|)-size matrix to denote the carbon emis-
sions rates of consumption, and PCEFC is a (|N | × |K|)-size matrix to denote the
distribution of power loads yielded by power flow analysis. The indices na and nb
(na, nb ∈ N ) of each element rCEFT,na,nb ∈ RCEFT indicate the direction of CEFT
in transmission line is from bus na to bus nb. The indices n and k of elements
rCEFC,n,k ∈ RCEFC and pCEFC,n,k ∈ PCEFC indicate that the load k is located at bus
n.
Carbon Emissions Flow from Transmission Loss
According to the Property 2, the power loss can be taken as a power outflow from a
bus, and has the same carbon emissions intensities with other power outflows from
this bus. Recall that PB denotes the distribution of power inflows to each of buses
in power networks. Let a (|N | × |N |)-size square matrix P′B denote the distribution
of power outflows from each of buses in power networks. The carbon emissions rates
of transmission losses can be calculated as
RCEFL = diag{ρCEFT} × (P′B −PB), (3.2.9)
where RCEFL is a (|N | × |N |)-size square matrix to denote the carbon emissions
rates of transmission losses. The indices na and nb (na, nb ∈ N ) of each element
rCEFL,na,nb ∈ RCEFL indicate the direction of CEFL in a transmission line is from
bus na to bus nb.
Remark: For simplicity, the matrix calculations of CEF are represented by
fCEF (·) in the following sections. Let pk,t and rk,t denote the power consumption
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and corresponding carbon emissions rate of load k ∈ K at scheduling time t, and
pi,t and ri,t denote the power generation and corresponding carbon emissions rate of
generator i ∈ I at scheduling time t. Hence, for each load k and generator i, the
CEF is a function of power flow as
rk,t = fCEF (pk,t) , (3.2.10)
ri,t = fCEF (pi,t) . (3.2.11)
3.2.3 Decentralised Low Carbon Incentive Mechanism
Once the carbon emissions of individual consumers are traced, a low carbon incentive
can be formulated by the policy maker in the form of monetary compensation. The
target of low carbon incentive is on each of individual consumers, instead of an
ensemble of consumers as in the centralised incentive approaches. Let γk (·) denote
the function of the monetary compensation for carbon reduction of load k. The
following assumptions need to be considered to formulate the low carbon incentive.
 Assumption 1 : The monetary compensation should be non-negative. When
the carbon emissions rate with policy maker's incentive reduces to zero, the
monetary compensation of load k should be maximum, i.e. γk = γmaxk , if rk,t =
0, where γmaxk is the maximum monetary compensation for carbon reduction
of load k.
 Assumption 2 : If the carbon emissions rate after the policy maker's incentive
is higher than or equal to that before the policy maker's incentive, consumers
will not receive any monetary compensation as
γk
(
rk,t, r
′
k,t
)
= 0, rk,t ≥ r′k,t, (3.2.12)
where r′k,t is the carbon emissions rate caused by power consumption behaviour
of load k at scheduling time t before policy maker's incentive.
 Assumption 3 : When the carbon emissions rate before the policy maker's
incentive r′k,t is known, the monetary compensation should be monotonically
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decreasing to the carbon emissions rate after policy maker's incentive rk,t as
∂γk
(
rk,t, r
′
k,t
)
∂rk,t
< 0. (3.2.13)
 Assumption 4 : The loads with high-level of carbon emissions will receive more
monetary compensation than the loads with low-level of carbon emissions,
because those loads with high-level of carbon emissions are more urgent for
carbon mitigation. This means that the marginal monetary compensation
should be monotonically increasing to the carbon emissions rate before policy
maker's incentive r′k,t as
∂2γk
(
rk,t, r
′
k,t
)
∂r′2k,t
> 0. (3.2.14)
Hence, the following function which satisfies all the assumptions is modelled as the
decentralised monetary compensation for carbon reduction
γk
(
rk,t, r
′
k,t
)
:=
αt ·
√(
r′k,t ·∆t
)2 − (rk,t ·∆t)2, r′k,t > rk,t,
0, r′k,t ≤ rk,t,
(3.2.15)
where αt is the monetary compensation rate at scheduling time t.
3.3 Framework of Low Carbon Energy Scheduling
This section describes the framework of low carbon energy scheduling. The strategies
of consumers/generators and policy maker are analysed in order to model the process
of negotiation and reaching an agreement by Stackelberg game theory.
3.3.1 The Role of Consumers
The role of consumers aims to minimise the electricity bills by strategically deciding
the consumption behaviours and responding to the low carbon incentive. The carbon
emissions caused by time-varying and region-varying consumption behaviours can be
traced by the proposed CEF model. By incorporating the monetary compensation
into the electricity bills for individual consumers, policy maker can facilitate the
reshaping of consumption behaviours in a low carbon manner by eliminating the
high-carbon regions and time periods.
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The objective function of electricity bills can be modelled as
fk (pk,t, rk,t) :=
∑
t∈T
[pk,t ·∆t · pit − γk (rk,t)] , (3.3.16)
where fk (·) is the objective function of electricity bills of consumer k, T is the
index set of scheduling time, and pit is the retail electricity price at scheduling time
t charged by the electricity suppliers. For the scheduling interval of 0.5 h, we have
(∆t,|T |)=(0.5,48).
When consumers change their consumption behaviours, the power level of each
load should be restricted to certain limits considering the load type as
pmink ≤ pk,t ≤ pmaxk , (3.3.17)
where pmink and p
max
k are the minimum and maximum power consumption levels of
load k, respectively.
Therefore, the objective of individual consumers is to minimise their electricity
bills with decision variables of the power consumption behaviours and corresponding
carbon emissions rates as
min
pk,t,rk,t
: fk (pk,t, rk,t) , (3.3.18)
s.t.: (3.2.10), and (3.3.17).
Remark : Since this chapter focuses on the whole U.K. power systems, in order
to represent the technical properties of power systems whilst reducing complexity,
an ensemble of regional loads are merged as a consumer. The details of simplified
systems will be introduced in case studies.
3.3.2 The Role of Generators
The role of generators aims to maximise their profits by strategically dispatching
power outputs and responding to the carbon prices. The profits can be described as
the difference between the revenue of selling electricity to the wholesale markets and
the generating costs. As one of the generating costs, the carbon cost quantifies how
much the generators pay for the allowance of pollutant emissions, and is subject
to the variations of carbon prices. By incorporating the carbon prices into the
generating costs, policy maker can facilitate the power generation to transit from
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using the high carbon sources to using the low carbon sources, e.g. renewable energy
sources.
To analyse the incentive effects of carbon prices, the carbon cost is set aside from
the operating costs. The function of carbon cost can be modelled as
ccarbon,i (ri,t) := ri,t ·∆t · picarbon,t, (3.3.19)
where ccarbon,i (·) is the function of carbon cost of generator i, and picarbon,t is the
carbon price at scheduling time t.
Apart from the carbon cost, other operating costs include costs of operation,
maintenance, fuel, and carbon capture and storage [169] (costs of pre-development,
construction, decommissioning, and waste are not considered in our dynamic schedul-
ing problem). The coefficients of operating costs for each of energy sources are eval-
uated by the levelised costs of electricity generation (LCoE) [170]. The LCoE is a
discounted lifetime cost of a specific generation source, and quantified by the ratio
of the total costs of a source to the total expected amount of electricity generation.
Let δi denote the coefficient of the total operating costs of generator i. The function
of operating costs can be modelled as
ci (pi,t) := pi,t ·∆t · δi, (3.3.20)
where ci (·) is the function of operating costs of generator i excluding the carbon
cost.
The objective function of profits can be modelled as
fi (pi,t, ri,t) :=
∑
t∈T
{pi,t ·∆t · piws,t − [ccarbon,i (ri,t) + ci (pi,t)]} , (3.3.21)
where fi (·) is the objective function of profits of generator i, and piws,t is the wholesale
electricity price at scheduling time t purchased by the electricity suppliers.
When generators change their power outputs, the output level of each generator
should be restricted to certain limits considering the capacities of generators as
pmini ≤ pi,t ≤ pmaxi , (3.3.22)
where pmini and p
max
i are the minimum and maximum power generation levels of
generator i, respectively.
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Therefore, the objective of individual generators is to maximise their profits
with decision variables of power generation dispatching and corresponding carbon
emissions rate as
max
pi,t,ri,t
: fi (pi,t, ri,t) , (3.3.23)
s.t.: (3.2.11), and (3.3.22).
3.3.3 The Role of Policy Maker
The role of policy maker aims to mitigate the total carbon emissions from power
systems and facilitate the carbon revenue neutrality, by strategically adjusting the
carbon prices and monetary compensation rates. According to the carbon footprint
[84], the total carbon emissions rate from power systems equals to the total carbon
emissions rate of generators, and is subject to the CEF conservation at any given
time as ∑
i∈I
ri,t =
∑
k∈K
rk,t +
∑
l∈L
rl,t = % ·
∑
i∈I
ri,t + (1− %) ·
∑
i∈I
ri,t, (3.3.24)
where rl,t is the carbon emissions rate caused by the transmission loss of line l ∈ L,
and % is the ratio of the carbon emissions from consumption side to total carbon
emissions.
Through solving the objective functions of consumers and generators, the optimal
carbon emissions rates of each load k and generator i at scheduling time t, denoted
as r∗k,t and r
∗
i,t, respectively, can be obtained by the policy maker. The policy maker
subsequently adjusts the carbon prices and monetary compensation rates to abate
the total carbon emissions rate of generators by ∆rt. According to (3.3.24), the total
carbon emissions rate of consumers would be abated by (% ·∆rt) correspondingly.
Firstly, from the economic perspective, the carbon revenue neutrality defines that
the revenue from low carbon policy should be redistributed in a manner of monetary
incentive [171]. In our research, this means that the difference between the revenue
of selling carbon allowance to generators and the cost of monetary compensation to
consumers should be eliminated. Hence, the objective function of carbon revenue
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neutrality can be modelled as
fn (picarbon,t, αt,∆rt,∆rk,t) :=
∑
t∈T
{∑
i∈I
ccarbon,i
(
r∗i,t −∆rt
)−∑
k∈K
γk
(
r∗k,t −∆rk,t, r∗k,t
)}
,
(3.3.25)
where fn (·) is the objective function of carbon revenue neutrality, fn > 0, ∆rt is the
amount of abatement for the total carbon emissions rate of generators at scheduling
time t, and ∆rk,t is the amount of abatement for the carbon emissions rate of load
k at scheduling time t.
There are constraints when the policy maker decides the carbon prices, monetary
compensation rates, and the amount of abatement for the total carbon emissions
rates of generators as
pimincarbon ≤ picarbon,t ≤ pimaxcarbon, (3.3.26)
αmin ≤ αt ≤ αmax, (3.3.27)
∆rmin ≤ ∆rt ≤ ∆rmax, (3.3.28)
where pimincarbon and pi
max
carbon are the minimum and maximum levels of carbon prices,
respectively, αmin and αmax are the minimum and maximum levels of monetary com-
pensation rates, respectively, and ∆rmin and ∆rmax are the minimum and maximum
levels of abatement for the total carbon emissions rate, respectively.
Remark : The decision variable ∆rt targets on the overall carbon emissions, in-
stead of the carbon emissions of each generator. This design facilitates the generators
with low carbon sources to replace the generators with high carbon sources, so as to
achieve overall carbon reduction. On the contrary, due to the design of decentralised
carbon incentive mechanism (3.2.15), for the same amount of carbon abatement, the
received monetary compensation would be different for consumers at various carbon
emissions levels. Hence, the decision variable ∆rk,t targets on the carbon emissions
of each load, and is subject to the following constraint∑
k∈K
∆rk,t = % ·∆rt. (3.3.29)
Secondly, from the environmental perspective, the policy marker should abate
the total carbon emissions from power systems. The total carbon emissions can be
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modelled as
fc (∆rt) :=
∑
t∈T
(∑
i∈I
r∗i,t −∆rt
)
·∆t, (3.3.30)
where fc (·) is the objective function of total carbon emissions.
Therefore, the objectives of policy marker are to achieve carbon revenue neu-
trality, and minimise the total carbon emissions from power systems, with decision
variables of carbon prices, monetary compensation rates, and the amount of carbon
abatement of generators and each load, which leads to a multiobjective optimisation
problem (MOP) as
min
picarbon,t,αt,
∆rt,∆rk,t
: {fn (picarbon,t, αt,∆rt,∆rk,t) , fc (∆rt)} , (3.3.31)
s.t.: (3.3.26), (3.3.27), (3.3.28), and (3.3.29).
3.4 Solution of Game-Theoretic Problem
In this section, the Stackelberg game-theoretic problem is formulated. Through
analysing the approaches of solving this problem, an algorithm is developed based
on the basic structures of artificial immune system.
3.4.1 Problem Formulation
In the proposed framework, the policy maker acts as a leader to formulate the
strategies of carbon prices and monetary compensation rates. By contrast, |K|
consumers and |I| generators act as followers to decide the generation, consumption
and corresponding carbon emissions rates as responding strategies to the leader.
This leads to a 1 - leader, (|K|+ |I|) - follower Stackelberg game-theoretic problem.
The procedure of the Stackelberg game between leader and followers is as follows
Step 1 : The policy marker initialises its strategies as
picarbon,t = pi
min
carbon, αt = α
min. (3.4.32)
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Step 2 : With the policy marker's strategies, the consumers and generators decide
their responding strategies through solving their optimisation problems as{
p∗k,t, r
∗
k,t
}
= arg min
pk,t,rk,t
: fk (pk,t, rk,t) |αt=αmin (3.4.33)
s.t.: (3.2.10), and (3.3.17),{
p∗i,t, r
∗
i,t
}
= arg min
pi,t,ri,t
: −fi (pi,t, ri,t) |picarbon,t=pimincarbon , (3.4.34)
s.t.: (3.2.11), and (3.3.22).
Step 3 : After all the generators and consumers submit their scheduled power
generation and consumption, the power system operator performs the power flow
analysis under the system constraints to maintain the operational security of the
power systems. The system constraints include power balance constraint, voltage
limits, apparent power limits, line flow limits, thermal limits, and voltage angle
limits with details as studied in [172].
Step 4 : With the responding strategies of the generators and consumers, the
policy marker adjusts its strategies through solving its optimisation problems as{
pi∗carbon,t, α
∗
t ,∆r
∗
t ,∆r
∗
k,t
}
= arg min
picarbon,t,αt,
∆rt,∆rk,t
: {fn (picarbon,t, αt,∆rt,∆rk,t) , fc (∆rt)} ,
(3.4.35)
s.t.: (3.3.26), (3.3.27), (3.3.28), and (3.3.29).
Step 5 : The policy marker updates its strategies as
picarbon,t = pi
∗
carbon,t, αt = α
∗
t . (3.4.36)
With the updated policy marker's strategies, the consumers and generators
change their responding strategies through solving their objective functions. The
iteration continues until the carbon emissions from power systems meet the policy
marker's target of carbon abatement (∆r∗t = ∆r
∗
k,t = 0), or the maximum number
of iteration for negotiation between the policy maker and consumers/generators is
reached (ι = ιmax, where ι is the number of iteration, and ιmax is the maximum
number of iteration). This step indicates the stopping criteria of the Stackelberg
game as
∆r∗t = ∆r
∗
k,t = 0, or ι = ι
max. (3.4.37)
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The outputs are final optimal scheduling decisions pi∗carbon,t, α
∗
t , p
∗
k,t, r
∗
k,t, p
∗
i,t, and r
∗
i,t.
The flowchart of the Stackelberg game between leader and followers is presented in
Fig. 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Flowchart of the Stackelberg game between leader and followers.
3.4.2 Solution Analysis
To find optimal solutions for both the leader and followers' problems as an agreement
of negotiation, the deterministic approaches, such as gradient based algorithms and
non-linear programming, are liable to yield sub-optimal solutions for the following
reasons:
 The piecewise function of monetary compensation (3.2.15) results in the ob-
jective function of consumers to be a non-linear and non-convex function.
 The carbon emissions rates are disproportional to the power outputs due to
the dynamic carbon emissions intensities, resulting in the non-linear function
of carbon costs and thus the non-linear function of profits.
 The approach of carbon emissions tracing causes the feasible range of carbon
emissions rates to be a discrete space.
To overcome these challenges, our research develops an intelligent algorithm based
on the basic structure of artificial immune system to search the entire feasible space
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of decision variables for finding the global optimal solutions. Given that the fol-
lowers of individual consumers/generators optimise their own objective functions
separately and simultaneously, the followers distributed immune algorithm (FDIA)
is developed. For the MOP of the leader, the leader multiobjective immune algo-
rithm (LMIA) is developed to find the trade-off between leader's objectives.
3.4.3 Algorithms
Using the equality constraints (3.2.10) and (3.2.11), the followers' decision variables
rk,t and ri,t can be substituted by pk,t and pi,t, and these equality constraints can
be eliminated. Analogously, using equality constraint (3.3.29), the leader' s deci-
sion variable ∆rt can be substituted by ∆rk,t, and this equality constraint can be
eliminated.
To facilitate the discussions of algorithms, first, define vector-valued decision
variables and objective functions as follows
pfollower = [pi,t, pk,t|i = 1, ..., |I| , k = 1, ..., |K| , t = 1, ..., |T |] , (3.4.38)
pleader = [picarbon,t, αt,∆rk,t|k = 1, ..., |K| , t = 1, ..., |T |] , (3.4.39)
ffollower = [−fi (pi,t) , fk (pk,t) |i = 1, ..., |I| , k = 1, ..., |K|] , (3.4.40)
fleader = [fn (picarbon,t, αt,∆rk,t) , fc (∆rk,t)] , (3.4.41)
where pfollower is a [(|K|+ |I|)× |T |]-size row vector to denote the decision vari-
ables of followers, pleader is a [(|K|+ 2)× |T |]-size row vector to denote the decision
variables of the leader, ffollower is a (|K|+ |I|)-size row vector to denote the objec-
tive functions of followers, and fleader is a 2-size row vector to denote the objective
functions of the leader. Additionally, the lower bounds and upper bounds of the
decision variables of followers as described in (3.3.17) and (3.3.22) are denoted by
vectors p
follower
and pfollower, respectively. The lower bounds and upper bounds of
the decision variables of the leader as described in (3.3.26), (3.3.27), and (3.3.28)
are denoted by vectors p
leader
and pleader, respectively.
Next, the definitions with respect to the artificial immune system [173] and
Pareto optimality [174] are introduced as follows
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 Definition 1 (Antigen-Antibody): A random vector p in the decision variable
space
[
p,p
]
is termed as an antigen. The corresponding objective function
f (p) is termed as an antibody. All vectors generated from the decision variable
space form an antigen population as
A = {p1, ...,p|A|} , (3.4.42)
where A is the set of antigen population, and |A| is the number of antigens in
this population.
 Definition 2 (Clone and Mutation): The clonal process enables more antigens
to be reproduced over the decision variable space
[
p,p
]
. Through preserving
the diversity of antigens, the entire feasible space of decision variables can be
searched to ensure the global optimal solution. The amount of reproduced
antigens can be described by clonal rate as
rc :=
⌊ |Amax|
|A|
⌋
, (3.4.43)
where rc is the clonal rate, |Amax| is the maximum number of antigens in
the population, and b·c is the floor function. Hence, each original antigen in
(3.4.42) is cloned by (rc − 1) antigens through the mutation process to form
the set of clonal antigen population as
Ac =
{
p11, ...,p
rc−1
1 , ...,p
1
|A|, ...,p
rc−1
|A|
}
, (3.4.44)
where Ac is the set of clonal antigen population, in which each mutant can be
calculated as: ϑ · p + (1− ϑ) · p′, where ϑ ∈ [0, 1] is a random number, and
p′ is a random vector in the decision variable space
[
p,p
]
. Through the clone
and mutation process, the antigen population becomes Amax = A ∪Ac.
 Definition 3 (Pareto Dominance): A vector of objective function f (pa) domi-
nates another vector of objective function f (pb) in the decision variable space
pa,pb ∈
[
p,p
]
, denoted as f (pa)  f (pb), if f(pa) ≤ f(pb), ∀f(pa) ∈ f (pa),
f(pb) ∈ f (pb) holds true and at least one inequality is strict. The vector f (pb)
is termed as dominated antibody.
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 Definition 4 (Pareto Optimal Solution): A vector of decision variable p∗ ∈[
p,p
]
is a Pareto optimal solution, if its objective function f (p) dominates all
objective functions of any other feasible decision variables in
[
p,p
]
.
 Definition 5 (Pareto Optimal Set and Pareto Frontier): The set of all Pareto
optimal solutions is termed as the Pareto optimal set, denoted as P = {p∗}.
The graphical presentation of objective functions of the Pareto optimal solu-
tions in the Pareto optimal set is termed as the Pareto frontier.
Figure 3.4: Schematic illustration of the Pareto dominance and Pareto frontier. The
problem seeks for minimisation of two objective functions. Point b is dominated by
points a and c.
A schematic illustration of the Pareto dominance and Pareto frontier for a min-
imisation problem is presented in Fig. 3.4. Point b is a dominated antibody, whereas
points a and c are non-dominated antibodies. Under the same value of f1 (p), point a
provides a smaller value of f2 (p) than point b. Analogously, under the same value of
f2 (p), point c provides a smaller value of f1 (p) than point b. All the non-dominated
antibodies form the Pareto frontier.
The proposed algorithm is performed over the entire scheduling horizon |T | for
the following day. During the operation of the artificial immune algorithm, the
antigens are randomly generated and cloned to explore the entire decision variable
space. In each iteration, the dominated antigen-antibody pairs are removed to keep
the non-dominated ones. Until the iteration ends, the antigens of all non-dominated
antibodies form the optimal solution. The results of each generator/consumer serve
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as the best solution that maximises/minimises its profits/electricity bills, whereas
the results of the policy maker serve as a set of Pareto optimal solutions in the Pareto
frontier that achieves a trade-off between the carbon revenue neutrality and carbon
emissions reduction. Let ιFDIA and ιLMIA denote the nominal numbers of iterations
of the FDIA and LMIA, respectively, and ιmaxFDIA and ι
max
LMIA denote the corresponding
maximum numbers of iterations. The pseudocode code of the proposed FDIA-LMIA
is shown in Algorithm 1.
3.5 Case studies
In this section, case studies have been conducted to evaluate the proposed model
and algorithms on the context of the U.K. power systems and energy market. The
performances of low carbon energy scheduling under various policies are examined
to yield an appropriate policy design.
3.5.1 Simulation Setup and Data Availability
The proposed FDIA-LMIA is written in the MATLAB language. The simulations
are performed using a machine with IntelR CoreTM i9-9900K CPU at 3.60 GHz.
To improve the computational efficiency, 8-core parallel computing is used during
the clone and mutation process of the proposed FDIA-LMIA. The maximum and
nominal numbers of antigens are set as 6000 and 3000, respectively, and the numbers
of iterations for both the immune algorithm and Stackelberg game-theoretic model
are set as 50, based on the empirical study. The simulations are repeated 10 times
to eliminate the randomness and outliers.
The GB 29-bus test system is a simplified transmission network developed by
[176] to represent the technical properties of the GB transmission network whilst
reducing complexity. This test system is adopted by our research to examine the
effects of the formulated low carbon policies on the context of the GB power systems.
The schematic illustration of this test system is presented in Fig. 3.5. The GB 29-
bus test system consists of 29 buses, 98 double-circuit branches, 1 single-circuit
branch, and 89 generators. The total installed capacity of each generation source
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Algorithm 1 FDIA-LMIA
Input: minimum monetary compensation rate αmin, minimum carbon prices pimin
carbon
, and maxi-
mum number of iteration ιmax
1: initialise policy maker's strategies: αt = α
min
t , picarbon,t = pi
min
carbon,t
2: while ∆r∗k,t 6= 0, or ι ≤ ιmax do
3: followers distributed immune algorithm:
4: Input: monetary compensation rate αt, carbon prices picarbon,t, and nominal and maximum
number of antigens in the population of followers |Afollower| and |Amaxfollower|, respectively
5: randomly initialise the antigen population of followers within the decision variable space[
p
follower
,pfollower
]
as Afollower (0) =
{
pfollower,1, ...,pfollower,|Afollower|
}
6: while ιFDIA ≤ ιmaxFDIA do
7: implement clone and mutation operation according to (3.4.44), and the number of current
antigens |Afollower (ιFDIA)| increases to |Amaxfollower|
8: remove dominated antibodies and corresponding antigens from Afollower (ιFDIA)
9: while |Afollower (ιFDIA)| > |Afollower| do
10: remove the antigen-antibody pairs with small avidities according to [175], i.e. remove
the vectors of objective function in a crowded region
11: end while
12: Afollower (ιFDIA + 1) = Afollower (ιFDIA) , ιFDIA = ιFDIA + 1
13: end while
14: Output: optimal solution p∗
follower
=
[
p∗i,t, p
∗
k,t|i = 1, ..., |I| , k = 1, ..., |K| , t = 1, ..., |T |
]
15: leader multiobjective immune algorithm:
16: Input: p∗
follower
, |Aleader|, and |Amaxleader|
17: randomly initialise the antigen population of the leader within the decision variable space[
p
leader
,pleader
]
as Aleader (0) =
{
pleader,1, ...,pleader,|Aleader|
}
18: while ιLMIA ≤ ιmaxLMIA do
19: implement clone and mutation operation according to (3.4.44), and the number of current
antigens |Aleader (ιLMIA)| increases to |Amaxleader|
20: remove dominated antibodies and corresponding antigens from Aleader (ιLMIA)
21: while |Aleader (ιLMIA)| > |Aleader| do
22: remove the antigen-antibody pairs with small avidities according to [175]
23: end while
24: Aleader (ιLMIA + 1) = Aleader (ιLMIA) , ιLMIA = ιLMIA + 1
25: end while
26: Output: Pareto optimal set Pleader =
{
p∗
leader
|p∗
leader
=
[
pi∗
carbon,t, α
∗
t |t = 1, ..., |T |
]}
27: ι = ι+ 1, αt = α
∗
t , picarbon,t = pi
∗
carbon,t
28: end while
Output: Pleader,p∗follower
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is allocated to each generator, according to the installed capacities and locations of
the GB power plants at the end of 2019, published by the Department for Business,
Energy, and industrial Strategy [177]. The nuclear operates as baseload plants in
the GB power systems. Hence, the power output of nuclear is not considered as a
decision variable. The storages are included to dispatch power outputs of solar and
wind. The buses with installed generation capacity more than 5000 MW are set
as PV buses, the bus 27 is set as a reference bus, and other buses are set as PQ
buses. The allocation percentages and power factors of 29 loads in [178] are used to
allocate the total consumption to each load. The real-time states of the GB power
consumption are obtained from the GridWatch [179]. The power flow analysis is
performed by the Matpower using Newton-Raphson method.
Table 3.1: Coefficients of operating costs for generation sources
Source Onshore Wind Gas Nuclear Solar Hydro
Costs Coefficients (¿/MWh) 15 40 21 9 23
Source Offshore Wind Biomass Coal Import
Costs Coefficients (¿/MWh) 28 80 42 65
The ¿144/MWh of average retail electricity price from the U.K. suppliers [180] is
adopted, and the flat electricity pricing scheme is used in our research to specifically
investigate the impacts of carbon prices and monetary compensation rates. The
wholesale electricity price accounts for 45 % of the retail price [180]. The coefficients
of operating costs of generators for project commissioning in 2020 [170] are adopted
as shown in Table 3.1. The ¿18/ton of the U.K. carbon price support is used as
the minimum carbon price. Considering the variability of renewable energy sources
would cause additional carbon emissions from part-loaded thermal generators, the
dynamic carbon emissions intensities are modelled as follows.
 The coal and CCGT which are the dominant sources of carbon emissions
primarily operate at part-loaded. The part-loaded operation would reduce unit
efficiency, increase fuel consumption, and raise carbon emissions intensity. The
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Figure 3.5: Schematic illustration of the GB 29-bus test system and allocation of
generation capacities. The allocation is based on the installed capacities of the GB
power plants. The percentage of allocated capacities is shown in the pie chart of
each bus.
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following relationships between carbon emissions intensities and power factors
of coal and CCGT are used as studied in [77]
ρcoal,t =6.4 · cosθ6coal,t − 29.0 · cosθ5coal,t + 54.7 · cosθ4coal,t
− 56.1 · cosθ3coal,t + 33.9 · cosθ2coal,t − 12.0 · cosθcoal,t + 3.1
(3.5.45)
ρCCGT,t =0.14 · cosθ6CCGT,t − 0.68 · cosθ5CCGT,t + 1.49 · cosθ4CCGT,t
− 1.91 · cosθ3CCGT,t + 1.69 · cosθ2CCGT,t − 1.05 · cosθCCGT,t + 0.71
(3.5.46)
where ρcoal,t and ρCCGT,t are the carbon emissions intensities of coal and CCGT
at scheduling time t, respectively, and cosθcoal,t and cosθCCGT,t are power fac-
tors of coal and CCGT at scheduling time t, respectively.
 For other generation sources, the impact of part-loading on carbon emissions
intensities is not found to be significant by the study in [77]. Hence, the
average annual carbon emissions intensities are applied to the biomass and
nuclear, and evaluated by using the method proposed by Hawkes [79] as
ρ¯i =
Carbon Emissions Intensities of Fuel× Fuel Usage
Gross Electricity Supply
, (3.5.47)
where ρ¯i is the average annual carbon emissions intensity of source i. The
data of fuel usage and gross electricity supply is published by the Digest of the
U.K. Energy Statistics [181]. The data of carbon emissions intensities of fuel
is published by the U.K. Government Greenhouse Gas Conversion Factors for
Company Reporting [182].
 The carbon emissions of wind, hydro and solar primarily arise in manufacture
and construction. Hence, the operational carbon emissions intensities of these
sources are assumed to be zero in our research.
 The carbon emissions of interconnectors are caused by transmission and dis-
tribution losses. The data of carbon emissions intensities of transmission and
distribution losses is published by the U.K. Government Greenhouse Gas Con-
version Factors for Company Reporting [182].
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For comparing the results of the policy maker's MOP, a criteria in [183] is used
to select a representative solution from the Pareto frontier. An optimal solution
that maximises the minimum improvement (after normalisation) of all objective
functions is selected as the representative solution as
frep = max
p∈A
min
f∈f
f − f (p)
f − f , (3.5.48)
where frep is the vector of representative objective functions form the Pareto frontier,
f and f are the minimal and maximal values of each objective function.
3.5.2 Algorithms Evaluation
To evaluate the performances of the proposed Stackelberg game-theoretic model and
FDIA-LMIA, the following cases are used as a comparison:
 Case 1 (Benchmark): The benchmark is yielded by the sum of the GB power
system historical data of four representative days in 2019 [179] with equal
weight. According to the current GB carbon market design, the ¿30/ton is
used as the carbon prices (the U.K. carbon price support plus the EU ETS)
and ¿0/ton is used as the monetary compensation rate.
 Case 2 (MOP): Instead of using the Stackelberg game-theoretic model to sim-
ulate the process of negotiation and yield an optimal scheduling decisions,
a MOP is used to perform the scheduling for policy maker, consumers, and
generators simultaneously without iteration as studied in [183].
 Case 3 (Followers Aggregated Immune Algorithm (FAIA)): Instead of target-
ing on each individual consumers/generators, the FAIA schedules the aggre-
gated demand/supply to minimise/maximise the overall electricity bills/costs
as studied in [54].
The comparison of the aforementioned scheduling models and algorithms in
terms of realising the carbon emissions reduction targets of policy maker is pre-
sented in Fig. 3.6. For the MOP, without the process of iterative negotiation and
reaching an optimal agreement, the policy maker is unable to dynamically adjust
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of scheduling models and algorithms in terms of realis-
ing the carbon emissions reduction targets. The x axes indicate the percentage
of carbon emissions reduction by policy maker's targets, relative to the daily car-
bon emissions of benchmark. The y axes indicate the percentage of carbon emis-
sions reduction by consumers/generators' scheduling, relative to the daily carbon
emissions of benchmark. The green regions indicate the policy maker's targets
are achieved by consumers/generators' scheduling, whereas the red regions indi-
cate consumers/generators' scheduling fails to achieve the policy maker's targets.
The scheduling results are sampled in every 10 %.
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carbon prices and monetary compensation rates, and fails to incentivise the con-
sumers/generators to achieve the carbon reduction targets through scheduling. The
percentage of daily carbon emissions reduction of consumers/generators by MOP
remains at approximately 10 %, irrespective of the increasing carbon reduction tar-
gets. By contrast, through using the proposed scheduling model and the FAIA,
consumers/generators can be incentivised to keep reducing their carbon emissions
for meeting the increased carbon reduction targets, until above 40 % of carbon
emissions reduction. Additionally, as studied in [184], the power system operations
resulting from optimising an aggregated objective function may favour a particu-
lar participant, whereas our proposed FDIA-LMIA targets on each individual con-
sumers/generators' own objective function. Hence, the proposed model can further
improve to approximately 50 % of the carbon emissions reduction.
Table 3.2: Comparison of yielded objective functions by scheduling models and
algorithms
Benchmark Proposed Model MOP FAIA
Daily Electricity Bills (m¿) 105.51 95.96 96.97 96.24
Daily Profits (m¿) 17.92 16.58 16.68 16.64
Daily Carbon Emissions (kton) 42.92 37.15 38.63 38.56
The comparison of yielded objective functions by the aforementioned scheduling
models and algorithms is presented in Table 3.2. The electricity bills of all con-
sumers and profits of all generators are aggregated for comparison. The proposed
scheduling model and FDIA-LMIA yield the lowest daily electricity bills and carbon
emissions. For the daily profits, the proposed FDIA-LMIA targets on each individ-
ual generators, which enables the profits of generators with renewable energy sources
to be improved and the profits of generators with coal and gas to be reduced. Since
the generators with coal and gas account for a majority of power outputs, the profits
of our proposed model are lower than the profits of benchmark and non-negotiation
cases.
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3.5.3 Scheduling Performances
Figure 3.7: Carbon emissions tracing for generators/consumers over the scheduling
process. The x axes indicate the scheduling time of day. The y axes indicate the
number of generators/consumers. The z axes and colourbar indicate the carbon
emissions of individual generators/consumers for a given 0.5 h scheduling interval.
`Benchmark' and `Scheduling' refer to the carbon emissions before and after the
scheduling, respectively. `Reduction' refers to the difference of carbon emissions
before and after the scheduling.
The carbon emissions tracing for individual generators/consumers over the schedul-
ing process is presented in Fig. 3.7. For generation sources with high carbon emis-
sions intensities, i.e. coal and gas, the corresponding generators are incentivised
to ramp down the power outputs during the entire scheduling horizon for carbon
reduction and cost saving. It is particular for the peak demand period from the
twenty-fifth scheduling time to the thirty-sixth scheduling time, during which about
500 tons of carbon emissions per half-hour are reduced, accounting for 31.25 % of
the highest carbon emissions rate from generators. Meanwhile, the power outputs of
renewable energy sources ramp up to complement the decrease of coal and gas with-
out causing additional carbon emissions. Analogously, for the loads with high-level
of carbon emissions, the corresponding consumers are incentivised to shift or curtail
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the demand for carbon reduction, in order to earn the monetary compensation and
save electricity bills. During the peak demand period, about 200 tons of carbon
emissions per half-hour are reduced, accounting for 13.33 % of the highest carbon
emissions rate from consumers.
Incentive Effects of Monetary Compensation Rates on Consumers
Carbon Emissions
Consumer 1
Consumer 8
Consumer 15
Consumer 22
Consumer 29 -15%
-10%
-5% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
Electricity Bills
0 10 20 30 40 50
Monetary Compensation Rate (£/ton)
Consumer 1
Consumer 8
Consumer 15
Consumer 22
Consumer 29 -9%
-7%
-5%
-3%
-1%
Figure 3.8: Carbon emissions and electricity bills of consumers as a function of mon-
etary compensation rates. The x axes indicate the monetary compensation rates.
The y axes indicate the number of consumers. The colourbars indicate the percent-
age of increase (positive)/decrease (negative) of carbon emissions and electricity bills
for each consumer at a given monetary compensation rate, compared to the carbon
emissions and electricity bills without the monetary compensation rate, respectively.
The chromatograms in Fig. 3.8 show the trends of carbon emissions and electric-
ity bills of consumers as the monetary compensation rates increase. Each column
illustrates the carbon emissions and electricity bills of various consumers at a given
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monetary compensation rate. According to our proposed decentralised low carbon
incentive mechanism, the consumers with low-level of carbon emissions (as indi-
cated in consumers 10 - 15) would not be significantly incentivised by the monetary
compensation. By contrast, the consumers with high-level of carbon emissions (as
indicated in rest consumers) would receive more monetary compensations, and there-
fore curtail or shift their loads for carbon reduction and bill saving. The electricity
bills of consumers gradually decrease with the increase of the monetary compensa-
tion rates. When the monetary compensation rates exceed ¿33/ton, the bill saving
effects on consumers with extreme high-level of carbon emissions (as indicated in
consumer 17 and consumers 22 - 25) would be more significant (at approximately 9
% of bill saving through 10 % of carbon reduction).
Incentive Effects of Carbon Prices on Generators
The chromatograms in Fig. 3.9 show the trends of carbon emissions and profits of
generation sources as the carbon prices increase. Each column illustrates the carbon
emissions and profits of various generation sources at a given carbon price. For the
carbon emissions, with the increase of carbon prices, the generation sources with high
carbon intensities, i.e. coal and gas, are incentivised to ramp down power outputs for
cost saving. It is noted that the carbon emissions from coal generation increase when
the carbon prices rise from ¿28/ton to ¿42/ton. The reason is that although the coal
generators are incentivised to ramp down the power output for carbon reduction, the
slight carbon reduction is offset by the increased carbon intensity caused by part-
loaded operation. As a renewable energy source, the power output and incurred
carbon emissions of biomass rise to complement the decreased power outputs of coal
and gas. However, the carbon emissions intensity of biomass is much lower than the
carbon emissions intensities of coal and gas. Analogously, the power outputs of other
renewable energy sources ramp up without causing additional carbon emissions; For
the profits, the profits of generation from coal, gas, and biomass decrease with
the increase of the carbon prices. When the carbon prices exceed ¿33/ton and
¿92/ton, the profits of coal and gas generation, respectively, would drop to negative.
Additionally, the profits of power import increase with the rise of carbon prices,
October 8, 2020
3.5. Case studies 74
Carbon Emissions
Coal
Gas
Nuclear
Solar
Onshore Wind
Offshore Wind
Biomass
Hydro
Import -5%
0% 
5% 
10%
15%
Profits
18 40 60 80 100
Carbon Price (£/ton)
Coal
Gas
Nuclear
Solar
Onshore Wind
Offshore Wind
Biomass
Hydro
Import
-200%
-400%
0% 
200% 
400% 
Figure 3.9: Carbon emissions and profits of generators as a function of carbon prices.
Generators with the same source are aggregated. The x axes indicate the carbon
prices. The y axes indicate the generation sources. The colourbars indicate the
percentage of increase (positive)/decrease (negative) of carbon emissions and profits
for each source at a given carbon price, compared to the carbon emissions and profits
at ¿18/ton of the U.K. carbon price support, respectively.
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because the carbon prices of other regions keep unchanged and are lower than the
local carbon prices. It is profitable for generators to emit carbon emissions at the
regions with lower carbon prices, and export the power to the regions with higher
carbon prices as the study of emissions leakage issue [185].
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of power outputs by generation sources and average carbon
emissions intensity weighted by power outputs between the benchmark and propose
scheduling model. The x axes indicate the scheduling time of day. The left y axes
indicate the power outputs of generation sources corresponding to the stacked areas.
The right y axes indicate the average carbon emissions intensity weighted by power
outputs corresponding to the red line.
The comparison of power outputs by generation sources and average carbon
emissions intensity weighted by power outputs between the benchmark and pro-
posed scheduling model is presented in Fig. 3.10. Through the proposed energy
scheduling, the peak demand is curtailed and shifted to the off-peak demand period.
By increasing the proportion of power outputs from renewable energy sources and
decreasing the proportion of power outputs from coal and gas, the average carbon
emissions intensity of the proposed scheduling model is almost halved compared to
that of the benchmark. The daily percentage of renewable energy sources (solar,
wind, biomass, and hydro) increases from 39.53 % at benchmark to 45.13 % at the
proposed scheduling model.
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Figure 3.11: Pareto frontiers of the policy maker's objective functions under various
maximum bounds of monetary compensation rates and carbon prices. The x axes
indicate the objective function of daily carbon emissions. The y axes indicate the
objective function of daily net carbon revenue. The dashed line indicates the car-
bon revenue neutrality is achieved, i.e. the revenue of selling carbon allowance to
generators equals to the cost of monetary compensation to consumers.
The Pareto frontiers of the policy maker's trade-off between the carbon revenue
neutrality and the carbon reduction are presented in Fig. 3.11. We use the net
carbon revenue to describe the difference between the revenue of selling carbon
allowance to generators and the cost of monetary compensation to consumers. When
the maximum bound of the monetary compensation rates is relaxed from ¿10/ton
to ¿50/ton (under ¿20/ton of the fixed maximum bound of carbon prices), both the
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net carbon revenue and carbon emissions decrease. The carbon revenue neutrality
is achieved when the maximum bound of monetary compensation rates falls into
the range between ¿20/ton and ¿30/ton. When the maximum bound of the carbon
prices is relaxed from ¿20/ton to ¿60/ton (under ¿20/ton of the fixed maximum
bound of monetary compensation rates), the net carbon revenue increases whereas
the carbon emissions decrease. The carbon revenue neutrality is achieved when the
maximum bound of carbon prices falls into the range between ¿30/ton and ¿40/ton.
3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter proposes a novel model for energy scheduling and low carbon nego-
tiation between the policy maker and consumers/generators. The strategical ne-
gotiation is modelled as a Stackelberg game-theoretic problem, and the agreement
is reached by finding the optimal solutions for both the policy maker and individ-
ual consumers/generators. By implementing dynamic monetary compensation rates
and carbon prices, the consumers and generators with high carbon emissions inten-
sities can be incentivised to reduce carbon emissions for the propose of bill saving
and profit improving, respectively. Case studies based on the U.K. power systems
demonstrate that the proposed model and algorithm can achieve up to 50 % of
policy maker's targets for carbon emissions reduction, outperforming the models of
multiobjective optimization and aggregated scheduling. For consumers, when they
receive more than ¿33/ton of the monetary compensation rates, 9 % of bill saving
can be realised through 10 % of carbon emissions reduction by curtailing or shifting
the peak demand. For generators, the proposed scheduling improves the percentage
of generation from renewable energy sources from 39.53 % to 45.13 % and halves the
average carbon emissions intensities through ramping down the power outputs from
coal and gas. When the carbon prices exceed ¿33/ton and ¿92/ton, the profits of
coal and gas generation would drop to negative, respectively. For the policy maker,
when the maximum monetary compensation rates and carbon prices are set in the
ranges of ¿20/ton - ¿30/ton and ¿30/ton - ¿40/ton, the revenue of selling carbon
allowance can be completely used as monetary compensation, i.e. carbon revenue
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neutrality is achieved.
This research remains two directions to be explored in the next chapter: First,
in the practical scheduling process, individual consumers/generators have idiosyn-
cratic preferences, e.g. bill saving, utility improving, or cost saving, which requires
a scalable model to capture these preferences with diverse parameters and objective
functions. However, this would increase the computational burden of our designed
intelligent heuristic algorithm. For the case of solving a scheduling problem with
ι iterations, once it is combined with |K| consumers and |I| generators, the com-
putational complexity would increase to O
(
ι|K|+|I|
)
. In the next chapter, this issue
is overcome by using the machine learning as a model-free approach to extract
idiosyncratic preferences and learn to make the optimal decisions. Second, this
chapter assumes the flat electricity pricing scheme to specifically investigate the im-
pacts of carbon prices and monetary compensation rates, which remains the effects
of real-time electricity pricing scheme on the generation, consumption, and carbon
emissions to be investigated. Next chapter will exploit price elasticities to analyse
these effects and capture various energy patterns.
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Chapter 4
Data-Driven Prosumer-Centric Low
Carbon Energy Scheduling Using
Learning Approaches
4.1 Introduction
The advances of smart grids and smart meters enable increasing number of con-
sumers to produce or store energy in distribution networks through exploiting DRESs
and batteries, leading to a new figure: prosumers [42]. In the field of energy markets,
prosumers are residential, commercial, and industrial users, who actively produce
surplus energy and feed it into a distribution network after self-consumption; When
prosumers' demand cannot be met by self-generation, they consume energy from
the power grids. This chapter proposes a novel data-driven energy scheduling tool
for prosumers by using the learning approaches to overcome the issue of computa-
tional burden and investigate the effects of real-time electricity pricing scheme, as
remained in Chapter 3. The step of solving optimisation problem using intelligent
heuristic algorithm is replaced by the learning approaches, including deep neural
networks (DNNs) and CNNs. The learning approaches only require historical data
for learning to make optimal scheduling decisions with the advantage of improved
scalability and reduced computational complexity. The effects of real-time electric-
ity pricing scheme on generation, consumption, and carbon emissions are processed
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as corresponding three types of dynamic price elasticities. These dynamic price elas-
ticities represent intrinsic features of individual prosumers, referring as prosumption
patterns, which is processed as elasticity images and analysed by using the pattern
recognition capability of the CNNs. Additionally, a reliable scheduling tool requires
accurate predictions of prosumption behaviours, in particular given uncertainties
caused by the intermittency of DRESs and flexible demand. Hence, a real-time sce-
narios selection approach is developed to predict variations of these uncertainties,
by which each variation is defined as a scenario. Case studies based on various IEEE
test distribution systems demonstrate the effectiveness of designed neural networks,
in comparison with other learning approaches.
Overall, this chapter offers the following key contributions:
 An approach of prosumption patterns processing is designed to analyse local
features, temporal transient features, and the correlation of dynamic price
elasticities. By exploiting the pattern recognition capability of the CNNs,
how these intrinsic features affect individual prosumers' scheduling strategy is
investigated.
 Learning approaches are exploited to improve the scalability and computa-
tional efficiency of the energy scheduling tool from solving the optimisation
problem by the intelligent heuristic algorithms.
 A real-time scenarios selection approach is developed to improve prediction
accuracy under uncertainties, by which each scenario provides a possible energy
prosumption to be scheduled, and the scheduling decisions provide an update
for scenarios set.
 Case studies verify that the proposed energy scheduling tool improves the ac-
curacy of making optimal scheduling decisions with reduced computational
complexity, under the various IEEE test systems and uncertain scenarios.
The connection between the intrinsic features of dynamic price elasticities
and scheduling results is demonstrated.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 introduces an overview
of the implementation of the proposed energy scheduling tool. The training phase of
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the energy scheduling tool is detailed in Section 4.3 to describe how to use uncertain
scenarios, prosumption patterns, and optimal scheduling decisions for training the
neural networks. The deploying phase of the energy scheduling tool is detailed
in Section 4.4 to describe the real-time scenarios selection and energy scheduling
for individual prosumers. Section 4.5 provides case studies under various learning
approaches and IEEE test distribution systems to verify the proposed approaches.
Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Implementation of Energy Scheduling Tool
The motivation of this research is to design an energy scheduling tool by using learn-
ing approaches to reduce computational complexity and capture prosumption pat-
terns of individual prosumers. The prosumers include the residential, commercial,
and industrial users in the distribution networks. The proposed energy scheduling
tool is deployed in the day-ahead prosumption scheduling to help these prosumers
make optimal decisions for the next day, through analysing prosumers' smart meter
data. This section introduces the overview of the implementation of the proposed
energy scheduling tool, consisting of the training phase and the deploying phase, as
presented in Fig. 4.1.
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At the training phase, real-time metering data of individual prosumers is stored
in data warehouse, and used by the manufacturer of the energy scheduling tool to
train the neural networks under a supervised learning mode. Uncertainties caused
by the intermittency of the DRESs and flexible demand are analysed by the de-
veloped scenarios analysis approach. The intrinsic features of individual prosumers
represented by dynamic price elasticities are processed as elasticity images by using
the designed prosumption patterns processing approach. The uncertain scenarios
and elasticity images are used as training inputs. The training labels are opti-
mal decision variables yielded from solving the preferences optimisation problems.
These preferences are predefined by the users, such as electricity bill saving, utility
improving, and generating cost saving.
At the deploying phase, the energy scheduling tool with trained neural networks
is deployed to individual prosumers' sides. With real-time data from the prosumer's
smart meter, the scheduling tool automatically makes optimal decisions for the next-
day prosumption scheduling, and sends these optimal decisions to the controller
which controls both generators and loads.
4.3 Training Phase of Energy Scheduling Tool
In this section, the training phase of the proposed energy scheduling tool is dis-
cussed. The flowchart of the training phase is shown in Fig. 4.2. The historical
metering data is firstly processed by the proposed scenarios analysis approach in
Section 4.3.1. The dynamic price elasticities are processed as elasticity images by
the proposed prosumption patterns processing approach in Section 4.3.2, in order to
extract intrinsic features of prosumers by taking advantage of pattern recognition
capability of the CNN. The processed scenarios and elasticity images are used as
numerical and image inputs of neural networks, respectively. Meanwhile, each of
the analysed scenarios is used to solve the preferences optimisation problem in Sec-
tion 4.3.3. The preferences in our research are defined as minimising the costs and
carbon emissions by optimally modifying the generation and consumption profiles
of each scenario. These optimal decision variables are then used as training labels
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of the neural networks. This architecture of neural networks is described in Section
4.3.4. The overall algorithm of the training phase is shown in Algorithm 2.
Figure 4.2: Flowchart of the training phase of the energy scheduling tool. Histori-
cal data is processed by the scenarios analysis and prosumption patterns processing
approaches as training inputs of dense layers and convolutional layers, respectively.
The training labels are optimal scheduling decisions yielded by solving the prefer-
ences optimisation problems.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm of Training Phase of the Energy Scheduling Tool
Input: historical data pt,m, electricity price pit
1: generate |X | scenarios, each scenario pt,x with occurrence probability Pr(pt,x) =
1/ |X |
2: for x = 1, ..., |X | do
3: process elasticity images Φx (ta, tb,Ξ) as Fig. 4.5
4: solve preferences optimisation problem to obtain optimal decision variables
∆p∗x
5: train neural networks as (4.3.23)
6: end for
Output: trained neural networks fnn
4.3.1 Scenarios Analysis
At the training phase, the scenarios analysis aims at: 1) data augmentation to avoid
the overfitting problem [186] caused by limited samples; 2) accurately analysing
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intrinsic features of prosumers by covering more potential information of prosump-
tion patterns under uncertainties. The data augmentation is achieved by generating
scenarios using statistical approaches including kernel density estimation and Latin
Hypercube sampling. Each each generated scenario represents a possible variation
of uncertain variables. Accurately evaluating the distributions of uncertain vari-
ables is a prerequisite for scenarios generation. A non-parametric estimation [129]
which only relies on historical data can capture the stochastic feature of DRESs and
flexible demand, without the need of distributions and assumed parameters in para-
metric estimation. This research therefore uses the non-parametric kernel density
estimation [187] approach to estimate the probability density function of uncertain
variables.
With the estimated density function, the Latin Hypercube sampling [188] is then
implemented to produce the scenarios. The reason is that compared to random sam-
pling approach, such as Monte Carlo Simulation [189], Latin Hypercube sampling
can avoid over-concentration by space-filling so as to reduce the standard deviation
of samples, which means that scenarios are generated over the entire feasible range
of the historical data to guarantee the accuracy with reduced number of samples.
Recall that I and K denote the index sets of generators and loads of a prosumer,
respectively. The power generation of generator i ∈ I at scheduling time t is denoted
by pi,t. The power consumption of load k ∈ K at scheduling time t is denoted by
pk,t. The retail electricity price at scheduling time t is denoted by pit. For simplicity,
pi,t, pk,t, and pit are represented by an uncertain variable pt in this subsection. Let
M denote the index set of historical metering data. A data sample m ∈ M of
uncertain variable pt is denoted by pt,m. The unknown density function of pt is then
fitted from the set of the historical data by using the kernel density estimation [187]
as
f˜ (pt) :=
1
|M| · ς
|M|∑
m=1
fkernel
(
pt − pt,m
h
)
, (4.3.1)
where f˜ (·) is the estimated kernel density function of the uncertain variable pt,
|M| is the number of historical data, ς is the bandwidth smoothing parameter, and
fkernel (·) is the kernel function. Gaussian kernel function is used due to its high
accuracy [190]. The kernel function is placed around each historical data pt,m to
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construct f˜ (pt) by the sum of |M| kernels as shown in Fig. 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Schematic illustration of the kernel density estimation. The kernel
function fkernel is placed around each historical data pt,m. The estimated kernel
density function f˜ (pt) is constructed by the sum of |M| kernels.
Let fcumul (pt) denote the cumulative density function of the uncertain variable
pt, where fcumul (pt) is obtained by the integral of f˜ (pt). Let X denote the index set
of scenarios and |X | denote the number of scenarios. To generate the desired |X |
scenarios, the value range of the cumulative density function fcumul (pt), i.e. [0,1], is
equally divided into |X | subintervals. The scenario x ∈ X of uncertain variable pt,
denoted by pt,x, is generated from each subinterval by using the Latin Hypercube
sampling [188] as
fcumul (pt) |pt=pt,x :=
(
1
|X |
)
· ϑ+ x− 1|X | , (4.3.2)
where ϑ ∈ [0, 1] is a random variable following a uniform distribution. The value of
scenario can be calculated by the inverse function as
pt,x = f
−1
cumul
[
fcumul (pt) |pt=pt,x
]
, (4.3.3)
The occurrence probability of pt,x can be obtained as
Pr(pt,x) =
1
|X | , (4.3.4)
where Pr (pt,x) is the occurrence probability of scenario pt,x.
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The schematic illustration of the Latin Hypercube sampling is presented in Fig.
4.4. The approach of scenarios analysis corresponds to the line 1 in Algorithm 2.
Figure 4.4: Schematic illustration of the Latin Hypercube sampling. The value range
of the cumulative density function fcumul (pt) is equally divided into |X | subintervals.
Through random sampling from each subinterval, the scenario pt,x can be obtained
by the inverse function of fcumul (pt) |pt=pt,x . The occurrence probability of each
scenario equals to 1/ |X |.
4.3.2 Prosumption Patterns Processing
Let pi,t,x and pk,t,x denote the power generation of generator i and consumption of
load k of scenario x at scheduling time t, respectively. Recall that T denotes the
index set of scheduling time. First, the effects of real-time electricity pricing scheme
on generation, consumption, and carbon emissions can be processed to corresponding
three types of dynamic price elasticities. These three types of price elasticities
describe the percentage change in generation, consumption, and carbon emissions
when there is a one percent change in electricity price. Hence, They represent
intrinsic features of individual prosumers, defined as the prosumption patterns.
 Price Elasticity of Generation: When the electricity prices change from pita at
scheduling time ta ∈ T to pitb at scheduling time tb ∈ T , a prosumer's total
power generation of scenario x correspondingly changes from
∑
i∈I pi,ta,x to
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∑
i∈I pi,tb,x. The price elasticity of generation between ta and tb can be defined
as
ξpi,x(ta, tb) :=
(∑
i∈I
pi,ta,x − pi,tb,x
pi,ta,x
)
·
(
pita
pita − pitb
)
, (4.3.5)
where ξpi,x (·) is the function of price elasticity of generation between any two
scheduling time.
 Price Elasticity of Consumption: When the electricity prices change from pita
at scheduling time ta ∈ T to pitb at scheduling time tb ∈ T , a prosumer's total
power consumption of scenario x correspondingly changes from
∑
k∈K pk,ta,x
to
∑
k∈K pk,tb,x. The price elasticity of consumption between ta and tb can be
defined as
ξpk,x(ta, tb) :=
(∑
k∈K
pk,ta,x − pk,tb,x
pk,ta,x
)
·
(
pita
pita − pitb
)
, (4.3.6)
where ξpk,x (·) is the function of price elasticity of consumption between any
two scheduling time.
 Price Elasticity of Carbon Emissions: There are two portions of carbon emis-
sions caused by prosumption behaviours: 1) When a prosumer consumes en-
ergy from the main grid, carbon emissions will be caused due to the gen-
eration from fossil-fuelled sources, e.g. coal and gas. 2) When a prosumer
uses biomass or diesel generators, the carbon emissions are caused by its self-
generation. These two portions of carbon emissions can be described as the
first and second terms of the following equation as
rt,x = pmain,t,x · ρmain +
∑
i∈I
pi,t,x · ρi, (4.3.7)
where rt,x is the carbon emissions rate of a prosumer's scenario x at scheduling
time t, pmain,t,x is the power exchange of a prosumer with the main grid of
scenario x at scheduling time t, ρmain is the average carbon emissions intensity
of all generation sources from the main grid, and ρi is the carbon emissions
intensity of a prosumer's own generator i. The first term of (4.3.7) holds when
pmain,t,x > 0.
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Due to the retail electricity prices cover the carbon cost of electricity genera-
tion, we define the price elasticity of carbon emissions as
ξrx(ta, tb) :=
(
rta,x − rtb,x
rta,x
)
·
(
pita
pita − pitb
)
, (4.3.8)
where ξrx (·) is the function of price elasticity of carbon emissions between any
two scheduling time.
Figure 4.5: Schematic illustration of an elasticity image. The image is in the form
of a 3-dimensional array as Φx (ta, tb,Ξ), ∀ta, tb ∈ T . Three elements of Ξ, i.e.
ξpi,x (ta, tb), ξpk,x (ta, tb), and ξrx (ta, tb) correspond to three colour channels. (ta, tb)
decides the location of a pixel at the elasticity image.
Next, the prosumption patterns processing approach is developed to process this
information to be elasticity images as inputs of the CNNs. Unlike the data pro-
cessing approach as studied by Choi et al. [121], to restructure the time-series data
October 8, 2020
4.3. Training Phase of Energy Scheduling Tool 90
from 1×24 row vector to 4×6×1 matrix as a greyscale image, we use the scheduling
time ta and tb to locate the position of x-axis and y-axis of a pixel at an image,
and assign three types of elasticities to three colour channels (R G B) of z-axis of
a pixel by proportionally scaling up to the value range of pixel, i.e. [0,255]. Hence,
a 3-dimensional array, i.e. elasticity image, is formed as shown in Fig. 4.5, denoted
as Φx (ta, tb,Ξ), ∀ta, tb ∈ T , where Ξ =
[
ξpi,x (ta, tb) , ξpk,x (ta, tb) , ξrx (ta, tb)
]
is the
vector of price elasticities between any two scheduling time. These 3 dimensions
ta, tb, and Ξ correspond to the height, width, and depth of an elasticity image,
respectively, and the depth refers to three colour channels. Since a price elasticity
from scheduling time ta to scheduling time tb does not equal to that from scheduling
time tb to scheduling time ta according to (4.3.5) (4.3.6) and (4.3.7), the elasticity
image is asymmetric with respect to the diagonal. Additionally, since the price elas-
ticities reflect the effects of price change between two scheduling time, the diagonal
elements, i.e. ta=tb are set as zero. In the elasticity image, a brighter pixel means
the prosumption or carbon emissions between scheduling time indicated by its x-
axis and y-axis are easier to be scheduled due to a higher price elasticity, whereas
a darker pixel means the prosumption or carbon emissions between scheduling time
indicated by its x-axis and y-axis are harder to be scheduled due to a lower price
elasticity. The approach of prosumption patterns processing corresponds to the line
3 in Algorithm 2.
The correlation of ξpi,x , ξpk,x , and ξrx is presented at a pixel by combining three
colour channels. The temporal transient feature of elasticities is presented as the
colour gradient between pixels. Hence, the proposed approach of prosumption pat-
terns processing can take advantage of the pattern recognition capability of the CNN
from a high-dimensional array. Another advantage is that the scale difference be-
tween prosumption (in a unit of kW) and carbon emissions (in a unit of kg) can be
normalised, because three types of elasticities can be treated equally by the CNNs
as pixel elements with the same value range.
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4.3.3 Preferences Optimisation
The problem of preferences optimisation is only solved at the training phase by
manufacturers of the energy scheduling tool, after the historical metering data and
pre-defined preferences from individual prosumers are received. At the deploying
phase, trained neural networks can replace the step of solving optimisation prob-
lems so as to help each prosumer automatically make predicted optimal scheduling
decisions. In our research, the preferences of individual prosumers are defined as
minimising the costs of using electricity and reducing the total carbon emissions
caused by prosumption behaviours for the next day. The following assumptions are
made when we consider a prosumer's energy scheduling.
 Assumption 1 : Since the generators and loads in a distribution network are
nearby, and the amount of generation from prosumers is small relative to the
total generation in power systems. The transmission losses in the distribution
network are neglected.
 Assumption 2 : When a prosumer sells power to the main grid, i.e. pmain,t,x < 0,
the selling price equals to the retail electricity price at that scheduling time.
The reason of this simplified assumption is that this chapter specifically inves-
tigates the effects of real-time retail pricing on prosumption behaviours. How
individual prosumers strategically decide their selling prices for maximising
their profits will be investigated in Chapter 5.
 Assumption 3 : The energy storage devices are equipped for individual pro-
sumers to help them schedule the non-dispatchable DRESs, e.g. wind and
solar. For the prosumers without the energy storage devices, the maximum
storage capacity and maximum charging/discharging rate are zero.
Problem Formulation
Firstly, from the economic perspective, a prosumer aims to minimise the costs of
using electricity by strategically modifying power exchange with the main grid, gen-
eration, consumption, and storage of each scenario. The objective function of costs
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of using electricity can be modelled as
fu (∆pmain,t,x,∆pi,t,x,∆pk,t,x) :=
∑
t∈T
[
(pmain,t,x −∆pmain,t,x) · pit,x
+
∑
i∈I
(pi,t,x −∆pi,t,x) · δi
+ |∆ps,t,x| · δs
]
·∆t,
(4.3.9)
where fu (·) is the objective function of costs of using electricity by a prosumer,
∆pmain,t,x is the amount of modifying the power exchange from the main grid of a
prosumer's scenario x at scheduling time t, ∆pi,t,x is the amount of modifying the
generation by generator i of a prosumer's scenario x at scheduling time t, ∆pk,t,x
is the amount of modifying the consumption by load k of a prosumer's scenario x
at scheduling time t, pit,x is the retail electricity price of scenario x at scheduling
time t, δi is the operating cost coefficient of generator i, ∆ps,t,x is the power charg-
ing/discharging rate of a prosumer's energy storage device of scenario x at schedul-
ing time t, and δs is the cost coefficient of energy storage devises, and ∆t is the
scheduling interval. For the scheduling interval of 0.5 h, we have (∆t,|T |)=(0.5,48).
The power dynamics of a prosumer's energy storage device can be described as
∆ps,t,x=(pmain,t−1,x−∆pmain,t−1,x)−
∑
k∈K
(pk,t−1,x−∆pk,t−1,x)+
∑
i∈I
(pi,t−1,x−∆pi,t−1,x) ,
(4.3.10)
where
∆ps,t,x = ps,t,x − ps,t−1,x (4.3.11)
indicates the power charging/discharging when the value of ∆ps,t,x is positive/negative,
respectively, and ps,t,x is the stored power of a prosumer's energy storage device of
scenario x at scheduling time t. There are two constraints for the energy storage
devices as
 Storage Capacity Constraint : The maximum storage capacity is determined
by the medium of storage devices [191]. The stored power should be restricted
to certain limits as
0 ≤ ps,t,x ≤ pmaxs , (4.3.12)
where pmaxs is the maximum storage capacity.
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 Charging/Discharging Rate Constraint : The charging/discharging rate should
be restricted below the maximum limit as
|∆ps,t,x| ≤ ∆pmaxs , (4.3.13)
where ∆pmaxs is the maximum charging/discharging rate.
Remark 1 : According to (4.3.10), the decision variable of modifying power stor-
age can be substituted by ∆pmain,t,x, ∆pi,t,x, and ∆pk,t,x. For the prosumers without
the energy storage devices, we have pmaxs = 0 and ∆ps,t,x = 0.
Remark 2 : Recall that in Chapter 3, the operating costs include the costs of
operation, maintenance, fuel, and carbon capture and storage (excluding the costs
of pre-development, construction, decommissioning, and waste). The coefficients
of operating costs are evaluated by the LCoE. In this chapter, the carbon cost is
also considered into the operating costs for simplicity, because the flat carbon pricing
scheme is used to specifically investigate the effects of electricity prices. Additionally,
the storage costs include the costs of operation, maintenance, charging/discharging
(excluding the initial installed cost). The coefficient of storage cost is evaluated by
the levelised cost of storage (LCoS) [192]. The LCoS is a discounted cost per unit
of charged/discharged electrical energy.
Secondly, from the environmental perspective, a prosumer aims to minimise the
total carbon emissions caused by prosumption behaviours. The objective function
of total carbon emissions can be modelled as
fc (∆pmain,t,x,∆pi,t,x,∆pk,t,x) :=
∑
t∈T
[
(pmain,t,x −∆pmain,t,x) · ρmain
+
∑
i∈I
(pi,t,x −∆pi,t,x) · ρi
]
·∆t,
(4.3.14)
where fc (·) is the objective function of total carbon emissions caused by prosumption
behaviours. The first term of (4.3.14) holds when (pmain,t,x −∆pmain,t,x) > 0.
The power exchange, generation and consumption should be restricted to certain
limits considering the capacities of power grid, generators and loads as
pminmain ≤ pmain,t,x −∆pmain,t,x ≤ pmaxmain, (4.3.15)
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pmini ≤ pi,t,x −∆pi,t,x ≤ pmaxi , (4.3.16)
pmink ≤ pk,t,x −∆pk,t,x ≤ pmaxk , (4.3.17)
where pminmain and p
max
main are the minimum and maximum power exchange levels of
power grid, respectively, pmini and p
max
i are the minimum and maximum power gen-
eration levels of generator i, respectively, and pmink and p
max
k are the minimum and
maximum power consumption levels of load k, respectively.
Therefore, the objectives of a prosumer are to minimise the costs of using elec-
tricity and the total carbon emissions caused by prosumption behaviours, with the
decision variables of modifying power exchange, generation, and consumption of
each scenario, which leads to a MOP as
min
∆pmain,t,x,∆pi,t,x,∆pk,t,x
: {fu (∆pmain,t,x,∆pi,t,x,∆pk,t,x) , fc (∆pmain,t,x,∆pi,t,x,∆pk,t,x)} ,
(4.3.18)
s.t.: (4.3.10), (4.3.11), (4.3.12), (4.3.13),(4.3.15), (4.3.16), and (4.3.17).
Solution Algorithm
Firstly, to include the inequality constraints (4.3.12) and (4.3.13) into the solution
of preferences optimisation problem, an additional function is introduced to replace
(4.3.12) and (4.3.13) as
fa (∆pmain,t,x,∆pi,t,x,∆pk,t,x) := max {−ps,t,x, 0}+ max {ps,t,x − pmaxs , 0}
+ max {|∆ps,t,x| −∆pmaxs , 0} ,
(4.3.19)
where fa (·) is the function of inequality constraints. According to (4.3.10), fa (·)
is a function of ∆pmain,t,x, ∆pi,t,x, and ∆pk,t,x. A solution satisfies the inequality
constraints (4.3.12) and (4.3.13) if and only if fa (∆pmain,t,x,∆pi,t,x,∆pk,t,x) = 0.
The vector-valued decision variables and objective functions are defined as follows
for facilitating the discussion of algorithm.
∆px = [∆pmain,t,x,∆pi,t,x,∆pk,t,x|i = 1, ..., |I| , k = 1, ..., |K| , t = 1, ..., |T |] ,
(4.3.20)
fx = [fu (∆px) , fc (∆px) , fa (∆px)], (4.3.21)
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where ∆px is a [(|I|+ |K|+ 1)× |T |]-size row vector to denote the decision variables
of scenario x, and fx is a 3-size row vector to denote the objective functions and
constraints of scenario x. Additionally, the lower bounds and upper bounds of the
decision variables as described in (4.3.15), (4.3.16), and (4.3.17) are denoted by
vectors p and p, respectively.
Next, the algorithm for solving the preferences optimisation problem is proposed
based on the artificial immune system [173]. Readers can refer to the chapter 3 for
the detailed definitions of the artificial immune system and Pareto optimality. The
proposed algorithm is performed by individual prosumers over the entire scheduling
horizon of |T | for the following day. During the operation of the artificial immune
algorithm, the antigens are randomly generated and cloned to explore the entire
decision variable space. In each iteration, the dominated antigen-antibody pairs
are removed to keep the non-dominated antigen-antibody pairs. Until the iteration
ends, the antigens of all non-dominated antibodies form the optimal solution. The
results serve as a set of Pareto optimal solution in the Pareto frontier that achieves
a trade off between the cost saving and carbon emissions reduction. The criteria of
selecting a representative solution from the Pareto frontier as described in (3.5.48)
is used. Let ιIA and ιmaxIA denote the nominal and maximum numbers of iterations
of the proposed algorithm, respectively. The pseudocode code of the algorithm for
solving the preferences optimisation problem is shown in Algorithm 3.
Through solving the preferences optimisation problem, the optimal decision vari-
ables are yielded as
∆p∗x =
[
∆p∗main,t,x,∆p
∗
i,t,x,∆p
∗
k,t,x|i = 1, ..., |I| , k = 1, ..., |K| , t = 1, ..., |T |
]
.
(4.3.22)
The optimal decision variables are subsequently used as training labels to train
the neural networks. The labels indicate how far the predicted optimal scheduling
decisions from the theoretical optimal ones. The Preferences optimisation corre-
sponds to line 4 in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm for Solving the Preferences Optimisation Problem
Input: set of scenarios pi,t,x, pk,t,x, and pit,x, ∀x ∈ X , nominal and maximum number
of antigens in the population of decision variables |A| and |Amax|, respectively
1: for x = 1, ..., |X | do
2: randomly initialise the antigen population within the decision variable space[
p,p
]
as A (0) = {∆px,1, ...,∆px,|A|}
3: while ιIA ≤ ιmaxIA do
4: implement clone and mutation operation according to (3.4.44), and the
number of current antigens |A (ιIA)| increases to |Amax|
5: remove dominated antibodies and corresponding antigens from A (ιIA)
6: while |A (ιIA)| > |A|, or fa (∆px) 6= 0 do
7: remove the antigen-antibody pairs with the highest positive value of
fa (∆px)
8: remove the antigen-antibody pairs with small avidities according to [175],
i.e. remove the vectors of objective function in a crowded region
9: end while
10: A (ιIA + 1) = A (ιIA) , ιIA = ιIA + 1
11: end while
12: remove the antigen-antibody pairs that yield fa (∆px) > 0
13: select a representative solution from the Pareto frontier
14: end for
Output: optimal solution ∆p∗x
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Figure 4.6: Architecture of designed neural networks. The elasticity image is im-
ported to the convolutional layers. The numerical data is imported to the dense
layers. The outputs of both layers are merged by fully-connected layers.
Figure 4.7: Schematic illustration of the local feature, temporal transient feature,
and correlation of elasticities. The filter size is indicated by the yellow box.
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4.3.4 Neural Networks Architecture
The designed neural networks consist of dense layers to import numerical inputs
of each scenario and convolutional layers to extract intrinsic features from each
elasticity image. The outputs of these two layers are merged by fully-connected
layers to extract combined feature representations. The architecture of the designed
neural networks is presented in Fig. 4.6. This structure of paralleled networks [193]
has been validated as an efficient approach for extracting information from both
numerical data and images in [119]. The training input of dense layers is the original
power exchange, generation, and consumption of scenario x, i.e. pmain,t,x, pi,t,x, and
pk,t,x, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ K, and t ∈ T , denoted by a ((1 + |I|+ |K|)× |T |)-size matrix
Px. The training input of convolutional layers is an elasticity image of scenario x,
denoted by a 3-dimensional array Φx. The training output is the predicted optimal
scheduling decisions of scenario x, i.e. ∆pˆ∗main,t,x, ∆pˆ
∗
i,t,x, and ∆pˆ
∗
k,t,x, ∀i ∈ I, k ∈ K,
and t ∈ T , denoted by a ((1 + |I|+ |K|)× |T |)-size matrix ∆Pˆ∗x. The relationship
between the training inputs and output can be described as
∆Pˆ∗x = fnn (Px,Φx) , (4.3.23)
where fnn (·) is the relationship function parametrized by tuning neural networks.
The process of training the neural networks corresponds to line 5 in Algorithm 2.
The convolutional layers convolve the elasticity image with multiple filters to
extract the following features as shown in Fig.4.7:
 Local Feature: The local feature of each type of price elasticity within the filter
size can be detected when the filter is on a patch of image. e.g. If the filter
size is 5 × 5, the local feature within every 5 consecutive scheduling intervals
is extracted.
 Temporal Transient Feature: The temporal transient feature of each type of
price elasticity can be detected when the filter slides through the image by
strides. e.g. If the stride is (24,24), the temporal transient feature over every
24 inconsecutive scheduling intervals, i.e. between day and night, is extracted.
 Correlation of Elasticities : The correlation of three types of price elasticities
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can be detected when multiple filters simultaneously convolve three colour
channels.
All these three extracted features are stacked as a feature map and processed by
further layers. The feature map of all filters can be described as
Φmap = fReLU (W ·Φx + b) , (4.3.24)
where Φmap is the array of the feature map, fReLU (·) is the activation function, W
is the weight array, and b is the bias vector. The rectified linear unit (ReLU) [194]
is used as the activation function.
The function of pooling layers is to progressively reduce the spatial size of the
feature representations, so as to reduce the parameters and computational burden
of neural networks [195]. Each convolutional layer is followed by a pooling layer to
downsample the feature map through using max pooling [196]. In order to control
the spatial size of convolutional outputs, the same padding is used to pad the input of
each convolutional layer with zeros around the border. Over multiple convolutional
layers and pooling layers, a global feature map is formed by integrating the feature
representations from every layer. The global feature map is subsequently converted
to a vector by a flatten layer and processed by fully-connected layers. The function
of fully-connected layers is to further extract feature representations from merged
feature representations of numerical data and images.
4.4 Deploying Phase of Energy Scheduling Tool
This section introduces the deploying phase of the proposed energy scheduling tool.
The flowchart of the deploying phase is shown in Fig. 4.8. The historical data is
dynamically updated by the real-time data from a prosumer's smart meter. To pro-
vide a prosumer with an accurate prediction that considers the uncertainties of the
DRESs and flexible demand for the following day, the scenarios analysis approach
in Section 4.3.1 is implemented at the deploying phase, and developed as a real-time
scenarios selection approach. This approach can dynamically select the scenar-
ios with current characteristics of uncertainties and discard dated scenarios. The
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processed scenarios and elasticity images are subsequently fed into trained neural
networks to yield the predicted optimal scheduling decisions. The overall algorithm
of the deploying phase is shown in Algorithm 4, with detailed steps as follows:
Figure 4.8: Flowchart of the deploying phase of the energy scheduling tool. His-
torical data is dynamically updated by the real-time data from a prosumer's smart
meter. The scenarios are selected by the real-time scenarios selection approach.
The processed scenarios and elasticity images are fed into trained neural networks
to yield the predicted optimal scheduling decisions.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm of Deploying Phase of the Energy Scheduling Tool
Input: real-time data pmain,t, pi,t, pk,t, and pit
1: use scenarios analysis approach to generate scenarios from updated data
2: for x = 1, ..., |X | do
3: update occurrence probabilities using (4.4.25) and (4.4.26)
4: process elasticity images Φx (ta, tb,Ξ) as Fig. 4.5
5: use trained neural networks to obtain predicted optimal decision variables
∆Pˆ∗x and select predicted optimal decision variables that maintain the opti-
misation constraints
6: end for
7: aggregate the predicted optimal scheduling decisions of |X | scenarios as (4.4.27),
(4.4.28), and (4.4.29), and perform controlling decisions
Output: controlling signals pmain,t, pi,t, pk,t
Step 1 : The historical data is updated by the real-time data for the current day.
The updated data is used to generate scenarios according to the scenarios analysis
approach proposed in Section 4.3.1. Let pt,x and p′t,x denote the scenarios generated
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from the historical data and updated data, respectively. The occurrence probability
of p′t,x is updated as [96]
Pr
(
p′t,x
)
= Pr (pt,x) +
1
|X |+ 1 [ϑPr − Pr (pt,x)] , (4.4.25)
where ϑPr ∈ {0, 1} is a binary value determined by
p
′∗
t,x = arg min
p′t,x
lx,x′ , (4.4.26)
where lx,x′ = pt,x−p′t,x is the distance between pt,x and p′t,x. If p′t,x = p′∗t,x, ϑPr = 1 and
the predicted error term [ϑPr − Pr (pt,x)] becomes positive to reinforce the previous
probability; if p′t,x 6= p′∗t,x, ϑPr = 0 and the predicted error term becomes negative to
weaken the previous probability. This step corresponds to the line 1-3 inAlgorithm
4.
Step 2 : Elasticity image Φx is processed by the prosumption patterns process-
ing approach as described in Section 4.3.2. This step corresponds to the line 4 in
Algorithm 4.
Step 3 : The trained neural networks are used to obtain the predicted optimal
scheduling decisions of each scenario. The predicted optimal scheduling decisions
are subsequently examined by the constraints of optimisation problem. This step
corresponds to the line 5 in Algorithm 4.
Step 4 : The controlling signals for the next day are yielded by aggregating the
predicted optimal scheduling decisions of |X | scenarios, weighted by the occurrence
probabilities as
pmain,t =
∑
x∈X
(
pmain,t,x −∆pˆ∗main,t,x
) · Pr (pmain,t,x) , (4.4.27)
pi,t =
∑
x∈X
(
pi,t,x −∆pˆ∗i,t,x
) · Pr (pi,t,x) , (4.4.28)
pk,t =
∑
x∈X
(
pk,t,x −∆pˆ∗k,t,x
) · Pr (pk,t,x) . (4.4.29)
The controlling decisions are performed by a prosumer's controller and serve as
real-time data for the next day. This real-time data is processed by the Step 1
cyclically. This step corresponds to the line 7 in Algorithm 4.
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4.5 Case Studies
In this section, case studies have been conducted to evaluate the proposed ap-
proaches by comparing various learning approaches and IEEE test distribution sys-
tems.
4.5.1 Simulation Setup and Data Availability
The simulations are performed using a machine with IntelR CoreTM i9-9900K CPU
at 3.60 GHz and a NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080 GPU. The proposed approaches of
scenarios analysis, prosumption patterns processing, and preferences optimisation
are written in the MATLAB language and run on the CPU. The proposed neural
networks are written in the Python language by using PyTorch and run on the
GPU. To improve the computational efficiency, the training process is performed
on the GPU, and 8-core parallel computing is used during the scenarios analysis,
prosumption patterns processing, and preferences optimisation. The maximum and
nominal numbers of antigens are set as 6000 and 3000, respectively, and the number
of iterations for the immune algorithm is set as 50, based on the empirical study.
The simulations are repeated 10 times to eliminate the randomness and outliers.
Since the scale of energy prosumers varies from the residential houses, commer-
cial areas, industries, to an entire city [42], the following IEEE test distribution
systems are adopted by our research to examine the scalability of our proposed
energy scheduling tool.
 Case 1 (Modified IEEE 69-bus distribution network): The schematic illustra-
tion of the modified IEEE 69-bus distribution network is presented in Fig. 4.9.
The network is partitioned into 5 prosumers. 15 solar photovoltaics, 6 diesel
generators, 4 wind turbines, and 3 biomass generators are arbitrarily assigned
to each prosumer, and 69 loads are assigned to each bus.
 Case 2 (Modified IEEE 33-bus distribution network): The schematic illustra-
tion of the modified IEEE 33-bus distribution network is presented in Fig.
4.10. The network is partitioned into 3 prosumers. 12 solar photovoltaics,
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3 diesel generators, 3 wind turbines, and 1 biomass generator are arbitrarily
assigned to each prosumer, and 33 loads are assigned to each bus.
 Case 3 (Modified IEEE 18-bus distribution network): The schematic illustra-
tion of the modified IEEE 18-bus distribution network is presented in Fig.
4.11. The network is partitioned into 3 prosumers. 7 solar photovoltaics, 3
diesel generators, 2 wind turbines, and 1 biomass generator are arbitrarily
assigned to each prosumer, and 18 loads are assigned to each bus.
Figure 4.9: Modified IEEE 69-bus distribution network. The network is partitioned
into 5 prosumers. 15 solar photovoltaics, 6 diesel generators, 4 wind turbines, and
3 biomass generators are arbitrarily assigned to each prosumer, and 69 loads are
assigned to each bus.
To modify the static default data of generation and consumption from these IEEE
test distribution systems as dynamic data, the real-time states of the GB power
generation and consumption in 2019 from the GridWatch are used [179]. The ratio
of peak real-time consumption from the GB power systems to the peak static con-
sumption from these IEEE test distribution systems is used to scale down the GB
real-time generation of diesel, solar, wind, biomass, and consumption. The initial
stored power is set as zero. The percentages of consumption of each load in the
IEEE test distribution systems are used to allocate the total dynamic consumption
to each load. The total power outputs of each generation source are equally allo-
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Figure 4.10: Modified IEEE 33-bus distribution network. The network is partitioned
into 3 prosumers. 12 solar photovoltaics, 3 diesel generators, 3 wind turbines, and
1 biomass generator are arbitrarily assigned to each prosumer, and 33 loads are
assigned to each bus.
cated to the corresponding generators. The lithium energy storage model and cost
coefficient studied in [197] is used. The maximum charging/discharging rate is set
as 0.3 MWh and maximum storage capacity is set as 2 MWh according to the model
of distribution-scale energy storage device in [197].
The half-hourly wholesale electricity prices obtained from the GB energy market
[198] are used to calculate the real-time retail electricity prices, by dividing 45 % of
the average ratio of wholesale electricity prices to retail electricity prices [180]. The
coefficients of operating costs and carbon emissions intensities are presented in Table
4.1. The coefficients of operating costs of generators for project commissioning in
2020 [170] are adopted. The carbon emissions of wind and solar primarily arise in
manufacture and construction. Hence, the operational carbon emissions intensities
of these sources are assumed to be zero in our research. The average annual carbon
emissions intensities are applied to the biomass and diesel, and evaluated by using
the method proposed by Hawkes [79] as
ρ¯i =
Carbon Emissions Intensities of Fuel× Fuel Usage
Gross Electricity Supply
, (4.5.30)
where ρ¯i is the average annual carbon emissions intensity of source i. The data of
fuel usage and gross electricity supply is published by the Digest of the U.K. Energy
Statistics [181]. The data of carbon emissions intensities of fuel is published by the
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Figure 4.11: Modified IEEE 18-bus distribution network. The network is partitioned
into 3 prosumers. 7 solar photovoltaics, 3 diesel generators, 2 wind turbines, and
1 biomass generator are arbitrarily assigned to each prosumer, and 18 loads are
assigned to each bus.
U.K. Government Greenhouse gas Conversion Factors for Company Reporting [182].
Table 4.1: Coefficients of operating costs and carbon emissions intensities
Source Diesel Wind Biomass Solar Storage
Costs Coefficients (¿/MWh) 123 15 80 9 135
Carbon Emissions Intensities (ton/MWh) 1.69 0 0.05 0 0
The inputs of neural networks are separated into 70% of training set and 30%
of validation set with randomly sampling. The numerical data is preprocessed by
the z-score normalisation [199]. The Adam [200] is used as an optimiser to train the
neural networks for 50 epochs, with 4-size of minibatch, 1×10−4 of initial learning
rate, and 1×10−2 of weight decay [201]. The learning rate will be reduced if no
improvement of accuracy is seen for 5 epochs. To avoid the overfitting problem
caused by parameters of deep structure, 0.5 of dropout [202] is used for each layer to
randomly drop units. These training parameters are empirically determined through
tuning the neural networks by using validation data. The training labels are used as
a benchmark to examine the training accuracy. The mean squared error (MSE) [203]
is used as a performance metric to indicate the learning losses. The hyper-parameters
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considered in the optimisation of neural networks are shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Hyper-parameters considered in the optimisation of neural networks
Item Training Data Size Validation Data Size Normalisation Optimiser
Value 70 % 30 % Z-score Adam
Item Minibatch Size Initial Learning Rate Weight Decay Dropout
Value 4 1×10−4 1×10−2 0.5
The architecture of the proposed neural networks is shown in Table 4.3. The
output size of a convolutional layer can be calculated as
Output Size =
Input Size− Filter Size + 2× Padding
Stride
+ 1. (4.5.31)
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4.5.2 Evaluation of Training Phase
To test the convergence performance and learning accuracy, the proposed neural
networks are compared with the following learning approaches, under the same
training parameters:
 Approach 1 (Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)): The convolutional layers of
our proposed neural networks are replaced by a RNN [204] with a 1024-node
hidden layer to extract information from elasticity images. Different from the
CNN to simultaneously convolve three colour channels, the RNN can only
import a matrix as an input. Hence, the elasticity image is reshaped as a
(|T | × (|T | × 3))-size matrix as shown in Fig. 4.12. At each time step, the
RNN imports each row of this matrix and returns a hidden state and an
output. The hidden state is used by the next time step to analyse the temporal
transient feature of price elasticity. When the RNN processes an entire image,
i.e. |T | time steps, the outputs are stacked as a (|T | × 1024)-size vector and
processed by further layers.
 Approach 2 (Long Short Term Memory (LSTM)-RNN): The convolutional
layers of our proposed neural networks are replaced by a LSTM-RNN [144]
with a 1024-node hidden layer to extract information from elasticity images.
The input matrix of the LSTM-RNN is the same as that of the RNN. However,
the LSTM-RNN only returns an output of 1024-size vector at the last time
step as shown in Fig. 4.13, since it has the memory of the entire image.
 Approach 3 (DNN): The convolutional layers of our proposed neural networks
are excluded. The neural networks become a DNN and only learn from the
numerical input.
Performances of Training and Validation
The learning process is considered to be converged when the learning rate drops
below 1×10−7 and no improvement of accuracy is seen for 5 epochs. Prosumers
of the modified IEEE 69-bus distribution network with 5000 scenarios are used as
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Figure 4.12: Processing of elasticity image as inputs of the RNN. At each time step
indicated by the yellow box, the RNN imports each row vector and returns a hidden
state and an output. The hidden state is used by the next time step. The RNN
has a 1024-node hidden layer, which leads to a (|T | × 1024)-size vector as stacked
outputs.
Figure 4.13: Processing of elasticity image as inputs of the LSTM-RNN. At each
time step indicated by the yellow box, the LSTM-RNN imports each row vector
and returns a hidden state and an output. The hidden state for the entire image
is stored and selected by a memory cell. The LSTM-RNN has a 1024-node hidden
layer, which leads to a 1024-size vector as an output at the last time step.
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samples to demonstrate the performances of training and validation. As shown in
Fig. 4.14, both training and validation of these four learning approaches converge
within around 30 epochs. With the additional information of prosumption patterns
extracted from elasticities images, the training losses of the proposed neural net-
works, RNN, and LSTM-RNN are lower than the training losses of the DNN. The
validation losses of our proposed neural networks are the lowest for all prosumers.
By contract, the validation losses of the DNN are the highest for prosumer 1, pro-
sumer 3, and prosumer 5, and the validation losses of the RNN are the highest for
prosumer 2, and prosumer 4. The potential reason is that the DNN cannot extract
information of prosumption patterns from the elasticity images, and the RNN is
incapable of extracting the global features from an entire image without the mem-
ory cell of the LSTM-RNN. Therefore, the information of prosumption patterns is
a crucial factor for improving the learning accuracy.
Performances of Testing
The testing data is used to evaluate the learning accuracy affected by the number
of scenarios. The testing data of load 1 in the modified IEEE 69-bus distribution
network is sampled to examine the testing losses with various number of scenarios
as shown in Fig. 4.15. With the increasing number of scenarios, the testing losses
rise for all learning approaches, because a more diverse set of scenarios would cause
a larger bias for the training inputs. However, the proposed neural networks outper-
form other learning approaches under any scenarios number. To cover the diversity
of uncertainties, 5000 scenarios are used in the simulation of the deploying phase in
our research. In the practical implementation, an appropriate number of scenarios
can be adjusted according to a prosumer's computational power.
4.5.3 Evaluation of Deploying Phase
Analysis of Scheduling and Prosumption Patterns
To demonstrate the connection between the intrinsic features of dynamic price elas-
ticities and a prosumer's energy scheduling, an electricity image and scheduling
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Figure 4.14: Comparison for performances of training and validation. Prosumers
of the modified IEEE 69-bus distribution network with 5000 scenarios are sampled
to demonstrate convergence and losses under learning approaches of the proposed
neural networks, RNN, LSTM-RNN, and DNN. The x axes indicate epochs, and the
y axes indicate the MSE losses.
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Figure 4.15: Testing accuracy under various number of scenarios. The load 1 in
the modified IEEE 69-bus distribution network is sampled to examine the testing
losses affected by the number of scenarios under learning approaches of the proposed
neural networks, RNN, LSTM-RNN, and DNN. The x axes indicate the scheduling
time of day, and the y axes indicate the power demand.
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Figure 4.16: Schematic illustration of the connection between prosumption patterns
and scheduling results. The left four images show the electricity image and corre-
sponding decomposition of three colour channels, i.e. `R' for elasticity of generation,
`G' for elasticity of consumption, and `B' for elasticity of carbon emissions. The elas-
ticity of every two scheduling time is assigned to a pixel indicated by x axes and y
axes; The right six figures show the comparison between original prosumption and
scheduled prosumption.
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results from the same scenario are sampled as shown in Fig. 4.16. The elasticity
image is at the left-top and corresponding decomposition of three colour channels
are follows, i.e. `R' for elasticity of generation, `G' for elasticity of consumption, and
`B' for elasticity of carbon emissions. The brighter region in these images means
the prosumption or carbon emissions between scheduling intervals indicated by its
x-axis and y-axis are easier to be scheduled due to a higher price elasticity, whereas
the darker region means the prosumption or carbon emissions between scheduling
intervals indicated by its x-axis and y-axis are harder to be scheduled due to a
lower price elasticity. The right figures are information of electricity price, costs of
using electricity, power generation, charging/discharging from storage, power con-
sumption, and carbon emissions from prosumption behaviours. The positive value
of the second figure means the costs of using electricity, and the negative value of
the second figure means the revenue of exporting electricity to the main grid. The
positive and negative values of the fourth figure mean the charging and discharging
from the storage, respectively.
For the electricity generation, when the electricity price at one scheduling time
is higher than that at another scheduling time, a prosumer would reduce the power
import from the main grid, and increase the self-generation, or discharging from
the storage, so that this prosumer can supplement to its demand and export extra
power to the main grid for earning revenue. It can be seen from the second row of
the Fig. 4.16, when the electricity price increases, the scheduled generation increases
correspondingly with remaining the storage discharging unchanged. For the period
from the eighteenth scheduling time to the twenty-forth scheduling time, the price
elasticity of generation is relatively low (as indicated by the yellow box on the image
of elasticity of generation). Hence, the scheduled generation keeps almost the same
as the original generation.
For the electricity consumption, when the electricity price at one scheduling time
is higher than that at another scheduling time, the consumption is shifted away or
curtailed. By contrast, when the electricity price at one scheduling time is lower
than that at another scheduling time, the consumption is shifted to this scheduling
time with lower price. It can be seen from the third row of the Fig. 4.16, for
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the period from the first scheduling time to the twelfth scheduling time, the price
elasticity of consumption is relatively high (as indicated by the yellow box on the
image of elasticity of consumption) and the electricity price is relatively low. Hence,
the scheduling drives the demand to be shifted from the rest of scheduling time to
this period.
For the carbon emissions caused by the prosumption behaviours, a higher price
elasticity of carbon emissions indicates the prosumer is more flexible to increase or
decrease carbon emissions, as indicated by the yellow box on the image of elasticity
of carbon emissions. Additionally, since the overall price elasticity of carbon emis-
sions is lower than that of generation and consumption during the entire scheduling
horizon (indicated by the elasticity image which is dominated by the red colour and
green colour), the prosumer inherently prefers to save the costs of using electricity,
disregarding the increase of carbon emissions.
Accuracy of Scenarios Selection
To test the accuracy of scenarios selection, the data of the first 300 days is taken
as the historical data. From day 301 to day 364, the proposed real-time scenar-
ios selection is used to update the scenarios set and occurrence probabilities. The
data on day 365 is used as a benchmark to examine the accuracy of the selected
scenarios in terms of predicting uncertainties caused by the DRESs and flexible
demand. Our proposed real-time scenarios selection approach is compared with
the approach of synchronous-back-to-generation-reduction [205]. Both approaches
firstly generate 5000 scenarios, and then select the high probable scenarios as a
prediction for the current day. The load 34, wind generator 8, and solar genera-
tor 2 in the modified IEEE 69-bus distribution network are sampled as presented
in Fig. 4.17 to demonstrate the accuracy of scenarios selection. Compared to the
synchronous-back-to-generation-reduction, the proposed real-time scenarios selec-
tion can more accurately capture the current features of uncertainties, and thus
yield precise predictions. This is because the proposed real-time scenarios selection
can take advantage of the information from all dynamically generated scenarios by
keeping updating the scenarios set and occurrence probabilities with the prosumer's
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real-time data. By contrast, the synchronous-back-to-generation-reduction directly
deletes the scenarios with low occurrence probabilities, which causes the selected
scenarios to be dominated by certain scenarios.
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Figure 4.17: Accuracy of Scenarios Selection Approaches. The load 34, wind gen-
erator 8, and solar generator 2 in the modified IEEE 69-bus distribution network
are sampled. The data on day 365 is used as a benchmark. The x axes indicate the
scheduling time of day, and the y axes indicate the power.
Scalability Evaluation
To test the scalability of our proposed energy scheduling tool, the artificial immune
algorithm for solving the preferences optimisation problem is used to compare the
computational time per scenario of daily energy scheduling under the aforemen-
October 8, 2020
4.6. Chapter Summary 117
tioned IEEE test distribution systems. As shown in Table 4.4, with the increase
of the system scale including the numbers of prosumers, generators and loads, the
computational time of the artificial immune algorithm dramatically increases. On
the contrary, once the proposed neural networks are trained, it only requires mi-
croseconds to predict the optimal scheduling decisions, irrespective the increase of
system scale. This is because the neural networks can generalise high-complexity
problems to extract feature representations.
Table 4.4: Scalability and computational time evaluation under various IEEE test
distribution systems
IEEE Test Systems Prosumers
Computational Time (s)
Neural Networks
Artificial Immune Algorithm
Training Testing
18-bus
13 generators
3 66.58 0.0013 2954.37
18 loads
33-bus
19 generators
3 66.73 0.0021 6533.78
33 loads
69-bus
28 generators
5 67.42 0.0019 17311.61
69 loads
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter proposes a data-driven prosumer-centric energy scheduling by using
learning approaches to improve computational efficiency and scalability of the en-
ergy scheduling tool. By generating scenarios to analyse variations of uncertainties
and using the CNNs to extract prosumption patterns, optimal scheduling decisions
can be automatically made by trained neural networks with the strategy of mini-
mizing costs and carbon emissions. Case studies based on various IEEE test dis-
tribution systems demonstrate that the designed neural networks outperform other
learning approaches in terms of the testing accuracy with any scenarios number.
The information of prosumption patterns from elasticity images is a crucial factor
for improving the learning accuracy. The connection between the intrinsic features
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of dynamic price elasticities and a prosumer's energy scheduling has been testified,
and shows that a higher price elasticity indicates a more flexible prosumption or
carbon emissions to be scheduled. The proposed real-time scenarios selection ap-
proach can accurately capture the current features of uncertainties by using the
information from a prosumer's real-time data and generated scenarios. The pro-
posed learning approach is more scalable and computationally efficient compared to
solving optimisation by the intelligent heuristic algorithm.
This chapter remains two directions to be explored in the next chapter: First,
under practical contexts of the small-scale prosumers, e.g. a household, the cost
saving of energy scheduling would be offset by a higher installed cost of energy stor-
age devices. The peer-to-peer energy trading is an alternative solution to balance
the surplus/scarcity of energy among prosumers; Second, the centralised wholesale
energy pricing is determined by the supply-demand balance between generators and
retailers, and the centralised retail energy pricing, e.g. flat pricing, time-of-use pric-
ing, and real-time pricing, is determined by the supply-demand balance between
retailers and consumers. The centralised carbon pricing is determined by the emis-
sions trading scheme. These prices dynamically fluctuate with the supply-demand
balance of overall markets and are uniform for all customers. Because these prices
are independent of the behaviours of individual prosumers, not every prosumer can
be efficiently incentivised to reduce carbon emissions and facilitate energy balance.
Decentralising these pricing schemes in both energy and carbon markets is a solution,
by which the bidding/selling prices of individual prosumers can directly incentivise
their behaviours. In the next chapter, a novel blockchain based peer-to-peer trad-
ing framework will be introduced enabling prosumers to trade energy and carbon
allowance.
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A Blockchain Based Peer-to-Peer
Trading Framework Integrating
Energy and Carbon Markets
5.1 Introduction
The emerging role of prosumers provides opportunities for local trading of energy
and carbon allowance, to achieve regional supply-demand balance of energy and re-
duce carbon emissions caused by long-distance power transmissions. The blockchain
technology [206] (one of the distributed ledger technologies) has the potential of es-
tablishing a decentralised trading platform with automated trading procedures and
protected residential privacy. The smart contract [143], as one of the key blockchain
technologies, enables prosumers to proceed the trading in a manner of self-enforcing
settlement and setting out negotiation. For the detailed advantages, challenges, and
opportunities of applying the blockchain and smart contract into peer-to-peer trad-
ing of energy and carbon allowance, readers can refer to the Section 2.5. This chapter
proposes a novel blockchain based peer-to-peer trading framework. This framework
enables prosumers to jointly exchange energy and carbon allowance, since purchasing
carbon allowance is a part of generating costs. The biding/selling prices of individ-
ual prosumers in energy and carbon markets are able to directly incentivise the
reshaping of prosumption behaviours for energy balance and carbon saving, which
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decentralises the pricing schemes as remained in Chapter 4. Additionally, when pro-
sumers exchange energy as both generators and consumers, they need to know how
much carbon allowance would be required. The carbon emissions tracing approach
in Chapter 3 is developed to identify the carbon emissions caused by a prosumer' s
generation for self-consumption, consumption from self-generation, and generation
(or consumption) for (or from) energy exchange with other prosumers. A low carbon
incentive mechanism is subsequently designed for individual prosumers. Case studies
based on the modified IEEE 37-bus distribution network testify the proposed trading
framework, in comparison with the centralised trading scheme and aggregator-based
trading scheme. The execution of smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain, and
the interface between scheduling algorithms and smart contract are demonstrated.
A conceptual graph of the proposed peer-to-peer trading framework is presented
in Fig. 5.1. Overall, this chapter offers the following key contributions:
 A new trading framework is designed enabling the exchange of energy and
carbon allowance at both prosumer level and microgrid level, using a smart
contract based trading platform. The proposed energy scheduling algorithms
interact with the self-enforcing nature of smart contract to automate the stan-
dardised auction procedure.
 A carbon emissions tracing approach targeting on individual prosumers' be-
haviours is developed to ensure a fair allocation of low carbon incentives.
 Case studies show that the proposed trading framework achieves better energy
balance and carbon saving than those approaches of centralised trading and
aggregator-based trading. The interface between scheduling algorithms and
smart contract, and the execution of smart contract are demonstrated.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 introduces the pro-
posed three-layer trading framework. Corresponding to each layer, the details of
problem formulation and the smart contract based auction mechanism are described
in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provides case studies to verify the proposed framework
and demonstrate the trading platform. Section 5.5 draws the conclusion of this
chapter.
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5.2 Trading Framework
This section describes the overall trading framework under which both energy and
carbon allowance are exchanged within distribution networks. According to the
commercial relations of market participants, i.e. prosumer and microgrid-trader
(MT), as described in [207], the trading procedure is hierarchically categorised into
three layers: prosumer-centric trading, MT-centric trading, and peer-to-peer trading
platform. Fig. 5.2 shows the architecture and information flows of these three
layers. The proposed framework is implemented in the day-ahead market to schedule
energy prosumption and perform trading for the following day. The prosumers in the
context of our research refer to a master of energy prosumption [42] which seeks for
personal benefits, e.g. bill saving or cost saving, and environmental goal, e.g. carbon
emissions reduction, by participating in both energy and carbon markets using their
DRESs. Ethereum blockchain network [208] is used consisting of full nodes and
light nodes. The market operator acts as full nodes to provide and manage the
trading platform by offering computing power for blocks mining, storing all blocks,
and earning rewards for mined blocks. Prosumers and MTs act as light nodes to
store header chain and verify transactions. As the light nodes, prosumers and MTs
do not need powerful computers. Hence, the trading process can be supported by
smart meters or mobile phones. The specific design of each layer is described as
follows and the problem formulation will be detailed in Section 5.3.
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5.2.1 Prosumer-Centric Trading
The layer of prosumer-centric trading aims at using the collected metering data
to help individual prosumers make optimal decisions of reshaping prosumption be-
haviours and bidding prices. The optimal decisions are yielded by solving opti-
misation problems with the objective of minimising electricity bills for buyers or
maximising profits for sellers. The optimal decisions of reshaped prosumption are
implemented by controllers, and the optimal decisions of bidding prices are sent to
smart contract for auctions. Through evaluating the carbon emissions behaviours,
blockchain automatically updates monetary incentives for individual prosumers. For
regional energy balance and reducing transmission losses, prosumer-centric trading
only applies for an ensemble of prosumers geographically in the same microgrid
by assigning a microgrid index. The advantages of prosumer-centric trading are:
1) The reshaping of prosumption behaviours is directly incentivised by prosumers'
bidding or selling prices, instead of central authority, such as aggregator or energy
retailer [54]; 2) The monetary incentives for carbon reduction are directly linked
with individual prosumers considering their carbon emissions behaviours.
5.2.2 Microgrid-Trader-Centric Trading
A group of physically connected prosumers is managed by a virtual entity, MT [209].
On the layer of MT-centric trading, MT aggregates the residual supply and demand
of energy and carbon allowance for its ensemble of prosumers to trade with other
MTs. The optimal decisions of bidding prices are also yielded by solving optimisation
problems with the same objectives as those of prosumer-centric trading. The aim
of MT-centric trading is to help an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid
balance supply and demand by exchanging with other microgrids.
5.2.3 Peer-to-Peer Trading Platform
The layer of peer-to-peer trading platform aims to provide a standardised negotiation
and self-enforcing settlement for enabling buyers and sellers to proceed the trading
of energy and carbon allowance. These functions are achieved by smart contract in
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the form of `if an event happens, pay an amount of currency to the receiver on the
self-enforcing basis [143]' . In our research, the event is the delivery of energy or
carbon allowance which can be ensured by querying the smart meter.
The execution of smart contract includes initialisation, matching bids and offers,
bidding, winner selection, and ownership exchange. The seller initialises the smart
contract by specifying offer conditions. Buyers who meet the conditions will be
optimally matched to deposit their bids on the smart contract for auction. Until the
auction ended, the buyer with the highest bidding price wins the auction. The rest
of buyers can withdraw their deposits from the smart contract. The smart contract
directly queries the smart meter to ensure that agreed energy or carbon allowance
is supplied by the seller at the agreed time, before transferring the highest buyer's
deposited bid to the seller.
All the transactions are stored, shared and audited by full nodes to validate
authenticity and accuracy. The validated transactions are structured in publicly
available blocks. The blocks are chronologically chained to each other through in-
volving the hash of previous block into the current block, forming a blockchain. The
validation is collectively achieved by all nodes through reaching a consensus of the
proof-of-work [210] which uses secure hash algorithm SHA-256 to protect all blocks.
The inputs of SHA-256 are block number, nonce, timestamp, and hash output of
previous block, and the output of SHA-256 is a fixed-length digest as a unique iden-
tity of a block. This unique identity is guaranteed by specially mined nonce and
collectively verification of all nodes, which means that if a malicious node changes
one block, a different nonce will result in an unverified block, and if a malicious
node changes all blocks, it will be extremely computationally difficult. Therefore,
the chaining feature of blockchain and difficulty of solving the proof-of-work enable
transactions to be traceable, verifiable and tempering resistance.
5.3 Problem Formulation
This section describes the problem formulation of hierarchical three-layer trading
framework.
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5.3.1 Prosumer-Centric Low Carbon Incentive Mechanism
Recall that in Chapter 3, for the conventional power systems, the large scale gener-
ators report their annual fuel usage and electricity supply to evaluate the efficiency
of electricity supply. With the information of the efficiency of electricity supply
and carbon intensities of fuels, the carbon emissions intensities of generators can
be traced. The proposed carbon emissions tracing approach in Section 3.2.2 is
subsequently implemented to evaluate the carbon emissions from generation, trans-
mission, transmission loss, and consumption. By contrast, with the integration of
the DRESs in the distribution systems, prosumers play a role as both generators
and consumers. This carbon emissions tracing approach needs to be extended to
distinguish the following portions of carbon emissions.
 Carbon emissions caused by using a prosumer's own generation for meeting
its own demand.
 Carbon emissions caused by using a prosumer's own generation for supplying
other prosumers' demand.
 Carbon emissions caused by a prosumer's demand being supplied by other
prosumers' generation.
The developed carbon emissions tracing approach aims to evaluate the CEF in
microgrids considering these bidirectional power flows caused by energy trading.
Recall that I and K denote the index sets of generators and loads of a prosumer,
respectively, and ri,t and rk,t denote the carbon emissions rates caused by power
generation of generator i ∈ I and power consumption of load k ∈ K at scheduling
time t, respectively. A schematic illustration of the aforementioned three portions
of carbon emissions is presented in Fig. 5.3. Prosumer A generates surplus energy
after meeting its own demand, and supplies the surplus energy to prosumer B who
is unable to generate enough energy to meet its own demand. The portion of car-
bon emissions caused by using prosumer A and prosumer B' s own generation for
meeting their own demand can be quantified by
∑
k∈K r
A
k,t and
∑
k∈K r
B
k,t, respec-
tively. In addition, the portion of carbon emissions caused by using a prosumer's
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own generation for supplying other prosumers' demand can be described as
rnet,t =
∑
i∈I
ri,t −
∑
k∈K
rk,t, (5.3.1)
where rnet,t is the carbon emissions rate caused by using a prosumer's own generation
for supplying other prosumers' demand at scheduling time t. Hence, as indicated
in Fig. 5.3, the portion of carbon emissions caused by using prosumer A' s own
generation for supplying prosumer B' s demand can be quantified by rAnet,t which is
the same amount for the carbon emissions rate caused by prosumer B' s demand
being supplied by prosumer A' s generation.
Figure 5.3: Schematic illustration of carbon emissions tracing for prosumers. Pro-
sumer A supplies surplus energy to prosumer B. Prosumer A needs to have the
carbon allowance (rAallow,t) when supplying energy to prosumer B.
Once these portions of carbon emissions are traced, the decentralised low car-
bon incentive mechanism in Section 3.2.3 is extended correspondingly targeting on
individual prosumers. According to the principle of carbon accounting [79], when
a prosumer supplies energy to other prosumers, this prosumer needs to have the
carbon allowance as a permission of pollutant emitting. Let rallow,t denote the car-
bon allowance of a prosumer at scheduling time t, and γ (·) denote the function
of the monetary compensation for carbon reduction of a prosumer. The following
assumptions need to be considered to formulate the prosumer-centric low carbon
incentive.
 Assumption 1 : If rnet,t > rallow,t, a prosumer has to buy the carbon allowance
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from other prosumers; If rnet,t < rallow,t, a prosumer can not only sell the extra
carbon allowance to other prosumers, but also receive monetary compensation
generated by the consensus of peer-to-peer trading networks.
 Assumption 2 : The monetary compensation should be non-negative. When
the net carbon emissions rate reduces to zero, the monetary compensation of
a prosumer should be maximum, i.e. γ = γmax, if rnet,t = 0, where γmax is the
maximum monetary compensation for carbon reduction of a prosumer.
 Assumption 3 : When the carbon allowance is assigned, the monetary compen-
sation should be monotonically decreasing to the net carbon emissions rate as
∂γ (rnet,t, rallow,t)
∂rnet,t
< 0. (5.3.2)
 Assumption 4 : LetN denote the index set of prosumers in the same microgrid.
The initial carbon allowance of each prosumer is assigned by the blockchain
system based on the carbon emissions intensities of prosumers and carbon
reduction target of an ensemble of prosumers as
rallow,t =
ρn∑
n∈N ρn
· e¯, (5.3.3)
where ρn is the carbon emissions intensity of prosumer n, and e¯ is the targeted
total carbon emissions of an ensemble of prosumers.
The prosumers with high-level of carbon emissions will receive more monetary
compensation than the prosumers with low-level of carbon emissions, because
those prosumers with high-level of carbon emissions are more urgent for carbon
mitigation. This means that the marginal monetary compensation should be
monotonically increasing to the assigned carbon allowance as
∂2γ (rnet,t, rallow,t)
∂r2allow,t
> 0. (5.3.4)
Hence, the following function which satisfies all the assumptions is modelled as the
prosumer-centric monetary compensation for carbon reduction
γ (rnet,t, rallow,t) :=
αt ·
√
(rallow,t ·∆t)2 − (rnet,t ·∆t)2, rallow,t > rnet,t,
0, rallow,t ≤ rnet,t,
(5.3.5)
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where αt is the monetary compensation rate at scheduling time t, and ∆t is the
scheduling interval.
5.3.2 Prosumer-Centric Algorithm
The prosumer-centric trading enables prosumers in the same microgrid to exchange
energy or carbon allowance with neighbouring prosumers for the purpose of regional
balance. The power losses consist of transmission losses and distribution losses.
The transmission losses refer to the losses from generators to distribution networks.
The distribution losses refer to the losses within the distribution networks, e.g.
power losses within a community. From the whole power systems perspective as
the focus in Chapter 3, the transmission losses account for about 2 % - 6 % of
total power generation [211]. From the distribution systems perspective as the
focus of this chapter, the distribution losses are lower than the transmission losses.
This is because the generators and loads are nearby, and the amount of distributed
generation from prosumers is smaller relative to the amount of large-scale generation
in power systems. Therefore, the distribution losses in this chapter are neglected.
Recall that pi,t and pk,t denote the power generation of generator i ∈ I at scheduling
time t, and power consumption of load k ∈ K at scheduling time t, respectively. The
prosumer-centric algorithm is discussed as follows when a prosumer is an energy
buyer or energy seller, respectively.
Prosumer as Energy Buyer
When a prosumer is unable to generate enough energy to meet its own demand, i.e.∑
i∈I pi,t <
∑
k∈K pk,t, this prosumer needs to buy energy from other prosumers as
an energy buyer. The objective function of a prosumer as an energy buyer can be
modelled as
fb (pi,t, pk,t, benergy,t) :=
∑
t∈Tbuyer
(∑
k∈K
pk,t −
∑
i∈I
pi,t
)
·∆t · benergy,t, (5.3.6)
where fb (·) is the objective function of electricity bills of a prosumer, benergy,t is the
bidding price of a prosumer at scheduling time t for buying energy, and Tbuyer is the
index set of scheduling time when a prosumer is an energy buyer.
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When a prosumer participates in the peer-to-peer trading network as an energy
buyer, the smart contract requires this prosumer to have enough account balance
for purchasing the bided energy as
∑
t∈Tbuyer
(∑
k∈K
pk,t −
∑
i∈I
pi,t
)
·∆t · benergy,t ≤ bbalance, (5.3.7)
where bbalance is the account balance of a buyer.
Additionally, to proceed the auction, the smart contract requires that a buyer's
bidding price is higher than the currently highest bidding prices submitted by other
energy buyers for the same offer as
bhighestenergy,t < benergy,t, (5.3.8)
where bhighestenergy,t is the currently highest bidding price for the energy selling at schedul-
ing time t over all energy buyers updated by the blockchain network. Let Benergy,t
denote the set of bidding prices submitted by all energy buyers for the offer of selling
energy at scheduling time t. We have
bhighestenergy,t = max : Benergy,t. (5.3.9)
Therefore, the objective of a prosumer as an energy buyer is to minimise its
electricity bills by strategically deciding the bidding prices of energy and reshaping
prosumption behaviours as
min
pi,t,pk,t,benergy,t
: fb (pi,t, pk,t, benergy,t) , (5.3.10)
s.t.:(5.3.7), (5.3.8), and (5.3.9).
Prosumer as Energy Seller
When a prosumer generates surplus energy after meeting its own demand, i.e.∑
k∈K pk,t <
∑
i∈I pi,t, this prosumer can sell the surplus energy to other prosumers
as an energy seller. Recall that when a prosumer sells energy to other prosumers,
this prosumer needs to have the carbon allowance rallow,t which is assigned by the
blockchain system. If rnet,t > rallow,t, the prosumer has to buy the exceeded carbon
allowance as a part of generating costs; If rnet,t < rallow,t, the prosumer can sell the
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extra carbon allowance and be compensated as a part of revenue. Let ccarbon (·)
denote the function of carbon cost/revenue of an energy seller. The cost/revenue
of buying/selling carbon allowance can be described as follows when ccarbon is posi-
tive/negative.
ccarbon (rnet,t) :=
 (rnet,t − rallow,t) ·∆t · b
highest
carbon,t − γ (rnet,t, rallow,t) , rnet,t < rallow,t,
(rnet,t − rallow,t) ·∆t · bcarbon,t, rnet,t > rallow,t,
(5.3.11)
where bcarbon,t is the bidding price of a prosumer at scheduling time t for buying car-
bon allowance, and bhighestcarbon,t is the highest bidding price for the carbon allowance sell-
ing at scheduling time t over all carbon allowance buyers updated by the blockchain
network. Let Bcarbon,t denote the set of bidding prices submitted by all the carbon
allowance buyers for the offer of selling carbon allowance at scheduling time t. We
have
bhighestcarbon,t = max : Bcarbon,t. (5.3.12)
Apart from the carbon cost, recall in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 that other op-
erating costs include costs of operation, maintenance, fuel, and carbon capture and
storage [169] (costs of pre-development, construction, decommissioning, and waste
are not considered in our dynamic scheduling problem). The coefficients of operat-
ing costs for each of energy sources are evaluated by the LCoE [170]. The function
of operating costs of a prosumer can be modelled as
c (pi,t) :=
∑
i∈I
pi,t ·∆t · δi, (5.3.13)
where c (·) is the function of operating costs of a prosumer excluding the carbon
cost, and δi is the coefficient of the total operating costs of generator i.
The objective function of a prosumer as an energy seller can be modelled as
fp (pi,t, pk,t, bcarbon,t) :=
∑
t∈Tseller
[(∑
i∈I
pi,t−
∑
k∈K
pk,t
)
·∆t·bhighestenergy,t− ccarbon(rnet,t)− c(pi,t)
]
,
(5.3.14)
where fp (·) is the objective function of profits of a prosumer, and Tseller is the index
set of scheduling time when a prosumer is an energy seller.
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Analogous to the energy trading, when a prosumer participates in the peer-to-
peer trading network as a carbon allowance buyer, the smart contract requires this
prosumer has enough account balance for purchasing the bided carbon allowance as∑
t∈Tseller
ccarbon (rnet,t) ≤ bbalance, (5.3.15)
Additionally, to proceed the auction, the smart contract requires that a buyer's
bidding price is higher than the currently highest bidding prices submitted by other
carbon allowance buyers for the same offer as
bhighestcarbon,t < bcarbon,t, (5.3.16)
Therefore, the objective of a prosumer as an energy seller is to maximise its
profits by strategically deciding the bidding prices of carbon allowance and reshaping
prosumption behaviours as
max
pi,t,pk,t,bcarbon,t
: fp (pi,t, pk,t, bcarbon,t) , (5.3.17)
s.t.:(5.3.12), (5.3.15), and (5.3.16)
The decision variable bcarbon,t, (5.3.15), and (5.3.16) only hold when a prosumer
buys the carbon allowance.
5.3.3 Microgrid-Trader-Centric Algorithm
After the completion of the prosumer-centric trading, there might be residual supply
or demand which cannot be met inside the microgrid due to the surplus or scarcity
generation of all prosumers in the same microgrid. The MT-centric trading aims to
help an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid aggregate the residual supply
and demand. Through solving the prosumer-centric algorithm, the optimal power
generation of generator i and optimal power consumption of load k for a prosumer
at each scheduling time t are yielded, denoted as p∗i,t and p
∗
k,t, respectively. The
residual power of prosumer n ∈ N can be described as
pn,t =
∑
i∈I
p∗i,t −
∑
k∈K
p∗k,t (5.3.18)
where pn,t is the residual power of prosumer n ∈ N at scheduling time t.
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Microgrid-Trader as Energy Buyer
When an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid is unable to meet their own
demand, i.e.
∑
n∈N pn,t < 0, MT needs to help its prosumers buy energy from other
microgrids or import from the main grid. The objective function of a MT as an
energy buyer can be modelled as
fB (benergy,t) :=
∑
t∈Tbuyer
∑
n∈N
(−pn,t) ·∆t · benergy,t, (5.3.19)
where fB (·) is the objective function of electricity bills of a MT.
Analogous to the prosumer-centric trading, there are account balance constraint
and the highest bidding constraint when the MT is an energy buyer as (5.3.20) and
(5.3.21), respectively. ∑
t∈Tbuyer
∑
n∈N
(−pn,t) ·∆t · benergy,t ≤ bbalance, (5.3.20)
bhighestenergy,t < benergy,t. (5.3.21)
Therefore, the objective of a MT as an energy buyer is to minimise overall
electricity bills for its prosumers by strategically deciding the optimal bidding price
of energy as
min
benergy,t
: fB (benergy,t) , (5.3.22)
s.t.: (5.3.20), and (5.3.21).
Microgrid-Trader as Energy Seller
When an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid generates surplus energy
after meeting their own demand, i.e.
∑
n∈N pn,t > 0, MT can help its prosumers sell
energy to other microgrids. Meanwhile, MT can help its energy sellers trade residual
carbon allowance with other microgrids. If the net carbon emissions of an ensemble
of prosumers in the same microgrid exceed the carbon allowance of this microgrid,
MT has to help its prosumers buy carbon allowance from other microgrids. If the net
carbon emissions of an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid are less than the
carbon allowance of this microgrid, MT can help its prosumers sell the extra carbon
allowance and earn the monetary compensation for its prosumers. This relationship
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has a similar format as (5.3.11). Hence, the objective function of a MT as an energy
seller can be modelled as
fP (bcarbon,t) :=
∑
t∈Tseller
∑
n∈N
[
pn,t ·∆t · bhighestenergy,t − (ccarbon,n + cn)
]
, (5.3.23)
where fP (·) is the objective function of profits of a MT, ccarbon,n is the carbon
cost/revenue of prosumer n, and cn is the operating costs excluding the carbon cost
of prosumer n.
There are account balance constraint and the highest bidding constraint when
the MT is a carbon allowance buyer as (5.3.24) and (5.3.25), respectively.∑
t∈Tseller
∑
n∈N
ccarbon,n ≤ bbalance, (5.3.24)
bhighestcarbon,t < bcarbon,t. (5.3.25)
Therefore, the objective of a MT as an energy seller is to maximise the overall
profits for its prosumers by strategically deciding optimal bidding prices of carbon
allowance as
max
bcarbon,t
: fP (bcarbon,t) , (5.3.26)
s.t.: (5.3.24), and (5.3.25).
The decision variable bcarbon,t, (5.3.24), and (5.3.25) only hold when a MT buys
the carbon allowance.
Remark : The optimisation problems of both the prosumer-centric algorithm and
the MT-centric algorithm are solved by the artificial immune algorithms as proposed
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. To improve the scalability and computational efficiency,
the learning approach as proposed in Chapter 4 is further implemented to make
predicted optimal scheduling decisions.
5.3.4 Smart Contract Based Auction Mechanism
In the layer of peer-to-peer trading platform, the proposed smart contract based
auction mechanism is applicable for both prosumers and MTs to trade either energy
or carbon allowance, under the standardised negotiation and self-enforcing of smart
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contract. The auction consists of the following steps: initialisation, matching, bid-
ding, withdrawal, and pay-to-seller. Each step is performed by a function of smart
contract, denoted as finit (·), fmatch (·), fbid (·), fwithdraw (·), and fpay (·), respectively.
Let U denote the index set of sellers, and V denote the index set of buyers. The
trading algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 5, is written in the Solidity language
and stored in the Ethereum blockchain [212]. Detailed steps of executing the auction
are described as:
Step 1 : Each seller calls the initialisation function finit (·) from smart contract
to specify the seller address, trading type (energy or carbon allowance), seller type
(prosumer or MT), microgrid number, selling amount, minimal accepted bidding
price, the currently highest bid, and the time of auction ended as
Ou = finit
(
idu, ε, β,mu, su, bminu,t , b
highest
u,t , τu
)
, (5.3.27)
where Ou is the offer initialised by seller u ∈ U , idu is the encrypted address of seller
u, ε ∈ {0, 1} is a binary value indicating if the trading type is energy (ε = 0) or
carbon allowance (ε = 1), β ∈ {0, 1} is a binary value indicating if the seller type
is prosumer (β = 0) or MT (β = 1), mu is the microgrid index of seller u which
enables buyers to find sellers in the same microgrid, su is the amount of energy or
carbon allowance to be supplied by seller u, bminu,t is the minimal accepted bidding
price specified by seller u for the energy or carbon allowance to be provided at
scheduling time t, bhighestu,t is the currently highest bidding price (b
highest
u,t = b
min
u,t at
the initialisation) for the energy or carbon allowance to be provided by the seller
u at scheduling time t, and τu is the time of auction ended specified by seller u.
The blockchain network stores and updates the offers of all the sellers. This step
corresponds to the line 1-3 in Algorithm 5.
Step 2 : In the proposed auction mechanism, each buyer needs to bid with a
higher price than the currently highest bidding price over all the buyers. Hence, the
matching function fmatch (·) aims to help buyers automatically match the optimal
offers combination to submit their bids, according to the following criterion.
 The demand of energy or carbon allowance for a buyer can be met by the
summation of selected offers.
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Algorithm 5 Smart Contract Based Auction Procedure
1: function: initialisation finit (·)
2: input: idu, ε, β,mu, su, bminu,t , b
highest
u,t , τu
3: output: Ou
4: function: matching fmatch (·)
5: for v ∈ V do
6: find optimal offers combination U∗v by (5.3.28) and (5.3.29)
7: end for
8: function: bidding fbid (·)
9: input: τnow, b∗v,mv, bbalance,v
10: while τnow ≤ τu, mv = mu, bhighestu,t · su < b∗v · su ≤ bbalance,v do
11: submit bids and update the highest bidding price by (5.3.31)
12: end while
13: output: bhighest
′
u,t
14: function: withdrawal fwithdraw (·)
15: input: τnow, b∗v, bbalance,v
16: while τnow > τ , v ∈ V , v 6= v∗ do
17: unsuccessful buyers withdraw their bids by (5.3.33)
18: end while
19: output: b′balance,v
20: function: pay-to-seller fpay (·)
21: input: τnow, b∗v, bbalance,u
22: while τnow > τ , v = v∗ do
23: pay the deposited highest bid to seller by (5.3.35)
24: end while
25: output: b′balance,u
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 The selected optimal offers have the minimal summation of the currently high-
est bidding prices, which allows buyers to bid with minimal bidding prices.
The optimal offers combination can be yielded as
U∗v = arg min
u
:
∑
u∈U
bhighestu,t · su, (5.3.28)
s.t.
∑
u∈U
su ≥ dv, (5.3.29)
where U∗v is the set of optimal offers combination that can meet buyer v' s demand
with minimal required bidding prices, and dv is the demand of energy or carbon
allowance of buyer v. This step corresponds to the line 4-7 in Algorithm 5.
Step 3 : The bidding function fbid (·) enables buyers to submit their bids after
checking the following conditions.
 The auction is not ended, i.e. τnow ≤ τu, where τnow is the current time.
 The microgrid index of buyer v, denoted as mv, matches mu, i.e. mv = mu.
 The buyer has enough balance to provide a higher bid than the currently
highest bidding price as
bhighestu,t · su < b∗v · su ≤ bbalance,v, (5.3.30)
where b∗v is the optimal bidding price of buyer v yielded by solving the optimi-
sation problems in prosumer-centric algorithm or MT-centric algorithm, and
bbalance,v is the account balance of buyer v.
After a buyer successfully submits a bid, the highest bidding price of seller u' s
offer is updated as
bhighest
′
u,t = fbid (τnow, b
∗
v,mv, bbalance,v) , (5.3.31)
where bhighest
′
u,t is the updated currently highest bidding price for the energy or carbon
allowance to be provided by the seller u at scheduling time t. Before the auction is
ended, all the bids are frozen by the smart contract, which means that the buyers
are unable to withdraw their bids back to their account. This step corresponds to
the line 8-13 in Algorithm 5.
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Step 4 : When the auction is ended, i.e. τnow > τ , the buyer with the highest
bidding price wins the auction as
v∗ = arg max
v
: Bt, (5.3.32)
where v∗ is the buyer with the highest bidding price, and Bt is the set of bid-
ding prices submitted by all buyers for the energy or carbon allowance provided at
scheduling time t.
The rest of unsuccessful buyers v ∈ V , v 6= v∗ withdraw their previously submit-
ted bids by calling the withdrawal function fwithdraw (·) as
b′balance,v = fwithdraw (τnow, b
∗
v, bbalance,v) , (5.3.33)
where
b′balance,v = bbalance,v + b
∗
v · su, (5.3.34)
is the updated account balance of buyer v after withdrawing the bid for seller u' s
offer. This step corresponds to the line 14-19 in Algorithm 5.
Step 5 : Once the smart contract confirms that the energy or carbon allowance
is delivered by querying the smart meter, the deposited final highest bid for offer u,
denoted as bhighest∗u,t is paid to the seller by the pay-to-seller function fpay (·) as
b′balance,u = fpay
(
τnow, b
highest∗
u,t , bbalance,u
)
, (5.3.35)
where
b′balance,u = bbalance,u + b
highest∗
u,t · su, (5.3.36)
is the updated account balance of seller u after receiving the payment. This step
corresponds to the line 20-25 in Algorithm 5.
5.4 Case Studies
In this section, case studies have been conducted to evaluate the proposed blockchain
based peer-to-peer trading framework.
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5.4.1 Simulation Setup and Data Availability
The proposed prosumer-centric algorithm and MT-centric algorithm are written in
the MATLAB language. The proposed smart contract is written in the Solidity 0.6.0
and executed on the Remix-IDE. Individual deposit accounts are created for each
prosumer and MT. An overview of testing environment for our proposed blockchain
based peer-to-peer trading framework is presented in Fig. 5.4. The simulations are
performed using a machine with IntelR CoreTM i9-9900K CPU at 3.60 GHz.
Figure 5.4: Overview of testing environment for blockchain based peer-to-peer trad-
ing framework. The smart contract is written in the Solidity language and executed
on the Remix-IDE. The prosumer-centric algorithm and MT-centric algorithm are
written in the MATLAB language. Individual deposit accounts are created for each
prosumer and MT.
The modified IEEE 37-bus distribution network is adopted by our research as
shown in Fig. 5.5. The network is partitioned into 5 interconnected microgrids.
Each bus represents a prosumer. 7 solar photovoltaics, 4 diesel generators, 4 wind
turbines, and 2 biomass generators are arbitrarily assigned to each microgrid, and
33 loads are assigned to each bus. The static default data of generation and con-
sumption from the IEEE 37-bus distribution network is replaced by dynamic data.
The demand data of residential loads is collected by using EFERGY monitor hub
and allocated to each prosumer as shown in Fig. 5.6. The data of solar generation
is obtained from the U.K. rooftop solar generation of endpoint consumers [76]. The
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Figure 5.5: Modified IEEE 37-bus distribution network. The network is partitioned
into 5 microgrids. Each bus represents a prosumer. 7 solar photovoltaics, 4 diesel
generators, 4 wind turbines, and 2 biomass generators are arbitrarily assigned to
each microgrid by connecting to prosumers' buses. 33 loads are assigned to each
bus.
real-time states of the GB generation in 2019 from the GridWatch are used [179].
The ratio of peak real-time demand to the peak static demand from the IEEE 37-
bus distribution network is used to scale down the generation of diesel, wind, and
biomass. The total power outputs of each generation source are equally allocated
to the corresponding generators. The generation allocation for prosumers and mi-
crogrids in the modified IEEE 37-bus distribution network is shown in Fig. 5.7.
The coefficients of operating costs and carbon emissions intensities are the same
as Table 4.1 in Chapter 4. The data of centralised prices of energy and carbon
allowance is obtained from the U.K. energy retail market [180] and the U.K. carbon
market [213], i.e. the E.U. emissions trading scheme plus the U.K. carbon price
support, respectively. These centralised prices are set as the minimal accepted
bidding price of each seller, such that during the auction process, the buyers can
provide a higher price than the centralised prices through solving their own objective
functions. As studied in [104], this design encourages more prosumers to sell their
surplus energy or carbon allowance, and reduces the import from central markets.
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Figure 5.6: Demand allocation for prosumers and microgrids in the modified IEEE
37-bus distribution network.
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Figure 5.7: Generation allocation for prosumers and microgrids in the modified
IEEE 37-bus distribution network.
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5.4.2 Balancing Performances of Energy and Carbon Allowance
To evaluate the balancing performances of energy and carbon allowance, the pro-
posed trading framework is compared with the following trading schemes:
 Scheme 1 (Centralised Trading): The trading of energy or carbon allowance
is only performed on the centralised markets. The prices of energy [180] and
carbon allowance [213] in central markets are applied in the centralised trading.
 Scheme 2 (Aggregator-Based Trading): As the trading scheme in [54, 56], the
reshaping of prosumption behaviours is managed by relatively decentralised
agents, i.e. aggregators, with the same objectives of minimising bills for buy-
ers or maximising profits for sellers. Aggregators then pay prosumers the
monetary compensation for the reshaping. The trading of energy or carbon
allowance is only performed by aggregators.
The net power of the modified IEEE 37-bus distribution network, i.e. the total
power generation minus the total power consumption, is presented in Fig. 5.8. The
positive net power indicates the total generation is greater than the total demand.
The negative net power indicates the total generation is less than the total demand,
and the distribution network has to import power from the main grid. Through
the proposed peer-to-peer trading framework, the summation of daily net energy is
0.99 kWh, which indicates a better energy balance, compared to -4.50 kWh in the
aggregator-based trading and -46.44 kWh in the centralised trading.
The surplus of carbon allowance of the modified IEEE 37-bus distribution net-
work, i.e. the total assigned carbon allowance minus the total carbon emissions, is
presented in Fig. 5.9. The positive surplus of carbon allowance indicates the total
carbon emissions produced by the distribution network are less than the total as-
signed carbon allowance, whereas the negative surplus of carbon allowance indicates
the total carbon emissions produced by the distribution network exceed the total
assigned carbon allowance. The proposed peer-to-peer trading framework can save
total daily carbon emissions from the carbon allowance by 1465.90 g, approximately
6 times higher than the aggregator-based trading (385.91 g) and 9 times higher
than the centralised trading (168.65 g). It is particularly for the period from the
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Figure 5.8: Net power of the modified IEEE 37-bus distribution network. The pos-
itive value of y-axis indicates the total generation is greater than the total demand.
The negative value of y-axis indicates the total generation is less than the total
demand. The x-axis indicates the scheduling time of day.
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Figure 5.9: Surplus of carbon allowance of the modified IEEE 37-bus distribution
network. The positive value of y-axis indicates the total carbon emissions are less
than the total assigned carbon allowance. The negative value of y-axis indicates the
total carbon emissions exceed the total assigned carbon allowance.
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thirty-sixth scheduling time to the forty-eighth scheduling time, during which more
carbon emissions are saved. Although the aggregator-based trading also achieves
the carbon saving during this period, it results in that the carbon emissions exceed
the carbon allowance during the period from the twenty-second scheduling time to
the thirty-fifth scheduling time.
5.4.3 Demonstration of Interface Between Scheduling Algo-
rithms and Smart Contract
The optimal energy scheduling and bidding prices for each of the individual pro-
sumers obtained by the prosumer-centric algorithm are shown in Fig. 5.10, relative
to the cases with no scheduling, i.e. original prosumption. For the microgrid at
scheduling intervals during which all prosumers of this microgrid cannot generate
surplus energy to trade, there is no energy seller and bidding price. By compar-
ing the scheduled prosumption and original prosumption, it can be observed that
during the peak demand periods for a majority of prosumers, i.e. from the twelfth
scheduling time to the thirty-sixth scheduling time, the generation is scheduled to
increase whereas the consumption is shifted to the off-peak demand periods, i.e. the
rest of scheduling time. When the prosumers experience high power consumption
and low power generation and thus become the energy buyers, by appropriately
scheduling, the bidding prices stabilise at around 10 pence/kWh without dramatic
increase. The slight fluctuation of bidding prices dynamically reflect the actual
supply-demand balance in energy markets.
The interface between scheduling decisions and smart contract is shown in Fig.
5.11. Through solving the prosumer-centric algorithm, the optimal bidding prices
of prosumers as buyers (indicated by the colourbar) are automatically sent to the
smart contract for auction. The highest bidding prices (indicated by the red line)
would be accepted by sellers. For the microgrid at scheduling intervals during which
all prosumers of this microgrid cannot generate surplus energy to trade, there is no
auction proceeded (indicated by the scheduling intervals without the red line). It
can be seen from Fig. 5.11 that the auctions are proceeded over all the scheduling
intervals of day at microgrid 4, whereas the auctions are only proceeded at a few
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Figure 5.10: Optimal energy scheduling and bidding prices obtained by prosumer-
centric algorithm. The left y axes indicate the power of original prosumption and
scheduled prosumption of individual prosumers, and the right y axes indicate the
optimal bidding prices. The x axes indicate the scheduling time of day.
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scheduling intervals at microgrid 2. This is because the generation capacity of
microgrid 2 cannot meet its demand. The MT 2 has to help its prosumers buy
energy from other MTs. Additionally, through the proposed peer-to-peer trading
framework, the selling prices are stabilised between 6 pence/kWh and 10 pence/kWh
over all the scheduling intervals, which is different from the aggregator-based trading
[54,56] with dramatic peak prices and off-peak prices. The auction prices decided by
individual prosumers can accurately target on the actual supply-demand relationship
of prosumers.
Figure 5.11: Optimal bidding prices of energy buyers as inputs of smart contract.
The y axes indicate the bus number of prosumers, assigned to corresponding mi-
crogrids. The x axes indicate the scheduling time of day. The colourbar indicates
the optimal bidding prices from each prosumer for a given 0.5 h scheduling interval.
The red line indicates the highest bidding prices accepted by energy sellers. The
scheduling interval without the red line means there is no surplus energy on the
microgrid to trade.
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5.4.4 Demonstration of Smart Contract Execution
Figure 5.12: Execution of smart contract based auction on the peer-to-peer trading
platform. The black line is the execution of the energy trading, and the dashed blue
line is the execution of the carbon allowance trading.
The proposed auction mechanism is performed in the form of smart contract on
the Ethereum blockchain. Fig. 5.12 demonstrates the procedure of executing the
auctions of energy and carbon allowance on the microgrid 5. Prosumers at bus 706
and bus 724 are energy sellers to supply 319 Wh and 109 Wh energy, respectively.
Prosumers at bus 706, bus 724, and bus 725 are carbon allowance sellers to supply 7
g, 113 g, and 123 g carbon allowances, respectively. The sellers call the initialisation
function from the full node to specify offer conditions. Prosumer at bus 722 and
bus 725 are energy buyers with the demand of 419 Wh and 202 Wh, respectively.
Prosumer at bus 722 is a carbon allowance buyer with the demand of 117 g. The
bids and offers are matched by the proposed matching criteria.
For the auction of carbon allowance, there is a single buyer with multiple sellers.
To meet the 117 g demand of carbon allowance, the prosumer at bus 722 has the
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options as
 Buying 123 g carbon allowance from the prosumer at bus 725 with 4 pence/kg
of bidding price.
 Buying 113 g from the prosumer at bus 724 with 3 pence/kg of bidding price
and buying another 7 g from the prosumer at bus 706 with 3 pence/kg of
bidding price.
According to the matching criteria, the second option would be selected.
For the auction of energy, there are multiple buyers with multiple sellers. For
the offer of selling 109 Wh energy by prosumer at bus 724, prosumers at bus 725
and bus 722 attempt to bid as buyers. The prosumer at bus 725 wins this auction
with the 7 pence/kWh of the highest bidding price. The unsuccessful buyer at bus
722 then calls the withdrawal function from the full node to withdraw its bid. Once
confirming the energy or carbon allowance is supplied, the smart contract pays to
the sellers with the highest bids.
The residual 123 g carbon allowance from prosumer at bus 725, 93 Wh energy
demand from prosumer at bus 725, and 100 Wh energy demand from prosumer at
bus 722 are aggregated by the MT 5 to trade with other MTs.
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter proposes a blockchain-based peer-to-peer trading framework to achieve
the regional energy balance and reduction of carbon emissions on distribution net-
works. The framework enables the energy and carbon allowance to be exchanged
simultaneously. The carbon emissions tracing approach is developed targeting on
specific prosumption behaviours, so that the low carbon incentive can be allocated
to individual prosumers properly. The optimal bidding/selling prices of prosumers
and energy reshaping decisions are yielded by the proposed prosumer-centric algo-
rithm and MT-centric algorithm. The auction is proceeded under the standardised
and self-enforcing smart contract. Case studies based on the modified IEEE 37-
bus distribution network testify that the proposed trading framework can export
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0.99 kWh of daily energy to the main grid and save 1465.90 g daily carbon emis-
sions. The balancing performance of the proposed trading framework on energy and
carbon allowance outperforms the centralised trading scheme and aggregator-based
trading scheme. The proposed scheduling algorithms drive up the prosumers' self-
generation, shift away the peak demand, and stabilise the energy prices below 10
pence/kWh. The auction prices of individual prosumers can accurately target on the
actual supply-demand relationship of prosumers. The execution of smart contract
on the Ethereum blockchain, and the interface between scheduling algorithms and
smart contract are demonstrated.
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Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis has contributed to address how smart grid enables the realisation of
future low carbon power systems and facilitates the emerging role of prosumers to
be integrated into energy markets. In this concluding chapter, the primary findings
and results from this thesis are summarised. The potential extensions based on this
thesis will be indicated to help researchers further explore in the future work.
6.1 Conclusions
Firstly, from the regulatory perspective, Chapter 3 has developed a novel model
for energy scheduling and low carbon negotiation between the policy maker and
consumers/generators. The process of dynamic negotiation of policy measures and
determining optimal power profiles of generators and consumers is modelled as a
Stackelberg game-theoretic problem, which is solved by the developed FDIA-LMIA
based on the artificial immune systems. The policy maker in the leader level for-
mulates monetary compensation rates and carbon prices to incentivise consumers
and generators with high carbon emissions intensities, for the purpose of electricity
bill saving and generating profit improving. Case studies show that the proposed
scheduling model outperforms the models of multiobjective optimization and ag-
gregated scheduling in terms of achieving policy maker' s target for carbon emis-
sions reduction and improving the percentage of generation from renewable energy
sources. It is worth noting that by considering the effects of part-loaded generation
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on the carbon emissions intensities, this research finds that the slight decrease of
carbon emissions by ramping down the power outputs from coal and gas would be
offset by the increased carbon emissions intensities.
Secondly, from individual prosumer's perspective, a data-driven energy schedul-
ing tool is developed in Chapter 4 by using learning approaches to reduce compu-
tational complexity and improve scalability from solving the optimisation problem
by intelligent heuristic algorithm. The CNNs are exploited to extract hidden pro-
sumption patterns from elasticity images processed by the developed prosumption
patterns processing approach. Scenarios are dynamically generated and updated
to predict the possible variations of uncertainties caused by the intermittency of
DRESs and flexible demand. The trained neural networks can automatically pre-
dict the optimal scheduling decisions with the strategy of minimising costs and
carbon emissions. Case studies show that the designed neural networks provide
an accurate prediction of optimal scheduling decisions, compared to other learn-
ing approaches including the RNN, LSTM-RNN, and DNN. The proposed learning
approach improves scalability and computational efficiency from solving the optimi-
sation problem by intelligent heuristic algorithm. The uncertainties caused by the
DRESs and flexible demand can be accurately predicted by the proposed real-time
scenarios selection approach. It is worth noting that this research finds the con-
nection between the intrinsic features of dynamic price elasticities and scheduling
results, and demonstrates the importance of the elasticity information for improving
the learning accuracy.
Thirdly, from community's perspective, a blockchain-based peer-to-peer trading
framework is designed in Chapter 5 enabling prosumers to trade energy and carbon
allowance simultaneously. The trading platform is based on the self-enforcing and
setting out negotiation of smart contract. Under the proposed trading framework,
the bidding/selling prices of individual prosumers can directly incentivise the re-
shaping of prosumption behaviours for regional energy balance and carbon emissions
mitigation. The carbon emissions tracing approach is also developed targeting on
specific prosumption behaviours to ensure a fair allocation of low carbon incentives.
Case studies demonstrate that the proposed peer-to-peer trading framework outper-
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forms the aggregator-based trading and the centralised trading in terms of exporting
energy to the main grid and saving carbon emissions from carbon allowance. The
proposed trading framework and demonstrated benefits can encourage more passive
consumers to invest in the DRESs and participate in the local energy exchange.
6.2 Future Work
This section presents the potential extensions based on the results and findings of
this thesis. Some new ideas based on our work are also indicated to be explored in
the future research.
6.2.1 Reducing Information Burdens
The interoperability of smart grid enables bidirectional information exchange be-
tween the policy maker and generators/consumers to cooperatively achieve energy
systems scheduling. Nonetheless, the system states monitored by sensors or smart
meters and decisions made by generators/consumers amplify the volumes of infor-
mation flows. This presents a challenge for the information infrastructure of current
power systems. To overcome this issue, a potential future work is to design a stan-
dardised protocol, e.g. smart contract, for automatic information exchange and
self-enforcing execution of controlling decisions towards large-scale power systems.
This would reduce the costs of processing information flows and enhance security
of power systems. A potential direction to do this is to scale our designed smart
contract from the distribution system level to overall power system level.
6.2.2 Long-Term Planing of Carbon Revenue
In chapter 3, the objective function of policy maker for carbon revenue neutrality
specifies that the revenue from charging carbon allowance is completely redistributed
as a monetary compensation. As future work, this revenue can serve for multiple
purposes. For instance, in addition to using a portion of carbon revenue for mon-
etary compensation, the rest portions of carbon revenue can be used for long-term
investment of low carbon technologies. In doing this, the day-ahead scheduling
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proposed by our research needs to be incorporated with long-term planing to find
optimal strategies for redistributing the carbon revenue.
6.2.3 Diverse Behaviour Learning
This thesis has attempted to process price elasticities as an intrinsic feature of
prosumers, and connected this feature with the energy patterns. As future work,
more features of prosumers can be extracted and mapped to energy patterns. For
instance, consumers' dissatisfaction can be captured from social media data through
using machine learning with target-specific dictionary. With analogous approaches,
the spike demand can be also connected to extreme social events.
6.2.4 Multiple Auction Mechanisms
This thesis has designed a general form of standardised smart contract by which the
energy sellers initiate the smart contract and the buyers compete for bidding with a
higher price. Future work can integrate multiple forms of smart contract and allow
prosumers to choose the most appropriate form according to the supply demand
relationship. For instance, the energy buyers can initiate the smart contract with
specified demand. The sellers can subsequently compete for providing energy with
a lower price.
6.2.5 Incorporating Hardware of Energy Trading
The blockchain based peer-to-peer trading platform proposed in Chapter 5 is based
on the software including Ethereum blockchain network, Solidity for coding smart
contract, and Remix IDE for compilation of smart contract. As future work, the
hardware, e.g. PXI/NI, can be exploited for supporting peer-to-peer trading. The
interface between blockchain network and hardware as well as associated protocols
can be also developed.
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